The historical factors behind the origins of bicameralism in the United States by McCarthy, Matthew James
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1955
The historical factors behind the
origins of bicameralism in the
United States
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/13054
Boston University
BOSTQ'tl! ill'IIVERSITY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL 
Di ssertation 
TJ!E '-ii3'T'0RICAL FACTORS BEHDTD THE ORIGINS C'F EI CA ..::r-u ~LIS f 
IN '!'HS tiNI TE::J STATES 
bv 
" 
Niatthew James }/cCarthy 
( ' "P ~- . '. ' Holy C.,.os.s, 1938; A . ~' ., Boston Univers ity, 1?51) 
Subrr •t ter in part:i ~~ 1 ulfilrr•ent of the 
requirer::ents for the degree of 
D8ctcr of r i 1osophy 
1955 
First 
Ap roved 
by 
Second Reacler .~. ~· •• £.~ o • •••• o o o o ••••••••• o ••• ,~~Professor of History 
Int roduction 
I. Virginia 
II . Massachusetts 
III . Connecticut 
I V. Rhode Island 
V. Nev1 York 
VI . 1v:ar;rland 
VII . Pennsylvania 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
VIII. The Constitutional Period 
IX . Bicameralism and the Const itutional Convention 
X. Vermont 
Bibliography 
Abst ract 
Autobiography 
i 
l . 
7. 
25. 
41. 
60. 
70. 
80. 
105. 
119 . 
124. 
xii 
Introduction 
The history of institutions is one of the fascinating segments of 
the more general field of history. Institutions are the means by which 
men strive and hope to obtain their ends. Among the political institut-
ions that one might find of interest is the widespread use of two houses 
in our legislative systems, both on the ?tate and federal levels. 
The explan~tions for its existence vary in sophistication. We have 
the simple statement found in textbooks that bicaneralism started in Mass-
achusetts because of a dispute involving a . pig claimed by a Widow Sherman 
and thereafter Massachusetts and eventually the remainder oft he country 
adopted the system. There is a plethora of other explanations. Some of 
the American colonies had governor .• a councils along with a popular:. re-
pr esentative body; there was a tendency to imitate the British Parliament 
with its Lords and Commons; and finally the axiomatic belief that the more 
tempestuous lower house must be controled by the upper house. 
James Bryce believed that the origin of this "very interestingtt 
feature was to be sought in history rather than in theory.l The purpose 
of this dissertation is to seek . such an historica origin. The aim is 
not to stress the pros and cons of this problem, for that would be a ~ro-
ject for a student of government, but to trace the history of bicameral-
ism, emphasizing the important factors that were involved in its introduct-
ion. Withthis completed perhaps a more penetrating analysis of this quest-
ion could be made from the purely governmental point of view. 
There are other reasons why this study should be made. Important as 
this project may be, it never has been done. In 1895 Thomas F Moran pub-
~ 
1. James Bryce, The American Commonwealth (New York, 1891) p. 461 
lished his Master's thesis, presenting a brief step by step account of 
the adoption of bicameralism in the various American colonies, but he fail-
ed to look into the forces at work behind these simple facts. 1 Con-
sequently the significance ofthe entire movement was not presented at all. 
Another reason for launching on this topic comes from an axiom of histor-
ical research; i.e., each generation should rewrite its own history, for 
while the past does not change, the attitude oft he present to that past 
·-does change . Moran wrote his treatise in a day when the use of two chamb-
ers was accepted with almost universal approval. Within recent years, how-
ever, political scientists no longer accept this position. A substantial 
majority of them now believe that two chambers represent a tremendous 
amount of duplication in time and energy. Whether correct or not, the 
present consensus is that a one-house legislature is perfectly adequate 
and far more practicable.2 
Yet should new legislatures be constituted at this time, they would 
possess two houses without a moment's debate. In 1912, for example, the 
Organic Act of Alaska created a legislature calling for two houses, a 
Senate and House of Representatives. No one saw any absurdity in the fact 
that the Senate would have eight members a nd the · House sixteen. The need 
for two houses was a foreordained conclusion however microscopic the 
branches. · . 
The problem of unicameraL ism versus bicameral ism stems from one of 
most fundamental questions pertaining to government and more specifically 
to constitutionalism. Government in itself is the legal and &dministrative 
1~ Thomas F.Moran, The Rise and Development of the Bicameral System in 
America. (Baltimore, 1895) 
2. W.F. Willoughby, Principles of Legislative Organization and Administ-
ration. (Washington, D.C. 1934) pp. 222-234. 
,.. . . 
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arrangement by which a political society protects and safeguards its col-
lecti ve rights. Constitutional ism pertains to that arrangement by which 
the officials in a government are effectively restrained from abusing their 
pavfers. Among the various technigues of restraining government officials 
are such devices as the popular and frequent election of officers, the keep-
of public records, the use of written constitutions, and the separation of 
powers. 
The idea of separation of powers comes under the concept of mixed gov-
ernment. For purposes of clarity one must make a careful . distinction. The 
traditional concept of mixed government which comes down from the Classical 
Past consists of a three-fold balance between monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy. Variations of this idea were knovm by the earliest colonial 
Americans.1 
The second concept of ''mixed government" while almost equally ancient 
is somewhat different. This breaks down the functions of government into 
the legislative, executive, and judicial, thereby presenting another vers-
ion of a balance of powers. Polybius is the first to develop this approam, 
but the idea remains lost until its rediscovery by Montesquieu.2 Con-
sequently, the founders of this nation were not aware of this theory. 
"Separation .of powers" accordingly can consist of a balance of social 
elements in one instance and a balance of governmental powers in the se-
cond. The history of the development of American Government shows the sue-
cessful juggl~ng of these two ideas so that in the name of a balance of 
governmental powers, a balance oft he social elements could be obtained. 
1. John Winthrop's Journal, Original Narratives of Eirly American History, 
(New York, 1908) I, p.l34 
2. George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theo!J: (New Y0 rk, 1937) p. 155 
Bicameralism is to play a key role in this governmental legerdemain. 
The demand for such a device comes from the well appreciated fact that 
society is divided between the privileged and the under-privileged, 
whether the nature of the privilege is social, political or economic. 
This situation where there are haves and have-nots is to be found in 
every level of our government and is the factor in the ever existent 
tension which produces bicameralism. 
This state of affairs can be looked at from a philosophical point 
of view: the question of the majority versus the minority. To. wha:t 
extent should the strength of the many be used to trample upon the special 
status of the. few? Or we coul,d turn the coin around and ask to what 
extent the few of this special status can ignore the demands of the many. 
These problems are to be found in the very warp and woof of this question 
of unicameralism versus bicameralism, and perhaps are not capable of 
resolution. 
It is not a simple question and it certainly is not the object of 
this paper to solve it. Still as background we may note that majority 
rule need not mean that there is no limitation on its sway. Then you 
would have what de Toqueville so feared, tyranny by the many. As one 
writer expressed it, "It (Majority Rule) involves the principle of equality 
of votes since no combination of individuals having extra votes can 
1 
impose their views '. t Accordingly then, political equality is limited to 
the same extent that majority rule is limited. 
This study of the use of bicameralism in the United States will be 
for the most part on a colony to colony basis, but not all colonies will 
1. J. Roland Pennock, "Responsiveness, Responsibility and Majority Rule" 
The American Political Science Review, LXVI,(Sept,l952)pp.791-796. 
iv 
be covered by any means. Two principles determined the selection of the 
state. Has the political history of the state any light to throw on our 
understanding of the . problemj Is there sufficient data from which to 
obtain an adequate picture of the situation? Georgia, for example, in 
spite of the fact that she can boast of being one of the three states to 
experiment with a one house legislature, has been omitted primarily for 
the second reason. Not only is there a paucity of documentation, but the 
use of one house was principally nominal since the state was a battlefield 
at the time and the constitution was not really enforced. 
GHAPI'ER I 
Virginia 
The problem of bicameralism is a legislative problem, and as such 
exists wherever legislature exists. vVhile this problem became evident 
earlie r in other coloni~s, Virginia with the first bona fide legislature 
to be found within the confine of this nation, presented a startling 
illust ration of why bicameralism developed. 
Virginia was the first English plantation in the New World. Here 
the original settlers around the James River and their promoters faced 
problems, many of which appeared insolvable. How were these people going 
to live? Vfuat would be the economic basis for an enterprise such as this? 
In effect, how could the Virginia Company make it a paying proposition? 
Polit ical questions were equally trying. What would be the relation-
ship between the Company and the Crown? between the Company and their 
colonists? Correct answers to these questions had to be found, for 
Virgi nia was the hope of the English. The colony, in fact was a belated 
attempt to offset the colonial expansion of her rivals, particularly Spain. 
This had to be done by indirect ion. With ·James I officially at peace with 
Philip II, the founding of a royal colony had to be accomplished in the 
' 1 guise of a private undertaking known as the Virginia Company. This was 
not the first, or for that matter, the last t~ne, that public policy was 
entrusted to private individuals to their mutual benefit; but it was 
unavoidable that such adventures, being of a semi-public nature would be 
buffeted by the political developments. The Virginia Company was no excep-
tion. 
1. T. J. Wertenbacker, Virginia under the Stuarts (Princeton :1914 1 p·. 29. 
l. 
2. 
The seventeenth century was a period of political change i.n England, 
institutions and ideas were in a state of flux. Many of .these changes 
produced effe cts reaching the James River and helped to explain why the 
Company lost its control so quickly. The charter was forfeited in 1624, 
after a brief sixteen years of Company controls. It had been a period of 
desperate hardsh:i.p during which hundreds of lives were lost and complaints 
concerning Company policies poured into Whitehall demanding a change of 
masters. Aggravating this situation was the struggle in England between 
Warwick and Sir Edwin Sandys. 
Sandys was a key person behind the introduction of a democratic legis-
lature in this country. A member of the Company throughout its duration, 
Sandys was selected in 1617 to assist a Sir Thomas Smythe in the management 
of the organization, but it wasn't until 1619 that Sandys became treasurer 
and the .eupon carried out the ideas that he had in mind. An examination 
of the financial records revealed the incompetency of Smythe; Sir George 
Yeardleywas sent to Jamestown to replace the unpopular Argall; and a 
committee was selected to determine the form of government for the colony. 
The harsh autocratic control exercised by the Company was discontinued and 
a new, more liberal policy was .adopted. 
Sandys' political views were well known. On W~y 21, 1614 five years 
before he won control of the Company, he had delivered an extraordinary , 
speech in the House of Commons in which he stated his democratic principles 
that the origin of every monarchy came from popular election; and that 
a king who intended to rule by any other title might be dethroned, 
whenever there was sufficient force to do so.1 If royal power stemmed 
ultimately from the people, obviously the power of any company did. 
1. DNB, Vol. SO, p. 287 
3. 
Acting in pursuance oft his democratic tendency and with the Company's 
instruct ions, Yeardley on July 30, 1619 SU11lilloned the first legislature on 
American soil. Thus, in the words of Sandys, tta more free government in 
V. . . ,,1 ~rg1n~a came into existence. 
With the commencement of this legislature exasperating problems of 
detail arose to plague it. Who should vote for the members of this Gen-
eral Assembly1 What qualifications were needed to be a member of this 
Assembly1 How extensive should its powers be? The question pertaining to 
the officers of this legislature and the manner of their select ion was to 
be a chronic sore spot. Among these legistive problems was th13 one pert-
inent to t his paper. How was this General Assembly to be organized? Im-
plicit in this is the question of bj,cameralism. 
Before one examines this problem as it evolved in colonial Virginia, 
one cannot recall too frequently the fact that there was no exact concept 
of the separation of governmental powers in the seventeenth century. The 
governor of Virginia, before andafter the loss ofthe charter, performed 
legislative, judicial, and executtve tasks and the same was true respect-
ing the other branches of the government. 
From the ver"'J first session oft re Virginia Assembly there were two 
types of members, Councillors and Burgesses. The Councillors, men of 
wealth and social position, were selected by the Governor before 1624 and 
- . 
by the King after the colony had become a royal province • . Dc:ting from 
the beginning of the colony, the Council became part of the General 
Assembly after 1619, but it had other functions that were performed in-
1. Wertenbacker, op. cit., p. 33. 
dependently of' the Assembiy, such asacting as a Council of' state f'or the 
governor. Furthermore councillors as indi victuals f'illed the most import-
ant posts in the colony and as tax collectors and naval of'f'icers handled 
virtually all of' the governmental f'unds. The number of' councillors varied, 
but twelve was the usual total. 
The councillors also possessed legislative powers in 1618, a year be-
f'ore the General ~ssembly was summoned. The Company extended this power to 
them, but f'rom the nature of their mode of' selection, the councillors were 
by no means a democratic legislature. Furthermore, throughout the colonial 
period the council retained its aristocratic characteristics. After the 
formation of the General Assembly, the governor and council v1ere to compose 
one part of the Assembly while representatives of the people would comprise 
4. 
the other. This second section became known as "the Commons of Virginia re-
1 presented by the Hguse of Burgesses." It was typical of the terminology 
of the period that "House of' Burgesses" would be used even when its members 
sat with the Council. This General Assembly, comprising coundllors and 
burgesses was empowered "to make, ordain, and enact such general laws and 
orders, f'or the behoof' of t he said colony, and the good government thereof, 
as shall from time to time appear necessary or requisites.n2 
The councillors and burgesses differed from the other in many ways. 
The manner by which they were· s electsd contrasted radically. While the 
councillors were at all time appointed, the burgesses were elected by a 
rather broad electorate. .The franchise in Virginia was liberal with 
virtually every white male over seventeen possessing the right to vote. 
1. Percy Scott Flippin, "The Royal Government of Virginia", Columbia Uni ver-
sity Studies in History (LXXXLV-1919) p. 189. 
2. El!lier I. Miller, "The Legislature of the Province of Virginian Ibid. 
(XXVLLL-1907) p. 27. cf'., W.W.Henings, Statutes at Large (Philadelphia: 
3 vol. 1819-1823) t, 111-112. 
This happy state existed from 1619 to 1654. Gradually as eries of 
restrictions narrowed this electorate and in 1670 a property qualification 
1 
was added. Eventually it became one oft he grievances behind Bacon 1 s 
R~bellion in 1675 even though the Indian Question wast he immediate cause. 
The divergences in political positions between the burgesses and council-
lors were greatest when the right to vote was most widely used. But by 
1680 because of' changes in the electoral laws and a significant change in 
organization that took place in the same year, the House of Burgesses was 
no longer a restraining factor on either council or governor. 2 
During the early sessions both houses sat together and probably voted 
3 
as one body; . they certainly did so while acting as the highest court of 
the colony. For many years, the General Ass~mbly served in th:.s capacity 
with the judicial function placed in the hands of a joint committee from 
5. 
the two houses. The burgesses usually had more members on the committee than 
did the councillors, so they could and did dominate this highest colonial 
court. Then occurred a disgraceful incident which produced bicameralism; 
our entire legislative historY has no parallel to it. 
In 1680 Lord Culpepper, ·a notorious rake, was Governor of Virginia. 
He was engaged in a lawsuit regarding land rights within the so-called 
"Northern Necktt of the colony, but he felt that when the case ·came up to 
the highest colonial court, he would not have the support of the burgesses. 
Culpepper then devised a stratagem that was brilliantly successful. 
Knowing that the burgesses and councillors were jealous of each 
others prerogatives, Culpepper privately encouraged the burgesses to in-
sist upon the privilege of determining all appeals by themselves. The 
1. W.W.Hening, op. cit., III, 423. 
2. Flippin, op.cit., p. 202. 
3. Miller, op. cit~, p. 41. 
burgesses fell into the tr~ and publicly requested this right of the 
Governor under the notion of privilege. Culpepper notified the King of 
this action. Charles II returned a royal proclamation immediately de-
priving the burgesses of this judicial function and limiting it to the 
1 governor and council. Ther:,eupon bicameralism became the esta.blished 
policy of Virginia, for the two houses sat apart as legislative bodies. 
As can be seen no profound· 'theories of government were involved in these 
changes. 
1. Robert Beverly, The Histo~r and Present State of Virginia (London, 1705) 
Louis B. Wright, (ed) 1947 edition p. 93 
6. 
CHAPI'ER II . 
Hassachusetts 
' Massachusetts furnished the classic illustration of hovr a colonial 
assembly developed from .a single house to a double-house legislature ; :tn 
fact, in this country the bicameral ~ystem had its origin in the Bay 
Colony. 
Tn 1629 an influential group of Puritans 'obtained (under interesting 
circumstances) a . charter from Charles I endowing them with specific powers 
and in the following year, contrary to all precedent, the Company came to 
this country, bringing their charter with them. 
The charter incorporated all members of the Company as freemen and 
empovrered them to elect a governor, a deputy governor, and eighteen 
assi stants annually to c~rry out the general business of the Company.l The 
transfer of the Company's officials and the charter to the Nev< World trans-
formed t he relationship between t he magistrates and the other inhabitants> 
but not to the extent which many writers have imagined. Textbooks have 
frequently stated that by the transfer the Company which at one time had 
been a private corporation thereupon became a public entity with all the 
prerogatives and trappings of a Commonwealth.2 
This idea fails to take into conside:eation the fact t hat at this 
time there was no legal distinction between public and privat•3 corporations;3 
1 . Francis N. Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial 
Charters, and other Organic Laws (Washington, 1909) III, 1BS2. 
2. Ieland D. Baldwin, The Stream of American Histor,v (Boston, 1952) I, 123. 
· 3 . Charles E. Merriam, Public and Private Government (New Haven, 1944) 
corporations combined responsibilities to the public with private pro-
fit. Borough governments were considered private organizations, exist-
ing for the special interests of its members. Not every resident of a 
. 1 borough was a member of the corporation; they were, in fact, closed to 
outside membership. Our colonial governments were considered by the 
Common Law as a municipal or borough type of government. Offsetting this 
is the fact that this transfer did give the magistrates of Massachusetts, 
thanks to the broad Atlantic, a more independent status, which weakened 
their subordinate position to Parliament. 
The Charter provided for the Company members or freemen to meet four 
times a year to elect officers and enact legislation. Bringing the 
directors of the Company tot he Bay posed two pressing problems: if the 
other colonists were not freemen, hovr were they formally to become so. 
And to what extent were they to participate in the affairs of this common-
wealth if they did become freemen. In October 1630 the power of electing 
the governor and deputy governor and of enacting general legislation was 
claimed by the assistants as the directors of the Company. The Charter 
provided in no way for the use of proxies or delegates by other freemen 
even after admission into the Company, so this ruling of 1630 t)ermitted a 
small cliaue of officials to exercise the only voice in the affairs of the 
'· 
new colony. 2 The assistants like the directors of most companies hoped 
to keep the candidates for office within their own ranks. 
The usual history of Massachusetts Bay recounts the struggles of the 
infant colony to maintain its independence against the machinations of 
1. Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederick N. Maitland, The History of Eig-
lish Law (Cambridge, 1923) I, 636. 
2. Frances Rose-Troup, The !massachusetts Bay Company and its Predeces-
sors (New York, 1930) P• 109. 
B. 
the stuarts and the fortuitous sequence of events which made it possible. 
There was another political development within the colony which, while not 
so dramatic in its nature, had an important bearing on its history. This 
was the struggle on the part of a coalition of freemen and non-freemen to 
participate in, if not to control, the political destinies of the colony. 
The exclusiveness of freemanship started the fight. The growing unpopular-
ity ·of the 1630 ruling forced the assistants to retreat from this extreme 
position, and in }~y 1631, over a hundred settlers became freemen and part-
icipated in the election of John Winthrop as Governor.1 
Further reaction to such centralization was inevitable. This came in 
February 1632 when the magistrates levied a tax on the settler:=; of the Bay 
colony. This tax, which was to be used to build a fort in Newt.on, was one 
of the first acts of a public character performed by the Massachusetts 
magistrates, and it was immediate~y protested. The freemen of Watertown, 
under the leadership of their pastor and elder, refused to pay the tax . 
because they believed that the court of assistants was only an administra-
tive body and consequently had no authority to levy taxes. In the opinion 
of this delegation, the government of the Bay Colony was "no other but as 
of a mayor and alde:rman who have not power to make laws or raise taxation 
2 
with the people. ~' 
This controversy forced the magistrates to clarify their status. By 
what right could these officers pass laws and levy t axes? John Winthrop 
acted as spokesman for the authorities. As far as he could see., their 
1. Massachusetts Records, I, 89. quoted by Rose-Troup, £E• cit.,p. 110. 
2. Winthrop's Journal, I, 74. cf. F. N. Thorpe, The Federal and State 
Constitutions (Washington Gov. Printing Office, 1909) III, 378. 
9. 
10. 
government was ''rather in -~he nature of a parliament" 1 and that the 
assistants, being elected by the freemen of the colony, were their legal 
representatives and so empowered with the authority to levy taxes. 
This is the first authoritative pronouncement on the de faeto arrange-
ment which resulted when the Company came with its charter and set up its 
government in the New World. No longer was it to be considered merely as 
a private corporation, but as a commonwealth possessing all the powers of 
a government. 2 This was illegal, for there was nothing in the eharter 
that gave the magistrates authority to raise money by levy, assessment or 
taxation. In fact, as executives of the Company they possessed no legisla-
':) 
tive powers at all.~ 
Had the Company remained in England, it would have been a simple semi-
public concern possessed with specified proprietary rights and the authority 
under English law to administer this property. However, it would not have 
the right to pass legislation, set up courts of justice, wage war or even 
establish a - school system. It would simply be another corporatj_on along 
with hundreds of others. 
Now that the Company was in the New World where no governmEmt existed, 
it was necessary for the Company's officers to fill the vacuum and to 
exercise all the coercive powers which a government possesses. With four 
or five thousand settlers under its control , it had to maintain order, pro-
vide for defense against the Indians, establish schools, and pay expenses 
by levying taxes, whether the Charter made such provisions or not . On the 
other hand, trade and land speculation as a corporation function were 
abandoned. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Winthrop 1 s ·Journal, . r.; ]__g_g_. _ c.:f, H. L' • Osgood~ American Colonies in the 
Seventeenth CentuEY, I, 156. 
Massachusetts Colonial Records, I, 62. 
Ibid., I, 56. 
Since it was apparent to every settler who came over that a govern-
ment was necessary, there was little protest over this assumption of 
power. Nevertheless, because of it, antagonism developed between the 
settlers who had a proprietary intere~t in the colony which had been 
founded at great exertion and expense and those who possessed no such 
interest · and were indifferent toward the motives of the Puritan immigrat-
ion. The dilennna was this; how we!'e these proprietary rights to be safe-
guarded from the encroachments of men who were outsiders. Yet whence came 
this right to exercise legislative control over non~freemen without their 
consent or participation.? Furthermore, since the . authorities restricted 
freemanship by means · of a religious qualification, they perpetuated a . 
flagrant violation of the Charter.1 
According to the Charter, the administration of the Company would be 
placed in the hands of eighteen magistrates, presided over by a governor, 
all elected by the members of the organization who were ealled freemen. 
Not only was the quota of magistrates never filled; but the number of 
freemen was limited as much as possible. Thus in 1631 out of a. populat-
11. 
ion of ·some four or five thousand, there were no more than two hundred 
2 
freemen. As this small faction strove to exercise control over the others, 
the government of Massachusetts. Bay ·became oligarchical. The gradual 
appreciation of this condition aroused intense opposition not only among 
those who possessed no voice whatever in their society, but also among 
the freemen who believed that they should have more influence in the 
Commonwealth. 
1. Charles M Andrews, The Colonial Period of American History (New Haven, 
1934) I, . 436. 
2. Brooks Adams, Emancipation of :WJ.8. ssachusetts (Boston, 1886) p. 266. 
The reaction continued. Winthrop had said that the a ssistants were 
a ttparliament~ '! But a "parliament'' comprising self-appointed members 
was a most inadequate system of representation, a fact to which Winthrop's 
attention was soon directed. 
In 1634 two deputies from each town appeared before the magistrates i:o 
request th~ establishment of a representative government. Such action 
was too precipitous for Winthrop; he suggested as a compromise that a com-
mittee of deputies should be appointed (by the magistrates, it may be ob-
served, and not elected) with the power to revise the laws and ·to present 
' 
grievances to the assistants.l This failed to satisfy the popular demand 
and at the next session of the General Court the repr~sentative system 
was inaugurated:~ .. Thus the popular movement had its initial success. 
Furthermore, in this humble legislature the kernels of a future bi-
cameral _system were clearly discernible. 2 For the first time the members 
of the General Court were given different designations, the assistants and 
the deputies, both elected by the people, but the former were elected at 
large and the latter were elected by the towns. A second difference be-
tween the two g roups was the fact that t he assistants possessed · administ-
rative and judicial duties,as well as legislativeJ the deputies only had 
legislative powers. But most significant or · all was that the assistants 
represented the proprietary element of the colony while the deputies, for 
the most part, stood for thos·e without privileged status. 
this time, they deliberated and voted as one assembly.3 
1. Winthrop, op. cit., I, 122. 
However, at 
2. Herbert L. Osgood, 11 Politit:al Ideas of the Puritans11 , Political Science 
Quarterly, VI, 6; Moran, op. cit., p. 9. 
3. l~ssachusetts Colonial Records, . I, 115. 
12. 
Duringthe spring session of the General Court in 1634, the deputies 
changed the status of the freemen in one aspect. 'l'hey modified the .. ~ oath 
of loyalty that was first introduced in 1631. The new freemen's oath made 
13. 
references to the common people and their government and further specified 
the powers belonging to the General Gourt. 1 
This new oath, however, did not make the posit~on of the deputies a~ 
too clear. As the Charter made no provision for a body of deputies, their 
relationship to the assistants was vague and shadowjr. According to the 
Charter, the goverrnnent of the Company would be in the hands of the assist-
ants, elected by the freemen, but the freemen as such were not part of the 
Company's administration. The existence oft he deputies was as unwarrcn t-
ed according to the Charter as was the expassion of the governmental funct~ 
ions of the assistants. Time and the familiar pre'Cedents of the English 
Constitution were needed to . clarify this relationship. The first step in 
the clarification came in 1634 also. 
In the fall of that year the residents of Newtown asked permission of 
the General Court to move to. the banks of the Connecticut River where . they 
expected to find better. pasturage fort heir livestock. 2 As thi.s Newtown 
group was a sizable congregation and their exodus would weaken the 
strength of Massachusetts Bay, there was opposition. E¥entually this 
question came to a vote in the General Court. F'ifteen deputie::: and two 
assistants plus Governor Winthrop gave their approval, while ten deputies, 
five assistants and the Deputy-Governor voted in the negative. The de-
puties claimed that the motion was carried by a vote of eighteen to six-
1. Massachusetts Colonial Records, I, 354, as quoted by Rose-Troup, op. cit., 
pp. 119-120. 
2. Winthrop, op. cit.~. I, 132. 
teen. The assistants denied this, since' they were opposed by a vote of 
six to three. They contended tl:at a majority of the assistants must be 
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in favor of any measure before the General Court before it is adopted. The 
issue paralyzed tte General Court, stopping the functions of that body com-
pletely.1 
After the affairs of the community became critical, the colony ob-
served a day of fasting and prayer, during the course of which John Cot-
ton preached a sermon on the nature of government. This sermon is signi-
ficant since it represents the philosophy of government professed by an 
outstanding leader of the Puritans of Massachusetts. 
The substance of Cotton 1 s remarks was that a society which Massachu-
setts Bay typified consisted of a magistracy, the ministry, and the people, 
with the first standing for authority, .the s eco~d for purity ()f doctrine, 
and the t .hird for.·. ~~berty. Aceord;iilg to this famous preacher each class 
had a veto on the others so that the final decision on all questions must 
be reached with the agreement of the three. 2 With the support 1;:,.f this 
theory, the assistants carried their point, establishing the pr13Cedent that 
the magistrates had the poWer to negate the post ion of the deputies. So for 
the first time one hears of the principle of the negative voice., Yet it 
was a questionable victory since by the same token the deputies possessed 
the same veto powers. The magistrates realized that their position was an 
act of desperation.3 
Four .years later the General Court pronounced upon the matter in the 
following terms: 
1. Winthrop, ot· cit., . I, 133. 
2. Ibid.,!, 13 • 
3. Ibid.,!, 133. 
And whereas it may fall out that in some of these 
General Court, to be holden by the magistrates and 
deputies, there may arise some differences of judg-
ment in doubtful cases, it is therefore ordered, 
that no law, order or sentence shall pass as an act 
of the Court without the consent of the greater part 
of the magistrates on the one part and lhe greater 
part of the deputies on the other part. 
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As Winthrop subsequently observed, llNeither the Magistrates alone 
nor the Deputies alone without the consent each of the other, in any 
2 General Court, have any power at all.!' 
This act, rendering the assistants and deputies coordinate in legis-
lative authority, introduced into Massachusetts Bay the essence if not 
the form of bicaneralism. _The two groups continued to sit together, how-
ever, until 1644 when a well-knwwn· episode occurred which made sitting to-
gether in.the same chamber intolerable. 
While noticing these developments, one should not believe that the 
struggle for power between magistrates a nd deputies existed only in the 
field of legislation. It also became evident in the executive and jud-
icial functions -of government. During the interim between the debate re-
garding the future of Newtown and the Sherman controver~y, the legislative 
I 
sessions of the General Court were filled with heated argument regarding 
the judicial powers of the magistrates, the deputies charging that these 
powers were practically unrestrained, either as to the nature ·of the law 
or to the punishments which the magistrates meted out. Winthrop believed 
along with the great English jurist, Coke, that state authority resided 
I 
ultimately in the judiciary. According to Winthrop, ltJudges were Gods 
on Earth~ t!: It is no wonder that he and his associates believed that in 
this respect the magistrates should be completely uncircumscribed. 
1. Massachusetts Colonial Records, I, 170. 
2. Robert C. Winthrop, Life & Letters of John Winthrop 2 vols~, 1869, II, 
431. 
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This position met stern opposition. The more democratic elements of 
the Commonwealth urged with increasing vehemence that a law cod1e enumerating 
1 
clearly the laws and the punishments for their infringement be compiled. 
Prior to this the magistrates in their capacity as judges had complete 
freed om in the construction of the law and in the severity of the punish-
ment. Finally, in 1641, after the work of the Long Parliament in England 
had made the Colony less fearful of royal displeasure, the first law code, 
called the Body of Libe~es, was .published in Massachusetts. As Osgood 
pointed out, not only was the existence of the code significant as a pop-
ular victory, but it abolished all feudal privileges, calling for equality 
of the citizens before the law in every matter except religion. 2 
The Body of Liberties .constituted as great a blm~ to the power of the 
magistrates as did the Act of 1636. Fruitlessly they argued t hat according 
to the Charter the General Court had no power to make laws and it would be 
preferable to have the laws develop by "custom" or precedent. Allow the 
law to be judge-made as is the common law. 3 
In 1635 and 1636 the Oligarchic elements in h~ssachusetts were 
strengthened by reports that several well-known Puritan noblemen, such as 
Lord Say and Sele, Lord Brooks et al. , were pianning to move t o the Bay 
area, provided their privileges of nobility would be preserved. Although 
such a group would have been staunch allies of the Winthrop group in any 
contest with the other elements of the ·Colony, this request was turned 
down for religious reasons. Acting as the spokesn:an of the Massachusetts 
leaders, John Cot ton in his reply revealed in tmequi vocal language disappr-
oval of popular government, maintaining that an office was similar to a 
freehold, to be considered as part of one's property and that furthermore 
1. Winthrop, I, 323. 
2, H. L. Osgood, Political Science Quarterly, VI, 27. 
3. Winthrop, I, 324. 
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the higher magistrates at least should hold office for life. There should 
be a nobility in Massachusetts Bay. 
This position which Cotton enunciated may be considered the typical 
position far any member of the oligarchy. An interesting developnent was 
the attempt to put this idea into practice. 
After 1639 there existed in the Colony a standing council, elected for 
life, comprising the three most · important leaders, John Winthrop, Thomas 
Dudley and John Endicott . This council was to act as a group of elder · 
statesmen who would always be on hand to assist the younger men in solving 
their difficulties. The standing council never fulfilled its function, and 
vnthin three years popular opinion compelled its discontinuance. 1 Still, 
the .order of repeal was so drawn up that it implied no condemnation of the 
institution in principle. In. fact the whole tone of Winthrop's narrative 
showed that he held the standing councilto be a useful and legitimate 
2 
organ and that he resented the demand for its abrogation. 
The occasion for the fonnal separation of the assistants and the dep-
uties was the well-lmown case of Mrs. Shennan's lost pig. As Winthrop ex-
pressed it, "There fell out a great business upon a very small occasion. tsr3 
Without going into the legal aspects of the controversy, i.t should suffice 
to mention that the colony became thoroughly aroused over the legal battle 
between Mrs. Shennan and a prosperous, but unpopular boston shopkeeper 
named Robert Keayne. The case over the disposition of the pig had been 
appealed to the General Court for adjudication, but the issue only widened 
the chasm existing between the assistants and the deputies.4 
1. Ellen E. Brennan, 11The :W;assachusetts Council of the Magistrates", New 
England Quarterly, IV, 54-93. 
2. Winthrop, II, 59-61; 86-88. 
3. Ibid., II, 64. 
4. Thomas Hutchinson, HistorY of Massachusetts (1795) I, 135. 
The issue was put to a vote in June, 1642, with two magistrates and 
fifteen deputies for the widow- and seven magistrates and eight deputies 
for the defendant. With seven oft he deputies abstaining, Mrs. She~an 
won by a vote of seventeen to fifteen. As it happened, the majority of the 
deputies was for N~s. Sherman, while the majority of the magistrates was 
for the shopkeeper. Had the qu~stion been:.:legi:slative in nature, the two 
. . . uld 11 1 maJor1t1es wo have can~e ed each other. But the question was a jud-
icial one. Did the Law of 1636 apply to judicial matters as it did to 
legislative questions? 
The question oft he negative voice by the magistrates: again came up. 
Winthrop, as usual in the thick oft he polemics, wrote a defense for the 
judicial negative voice which he based on a_ definition of a quorum as he 
found it in the Common Law. In his treatise concerning the veto power of 
the magistrates, Winthrop asked several questions the most pertinent of 
which referred to the pro~r status and power oft he deputies and to the 
basis in the Charter for the existence of the negative voice. Winthrop 
believed that there was a solid ground for accepting the negative voice. 
He based his conviction on a clause in the Charter which stipulated that a 
General Court must have at least seven assistants in attendance in order 
that there might be a quorum; and further, that this group had~1e author-
ity to make all laws not contrary tot he laws of England. 
The arglJlllent lfas wo:rlhless. Far. from deeming seven assistants 
necessary to form a quorum, the General Court on November 13, .1644 had 
ordered that only five magistrates were necessary fort he quorum. 2 This 
1. John Graham Palfrey, History of New Englarid (Boston, 1865) I, 619. 
2. ~., I, 614. 
I 
indicated that the clause to which Winthrop referred already had been 
· ignored. Yet Winthrop further argued from this clausethat, since seven 
magistrates had to be present in the Court . before any business could be 
discussed, it·:was mandatory for seven magistrates to be in favor of:: t he 
proposal before it became law.1 While other colonial charters provided 
for a definite quorum in their assemblies, only Winthrop tried to make 
the quorum synonymous with the size or the composition of the affirmative 
vote. Winthrop did not assert this unusual argument without contention, 
fort wo fellow magistrates, Richard Sci.ltonstall and Richard Bellingham~ 
men of a more liberal bent, rejected it. 
Another explanation that Winthrop advanced in support of his posttion 
was that the negative voice in the hands of the magistrates was funEi-
amental to the existence of gove;mment; for should it be removed, the en-
tire nature of the . .goverrnn~nt would be transformed from a "mixed demo-
cracytt to a "mere democracy~'."· In addition, this form of government had no 
warrant in Scripture, while at the same time it is ttamong most Civil 
nations, accounted the meanest and worst of all forms of govermnent ••• 
a monster ••• u3 
In reference to the status and influence oft he deputies, Winthrop 
felt that they had the same power as the freemen whom they reprE3sented 
would haveif they were assembled in a general aourt, and no more. Accord-
ing to Winthrop 1 a famous concept of liberty, the freemen and their re-
presentatives, the deput:i.es,. were free to elect their magistrat.es, but 
1. R.c. Winthrop, Life and ~etters of John Winthro£, II, 429. 
2. Winthrop's Journal, II, 5.9 • . 
19. 
3. Quoted in W.S.Carpenter's The Development of American Political Thought, 
(Princeton, 1930) P• 39. 
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they were not free to supervise the official conduct oft he ~gistrates. 
This belief sprang from the fact that the authority of the magistrates 
came from God and not from the people, therefore the manner in which this 
authority be exercised could not be called into question. Cons,~quently, 
giving the .Deputie s the negative voice violated the divine order of t hings 
and must be considered unacceptable.1 Miss Brown contends that the Puritan 
concept of aristocracy ~hould be considered representative democracy, as 
2 
the officials wer e elected by the people and given authority t o rule. 
How are we going to ·consider the persistent hostility of t he Furitan 
leaders t o every democratic tendency? The Congregationalism of Hooker and 
Cotton was a complex affair,- aristocratic and oligarchic since :i.t is under 
the tutelage of the elders; democratic since the elders have no author-
ity without a congregation·. 3 
Winthrop's renewed attack on the negative voice of the deputie s came 
f rom two sources: the awareness of the grovfing strength of the popular 
element and the fear that ·the ju~icial power of the magistrates would be 
curtailed. As the principle of a separation of government powers was un-
known at the time, the only effective defense of the judiciary of 
Massachusetts Bay. was to recover all concessions given t o the d(3puties. 
In reply t he deputie s demanded and obtained a separate chamber :for them-
selves. · In 1644 the representatives of the people moved that t he t wo 
orders should sit apart, with both groups having the identical power of 
'i.Ilitiating legislation. 
It is curious to note how the aims of the contending parties changed 
with t ime and altered circumstances. ' 
:J.. 
2 • . 
3. 
Winthrop's Journal, II, 121. 
Katherine B. Brown, 11A Note on the Puritan Concept of Aristocracy11 , 
Mi s sissippi Valley Historical Review, XLI, 105-112, (June, 1954). 
Perry G. Miller, "Thomas Hoo kf.') r A.T' r'l the Democracy of Early Connect-
icut" , New England Quarter} y'; XfV (October, 1931) 672. 
The resolution which introduced bicameralism incidentally revealed 
the in~luence o~ the English practices. 
·· Foreasm.uch as a~ter long experience, ·ve ~ind divers incon-
veniences in the manner o~ our ·providing in Courts wi.th 
magistrates and deputies sitting together and accounting 
it wisdom to ~ollow the laudable practice 0~ other states 
who have laid groundwork ~or government and order in the 
issuing o~ business o~ greatest and highest consequences ••• 
It ie there~ore ordered ••• that t~ magistrates may sH 
and act business by tha~selves ••• 
The deputies instigated the separation o~ · • .the two groups o~ legis-
lators; the magistrates were opposed, ~or while they wanted the negative 
voice ~or themselves, it was by no means to their interest to gtve the 
same prerogative to the deputies. 
In spite o~ this great victory, the deputies were still not satis-
~ied~ ~or they had mother complaint pertaining to questions o~ ad-
ministration. In this same year o~ 1644 they made known their ob-
jections to the practice o~ the magistrates acting as the colon:i.al ad-
ministrators during the recesses o~ the General 0ourt, a practice that 
remained ~rom the days when the magistrates were merely company o~~icers. 
The deputies believed that they should have administrative parity as well 
as legislative parity.2 
In October of this year there was discussion between the magistrates 
and the deputies on the question 0~ whether the magistrates could 
21. 
exercise their magisterial authority between sittings o~ the General. Court. 
They re~erred the question to the elders o~ the church who replied by 
distinguishing between the powers o~ government. Their distinction at 
this time consisted o~ the legislative powers, the judicial powers, and 
1. Massachusetts Colonial Records, II, 58. 
2. Winthrop's Journal, II, 211. 
and those powers in the hands of the '1deputies of the public affairs". 
The elders arrived at the conclusion that the legislative and directive 
powers were shared equally by both magistrates and deputies, but that the 
judicial power was at the disposal of the deputies only on rare occasions. 
The judicial power was considered ordinary administration.l 
Under the leadership of the deputies from Salem, the delegates from 
Essex County carried through the lower house a bill authorizing seven of 
the magistrates and three of the deputies to administer the affairs of 
state under the advisory control of a clergyman between meetings of.the 
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General Court. The magistrates contending that it would take away the right 
of the freemen to elect their officers rejected this proposal. So sensitive 
were the magistrates to the rights of the freemen! A more serious arg-
ument was that the assistants had already been granted a permanent 
administrative capacity by the Charter and it would be as superfluous as 
it would be unwarranted to set up another body by a commission from the 
General Court. Thus an attempt to establish a cabinet form of government 
failed. 2 
As the oligarchic group became more and more on the defensive, they 
used every political device available to protect their position. Among 
these devices interestingly enough was the principle of strict construction; 
brought forvmrd for the first time in the debate on the Salem resolution. 
The debate on the Salem resolution revealed an interesting difference in 
the interpretation of the relationship of the Charter to the goverrunent. 
As far as the assistants were concerned, the Charter was the fundamental 
law, l imiting the powers of the General Court. On the other hand, the 
deputies believed that the General Court was supreme within the colony and 
1. Winthrop, op. cit., II, 212. 
2. Ibid~,II, 123 
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that it was useless to appeal to the Charter. Once again the magistrates 
sought the advice of the elders of the church, who on this occasion as in 
many others, gave the magistrates their unstinted support. The eonsistent 
support which the church elders gave to the magistrates indicates another 
vi tal aspect of this struggle for power in this "Puritan Oligarc:1.y.;. rt After 
1644 the contending political groups in ~~ssachusetts arrived at an 
equilibrium. The popular factions under the leadership of such 1nen as 
Richard Saltonstall, Richard Bellingham, and William Hathorne had somewhat 
restricted the powers of the magistrates and in many ways forced them to 
retreat. 
The use of two legislative chambers was one attempt by the popular 
group to control the magistrates. Its adoption ended in a stalemate. 
Bicameralism introduced in Massachusetts as a check on the bureaucracy of 
the colony became in reality a bureaucratic check on the majority. The 
deputies had encircled themselves with a noose, yet it is important to 
note then that a religious division formed part of the political picture 
in Ma ssachusetts Bay. The clergy gave the magistrates their support for 
they foresaw that this movement .among the deputies, having strong support 
from the disfranchised, would result in a gradual elimination of the 
church 1s influence. That this fear was not purely imaginary can be seen 
by the fact that the popular party had already proposed that an agreement 
be made with other members of the Colonial Federation to extend the rights 
of citizenship to those who were not church members. In 1657 the synod of 
the Church which had met at Northhampton felt compelled to relax the 
requirements for church membership and authorized the half-way covenant. 
The balance of power between the two groups remained virtually 
unchanged until it was upset by royal intervention. The magistrates and 
their supporters were successful in preventing the adoption of many of 
Hathorn 1 s proposals, but they paid for this victory. So profound was the 
feeling of opposition existing among the rank and file of the Bay Colony 1 s 
residents, that, when Charles II revoked the Charter in 1684, the leaders 
of the Commonwealth found themselves substantially devoid of popular 
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support in their dispute with the King. All attempts by Increase Mather and 
others to win back the Charter following the "Glorious Revolutionll were 
in vain. At that time Connecticut and Rhode Island were restorHd to their 
corporate status. Massachusetts Bay finally obtained a new cha1~er in 
1691, which greatly modified the clerical influence on the Puritan leaders. 
There was an ironical development. Thereafter, as the govElrnors and 
council were not interested in upholding the privileged position of the 
Congregational Churches, this task fell by default on the lower and more 
representative house.l 
1. Perry, cf., New England Quarterly, IV, 663-712. 
CHAPI'ER III 
Connecticut 
Several congregatione from Massachusetts, among them one group of 
English dissenters who had settled in Newtown in 1632, founded Connect-
icut. Finding insufficient pasturage to support themselves, tht3y decided 
to retire under the supervision of their pastor, the Reverend Thomas Hook-
er,to the Connecticut River where the ttsweet grass" was more abundant. In 
addition to .this purely economic consideration, political and religious 
differences between these groups and the magistrates and elders of ~~ss­
achusetts Bay provided further inducements to leave overland for Hart-
ford. The people of Newtown, having a more democratic outlook, had part-
icipated in the movement of the freemen against the Bay authorities and 
they were willing to put their ideas into practice under Hooker's leader-
ship. 
In 1638 Hooker had written a letter to John ~~inthrop, the Governor of 
Massachusetts Bay, objecting to the almost unlimited discretion possessed 
by the magistrates on judicial matters.1 Hooker believed that the judge 
must have a definite rule of law to follow or the court system would be-
come tyrannical, a situation under which Hooker would neither l j_ke to 
live nor pass on to his descendants. This question was a prominent issue 
25. 
in Massachusetts at the very time the Newtown settlers left for Connecticut. 
In U~y 1635 the Massachusetts General Court granted permission to the 
inhabitants of Watertown and Roxbury to leave "provided they continue still 
under this government • ~'2 Within a few weeks residents from Watertown 
1. Herbert L. Osgood, American Colonies in the Seventeenth Centu;r, (New 
York, 1924) I, 303. 
2. Ibid., I, 304. 
and Roxbury established themselves along the Connecticut River outside 
the boundaries of Massachusetts Bay, and thereafter never by wo:rd or 
deed showed any attitude of political affiliation with her. The Newtown 
emigrants followed their example in June 1636. Thus the towns of Wethers-
field, Windsor and Hartford were founded . 
Between 1635 and 1638 these Connecticut settlers maintained a general 
court with all the powers of government. The entire procedure was 
unauthorized. During the spring of 1638 there was a general meeting of 
the settlers at Hartford and on January 14, 1639 they adopted what many 
consider to be the first written constitution, the Fundamental Orders. 1 
Hooker who had lead the exodus from Massachusetts played a decisive role 
in the formation of this document. 
Many of the principles of the Fundamental Orders came from Hooker. 
On May~ 31, 1638 he stated that 11the choice of public magistrates belongs 
unto the people by God 1 s own allowance", and that "the foundation of 
~~ 
authority is laid, firstly, in the free consent of the people• ~· Not only 
did this sermon have a profound effect upon the minds of those who drew up 
the Fundamental Orders but; its orientation differred considerably from 
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always the least and of that best part the wisest part is always the lesser. ~t 
His retort was: "In matters which concern the common good, a geJ~eral coun.;;. 
cil chosen by all, to transact businesses which concern all, I conceive 
1. R. V. Coleman, Dictionary of American History, II, 23. 
2. Alexander Johnston, Connecticut, (New York: 1887) p. 72. 
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most suitable to rule and most safe for relief of the whole~~~l 
According to the F'undamental Orders, the legislative body, called the 
General Assembly or General Court, consisted of the governor, magistrates, 
and four deputies from each of the towns with the magistrates be;ing elected 
by the whole body of freemen and the deputies by the people of the 
respective towns. 2 The Orders provided that there would be two general 
courts annually; the firs t the Court of l!:lection, in April in which at 
least six magistrates and the other officers would be chosen for one 
year terms. All the freemen convened in general assembly were to partici-
pate in these elections. The Orcters further instructed that thEl towns 
would send their deputies to this election session, so they could proceed 
to other business after the magistrates were elected and the frelemen had 
returned home. 
The magistrates and deputies composed one house and were presided 
over by the governor, who, in case of a tie, cast the deciding vote. The 
deputies were, however, authorized to meet by themselves at somE! time 
previous to the meeting of the . General Assembly "to advise and eonsult on 
all such topics as may concern the good of the public. tt.3 Thus they co~d 
meet separately in order that they might determine their own elHctions and 
punish by fine anyone who falsely considered himself e~ected or who was 
guilty of disorderly conduct.4 
Originally an attempt was made to have all the freemen att(md the 
Court of Elections, but it soon became obvious that it was impossible to 
convene all the freemen and 11proxies 11 came into existence. The deputies 
then assumed the role of "proxies" with the result that the Court of 
1. Quoted by A. B. Hart, Founders and Leaders of Connecticut{1934) p 1 53. 
2. Moran, op. cit., p. 16. 
3. Poor, Charter and Constitutions, I, 251. 
4. Connecticut Records, I, 24. 
Elections and the deputies became identical in personneiU.. Soon the 
deputies were considered as 11proxies 11 for the freemen in other matters 
as well, a rather significant fact for a "proxy" was considered to be the 
plenipotentary of the freemen sending him. As tpe deputies became the 
plenipotentaries of the freemen, why shouldn 1t the deputies have: all 
political power, the use of which naturally was t ·o be held to strict 
account by the freemen? 
Who were these freem.en in Connecticut 1 The Fundamental Orders seem 
to distinguish between two bodies of freemen. According to the Orders 
those who were admitted as freemen of the Colony could take paM; in the 
choice of the governor and magistrates at t he Court of Elections. On t he 
other hand, 11all admitted inhabitants" had a voice in the positions taken 
by t he deputies.l This curious distinction, if it was ever clearly rec-
ogni zed at the time, seems to have had little significance and :30on was 
2 ignored. 
While it is true that the founders of Connecticut were more democrat-
ically inclined than the magistrat es of Massachusetts Bay, this fact can 
be overstressed, as the faithful sons of Connecticut do in the histories 
of their state legislature. tt· ••• and her (Connecticut 1s constitution of 
1639) the first written and democratic constitution ori. record, was the 
starting point for the democratic development which has since gained 
control of all our commonwealth, and now makes the essential features of 
our commonwealth government ••• u3 They and others for that matter have 
represented the Fundamental Orders as being radically new in form and 
contents far in advance of anything previously attained in the field of 
government. Not only was the Massachusetts charter a written constitution 
1. Connecticut Colonial Records, I, 21-23. 
2. N. P. Mead, Connecticut as a Corporate Colony (1906) . p. 10. 
3. Alexander Johnston, Connecticut, a Study of a Commonwealth Democracl 
p. 188. 
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but in reality there were only a few important differences between the 
·connecticut Orders and the laws of 1~ssachusetts and Plymouth.~ Even in 
the ·omission of the religious test among the qualifications f or residence, 
Connecticut by no means stood alone, for Rhode Island and Plymouth had 
discarded such requirements for citizenship. In reaction to the prepond-
erant influence of Boston in selecting freemen for the c9lony of ~ass-
achusetts Bay, the Connecticut Orders left this task to the various settle-
ments within the colony, each town selecting its ovm citizens • . However 
since acceptability to one's neighb~rs became the prime requisite, it is 
obvious that religious affiliation played an important role in such 
selections. Thus it is extremely doubtful whether among the limited 
number of freemen there were many non-church members. The proportion of 
freemen to the total male population of voting age is difficult -to ascert-
ain, but from the formation of the Fundamental Orders to the granting of 
the charter, a period of more than t wenty years, there are on record only 
t wo hundred twenty-nine applicants admitted as freemen. By 1665' the total 
number of freemen was one thousand seven hundred eighty-nine out of a 
population of three thousand men capable of bearing arms. This was a 
2 
major ity of the men with the unfranchised forming a large minorUy. 
There is another · surprising fact. From the statements made by the 
Reveren& Thomas Hooker, specific limitations upon the arbitrary powers of 
the colony's officiais would be expected. This was his aim whil e in 
Massachusetts, yet now the authority of both governor and assistants was 
very loosely defined and there was no effort to specify by legislation the 
penalties for lawbreakers. 3 It was an interesting illustration of how 
29. 
1. H. L. Osgood, cf. , American Coloni es in the Seventeenth Cen~, I, 309. 
2. N. P. Mead, cf., Connecticut as a Corporate Colony, p. 10. 
3. H. L. Osgood, op. cit., I, 311. 
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Hooker's opinion changed after he became a magistrate himself. 
The founders of Connecticut did not conceive of a government of three 
coordinate branches.. The assembly was unquestionably the preeminent 
branch of the government, as was the judiciary in Massachusetts. The 
executive and judicial branches were to a considerable extent . subordinate 
rath~?r than coequalnparts of the government. - Furthermore the powers of the 
General qourt were not limited by the Fundamental Orders. vVhene:ver the 
General -Court felt that the Fundamental , Orders should be altered, it was 
done with no more apparent formality than was required tq pass ordinary 
legislation. There were no individual rights·,which the General Court was 
bound to respect, · for the idea of a sphere of individual iJnmunit.y from 
government action was quite foreign to the political thought of the early 
Puritan. Since the Orders could be amended as easily as any other law, one 
writer 2 at least thinks that it is strange that so many historlans have 
held that the Fundamental Orders of 1639 was the first historical example 
of a 11written constitution~! - Apparently, Mead in believing that the 
Orders must be the nsupreme Law" of the land binding the legislature as 
well as the people, has overlooked the possibility of a ~Titten constit-
ution not binding the legislature. Still, if the function of a constit-
ution is lleffective regularized restraintn, then the Orders werE3 
inadequate to say the least. 
Those functions of government which are usually termed adm:lnistrative, 
in contrast to the purely legislative, were largely retained by the 
General Court and not given to the magistrates. For example~ the adminis-
tration of financial affairs was from the first under the control of the 
General Court. 
1. Miller, cf., New England Quarterly, IV,pP• 663-712. 
2·. N. P. Mead, ££• cit., p. 15. 
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The magistrates and deputies sat and voted as one body. The deputies , 
1 
who at first were double the number of magistrates, grew more numerous 
with the admission of each new town and might have exerted the control 
over legislation, if they saw fit. This state of affairs continued until 
1645 when the magistrates ~ho were growing dissatisfied were given the 
negative voice, although they continued to sit with the deputies. up to the 
' close of the seventeenth century • 
. As the law of February 9, 1645 (N. s.) read: 
But no act shall pass or stand for a law which is not 
confirmed both by the major part of the said magistrates 
and by the major part of the deputies then present in 
Court, both .the magistrates and deputies being allowed, 
either of them,a negative vote.l · 
The substance . of · bicamell'alism.: existed . again. before its :form. . . 
Then the growth in political power of the magistrates began. 
It was soon found in Connecticut as it was in Massachusett~: where a 
similar law was passed that even after both magistrates and deputies 
received the negative vote, as long as they sat together, only the 
\ 
negative vote of the magistrates was effective, for the presiding officer 
was al ways a magistrate who controlled the proceedings without difficulty. 
Furthermore the magistrates ·received an additional increase in power in 
the authority to raise men and supplies for waging war. 
It is ordered that the magistrates of the greatest paJ~ 
of them shall have liberty if they see cause to press 
men and munitions for a defensive war, or to defend the 
.Moheguns until the next sitting of this Court ••• 2 
Since defensive measures against their Indian neighbors was a chronic 
problem fac~g the Connecticut colonists, the military power of the 
magistratP.~ became tremendous. This military role together with the 
1. Connecticut Records, I, 169. 
2. Connecticut Records, I, 108. 
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different modes of election foreshadowed further differentiation of 
1 function between the magistrates and the deputies. 
otherwise the General Court, as organized by the Fundamental Orders, 
continued with but slight change until the granting of the Royal .Charter. 
It is true that the quormn of the assistants was reduced in 164~; from 
four to three. In 1646 the General Court changed the time of holding the . 
Court of Elections from April to Y~y. In 1661 the General CouM; suggested 
to the freemen that the number of deputies be reduced one half, but no 
action · was taken on the proposal. (At the time there were t wenty-three 
deputies and only five magistrates.)2 The restriction preventil1g a person 
from being chosen governor more than once in two years was removed with 
the result that there were but three instances in which a person having 
once been chased governor was not reelected yearly for life.3 By 1660 
the dominance of the magistrates was complete • • 
The Restoration of the StUarts placed the settlers of Conmlcticut in 
the same precarious situation as those elsewhere in the Colonies. The 
Fundamental Orders had received no official recognition from thH English 
Government, while .the legal rights which Connecticut possessed were based 
on a dubious patent presented by the Earl of Warwick . It becamH the 
responsibility of John Viinthrop, Junior, to cross the Atlantic and to 
obtain from the Crown the most generous arrangement possible. 
In 1662 a royal charter superseded the . Fundamental Orders, a charter 
which Winthrop was sent to obtain and in the negotiation of which he was 
so eminently successful. The King evidently gave him everything he asked, 
for this document left little to be desired, "lifting the Connecticut lead-
ers to seventh heaven of satisfaction~~ , One author strongly hints that 
1 . 
. 2. 
3. 
4~ 
Moran, op. cit., p. 17. 
Connecticut Records,I, 372• 
Ibid., I, 346-7. 
A. Johnston, Genesis of a· New England State, Johns Hopkins University 
C!+.,..:l-1 ~-. T ?f:;_ 
1 bribery was used • . 
On April 25, 1662 Charles II granted Connecticut a letter patent 
conveying the most ample privileges under the great seal of England . The 
charter confi:rmed the whole tract of land .which had _been assignE~d to a 
group of English noblemen, including Lord Say and Sele, Lord Brook and 
others. The requests in Winthrop's petition were reported, almost 
verbatim, in the Charter. 
This Chart~r made a few significant changes in the organization of 
the General Court. It f:ixed the number of mag1strates, which had grown 
from six to twelve_, at twelve. On the other hand, it limited the number 
of deputies to two from each town. The General Court now consisted of 
a governor, a deputy-governor, t welve assistants, and a number of deputies 
not exceeding two from each "Place, town or city". The governor, deputy-
governor and assistants were to be chosen by the whole body of freemen 
in a 'primary assembly, while the deputieswere to be elected by the people 
of their respective localities. The reduction in the number of a tovm's 
representatives was felt to be necessary, for with -; the incorporat i on c£ 
such towns as Branford, Stamfo:rd, Guilford and Milford, plus the colony 
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of New Haven, the· number of deputies would have overwhelmed the magistrates~ 
This Charter, as is well known,incorporated the colony of New Haven 
in the jurisdiction of the Connecticut authorities, much to the displeasure 
of the inhabitants of New Haven who believed that Connecticut was too 
lenient about. its selection of freemen. Mr., Davenport, a power in r ew 
Haven, and others of similar character were strong in the opinion that all 
government should be in the Church. No person in New Haven could be a 
1 . A. Johnston, Connecticut, a Study of a Commonwealth Democrasr, p . 171. 
2. Mead, op. cit. , p. 11. 
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freeman unless he were a member in full communion. However, in Connecticut, 
all law abiding persons, possessing a free hold assessed for at least 
twenty pounds might become a citizen in his community. 1 This reason and 
the natural hu.TJlan desire to run one 1 s own affairs should more than explain 
the consternation which the Charter of 1662 produced in New Haven. It 
wasn't until 1664 ·when the coming of the Royal Commission threatened to 
discontinue many of the practices of the New England colonies, that New 
Haven decided to submit to the authorities of Connecticut. 
The magistrates and deputies of the expanded colony of Connecticut 
labored together without too much friction, as is shown. by the r ,gsolution 
of the General Court in 1678. In ruay of that year the governor, deputy-
governor, and assistants were constituted a "standing council to issue all 
such occasions and matters as should fall in the intervals of the General 
2 Court.'!' Since the regular meetings of the · Court took place in May and 
in October, such a standing conunittee seemed a necessity. The confidence 
thus placed in the assistants seems not to have been abused, for the 
authority conferred upon them at this time was regularly continUE3d at the 
May and OctQber meetings of the Court until 1686. This policy was an 
. 3 
important step in the introduction of bicameralism into Connect:i.,eut. 
During One of these intervals there arose a complicated situation which 
placed matters of the gravest ' im.portance into the hands of the magistrates. 
On kay 27, 1686, Edward Randolph, representing the Lords of Trade, wrote to 
Governor Treat and his Council asking them to surrender their charter. A 
writ of Quo Warranto had been issued against the Colony, but to avoid the 
legal unpleasantness he recommended the voluntary submission by Connecticut. 
1. Benjamin Trumbull, A Complete HistorY of Connecticut 2 vols. (New London: 
1898) I, 225! 
2. Connecticut Records, III, 15. 
3. Moran, op. cit., p. 18. 
as far as he was concerne?,.such an attempt to gain royal favor was the 
logical thing to do, especially in View of the fact that the writ had 
expired. This Randolph episode was a final decisive factor in the intro-
duction of the bicameral system into Connecticut.1 Heretofore, the bus-
i ness transacted by the governor and council during the recess of the 
General Court was largely of a routine nature ·and reports upon :lt were 
not deemed necessary. But at this time when the very existence of the 
colony was at stake, Governor Treat and his Council felt it expt3dient to 
place the entire question before the General Court in special St:lssion and 
to ask for an endorsement of his reply. This marked the .beginning of a 
system of report and approval in which the General Court reviewE~d all im-
portant matters handled by the governor and council. This custom con-
stituted a step toward the separate voting and separate deliberations of 
the two bodies. 
Sir Edmund Andros, acting under a commission from James IIJ, landed 
in Boston, December 29, 1686, and forthwith demanded the surr3nder of the 
New England charters. To handle this situation a special session of the 
Connecticut General Court convened on January 26, 1687, at which time the 
council was a gain empowered tot ake such .action as seemed requiBite. Haw-
ever, having suspended charter government in Connecticut, Andros governed 
as Governor General from 1687 to thi s expulsion in April , 1689. Connect-
icut became part of the Dominion of New England. 
After the spring of 1689 affairs returned to a more normal patten1. 
The policy followed before the coming of Andros of making the Governor and 
his Cotmcil a standing committee during the recesses. of the GenE!ral Court 
was continued, but it was modified in one essential parl i c.UJ.ar. For the 
1. · Moran, op. cit., p. 19. 
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first time the General Court definitely and repeatedly stated that there 
were certain matters with which the Council was not to deal; tht:Jse per-
tained. .to the Charter liberties and the levying of taxes. Moreover, dur-
ing the period between 1689 and 1698 all the acts oft he Council, includ-
ing those not related to taxes and the Charter, were submitted 1~th great-
er frequency and regularity to the General Court for approval • . In 1698, 
instead of approving isolated acts of the Council, the General Court ex-
pressed a blanket approval in the following formula: 
This Court declared their approbation of what hath be13n 
acted by the Council since October last.l 
At this moment the General Court of Connecticut obtained t he form it 
was to maintain throughout the colonial era. Although the magis~(,rates re-
ceived the negative voice in 1645, they had continued to sit with the de-
36. 
puties as a one-house legislature. In 1698, however, the Council can be 
considered as a separate legislative body. 2 Its responsibilities .increased. 
For example, in May, 1698, the General Court instructed it to make an in-
quiry as to the extent to 1vhich the 18ws of England were in foree in Amer-
ica and to report the findings to the General Court. The Court further in-
structed the Council to prepare and report bills for the regulation of 
courts of justice, to suggest proper methods of raising revenue:, and to 
devise a plan for the suppression of vice. Obviously, · the essential feat-
ures of bicameralism were present; there was little wanting to Inake the 
development of the system complete. 
The final step in the process the General Court recorded in October, 
It is ordered by this Court and the au t:·10ritye · thereof 
1, Colonial R@cords of Connecticut (1689-1706) P• 251. 
2. Mead, op. ci t., p. 12. 
· 3. Colonial Rpcords of Connecticut (1689-1706) p. 267. 
that for the future this General Court shall consist of 
the Governor or, in his absence, of the Deputye Governor, 
and Assistants, which shall be known by the name of the 
Upper House; the other ~hall consist of such deputies as 
shall b@ legally returned from the several towns within 
this colonie, to serve as members of this General Court, 
which shall be known .by the name of the Lower House ••• 
And it is f~ther ordered that no act shall be passed in-
to a law of the colonie, nor any law already enacted be 
repealed nor any other act proper to this General 'Assem-
bly but by the consent of bothe houses.l 
Bicameralism had become the practice in Connecticut. Throughout 
the seventeenth century, the demand for two houses came from thie de-
puties; in Connecticut, the opposite was true. The demand camte from 
the more well-to-do group, · a situation which was more t ypical o:f the 
eighteenth century than the seventeenth. 
The changes in qualifications for freemen were the basis factors in 
this developwent. Originally in the Fundamental Orders any per:3on who 
had taken the Oath of Fidelity after being admitted as an inhabitant by 
other members of the town became automatically a freeman. The t.own 
exercised this power with such generosity that many of the poli1iical 
leaders of Connecticut felt that this situation should be corrE;cted. As 
part of this reaction in 1643 the final decision on conferring eitizen-
sh:i.p was given to the General Court, but only after the inhabitc:mts of 
the town had expressed their opinion. 2 Thirteen years later in 1656 the· 
General Court not only had to deterinine whether the majority within a 
town had voted to accept an individual, but possessed the authority to 
give its own approval or disapproval.3 
In 1659 the conservatives of the colony won another outstanding vj ·ct-
...... 
1. Colonial Records of Connecticut II, 267, 
2. Ibid., I, 96. 
3. Ibid., I, 290. 
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The Court ordered on lfurch 9 that the to1vns could make no one a freeman 
unless he had reached the age .of twenty-one and possessed a per:sonal 
estate of thirty pounds.1 The RestOration broue;ht an end to thi:s movement. 
In 1662 the tide had changed and the property qualification;:was dropped to 
twenty pounds; 2 in 1675 it further reduced to ten pounds) 
These changes were the result of a highly significant controversy be-
tween the aristocratic and the democratic parties in the colony,. . Samuel 
Willis of Hartford threw some light on. this issue in several letters to 
38. 
Fitz John Winthrop. Willis, for thirty-four years a magistrate of Connect-
icut and a commissioner of the United Colonies, was a member of the colon-
ial aristocracy who felt that the democratic influence was becoming too 
strong. With the franchise as the basis of the political framework in 
Connecticut steadily becoming more liberal since 1660, he and other con--
servatives believed that they should alter their defense. As W:Lllis ex-
pressed it: 
There are two things -'.e:t'fected since Your Honor carr..e t.o 
_the Government which I judge will much conduce to the 
welfare of the Colony if they be continued; That the· 
Magistrates and Deputies sit distinct and that the 
justices be stated and commissioned and not annually 
chosen, which will much strengthen the Government when 
they are not at the dispose of the arbitrary humors of 
the people and yet subject to be called to account bv · 
the C~neral Court or to be displaced by delinquency.4 
1. Connecticut Colonial Records, I, 96. 
2. Ibid. , I, 3 89. . 
3. Ibid., I, 253. 
4. 'M'aSS'achusetts Historical Collections, 6th Series, III, 44; cf. Mead, 
op. cit., p. 12 
'·' 
Willis suggested that the Charter be anended so that "persons of 
mean and low degree be not improved in the chiefest place of ci1dl and 
military affairs-. •• but that persons of. parentage, education, abllity, 
and integrity be settled in such office. !11 
·Several histori~ns have inferred that the introduction of bicameral-
' ' ism :i.n Connecticut was the result oft he harmonious relations e::x:isting 
between the assistants and .deputies,and not from lack of faith end con-
fidence:' 1nr each':'other~ 2 _This po~t of view is based on the fact that as 
early as 1678 the magistrates became a general council to act a. s an 
administrative body when the General Court was not in session. 'I'hat such 
·an arrangement shows harmonious relations cannot be g~insaid. But it 
should 'be noted . that by 1696 this cordiality had deteriorated. In that 
year it became customary for the acts of the Council to be submH ted for 
approval to the entire Court; two years later in May 1698 the b:i~ls of 
the Council had to be approved before they became law,not after as was 
previously the case. · With the deputies exercising such a check of the 
magistrates, nowonder there was tremendous agitation among the con-
servatives for a similar check by .the Council. To say that the intro-
duction of bicameralism in Connecticut is attributed to the harmonious 
relatione between the two groups is simply contrary to fact. 
Shortly therea·fter difficulties appeared. A serious and prolonged 
dispute arose as to whether each house possessed the negative voice in 
the appointive and elective functions, as each had in the legislative. 
In 1707, upon the death of Governor Fitz .John Winthrop while in office, 
1. N. P. Mead, op. cit., p. 12. 
2. !Loran, p. 16; w. C. Morey, First State Constitutions(Philadelphia, 
1894) p. 14. 
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a special session of the General Court was SU1ll.moned to fill the vacancy. 
The votes of both houses were mixed together before being counted, an 
uns~tisfactory arrangement. 
Nine years later, after the two houses failed to agree on the choice 
of certairl officers, the deputies passed the following resolutions: 
Resolved: That since the Honorable the Upper House do not 
think fit to agrE?e with us in the appointment of sevelral 
needful officers in this Government, this House desires 
and insists that the election of the persons not yet agreed 
upon may be now perfonned according to the privilege of the 
charter and the direction of the law whereby is given to 
each member of the assembly, an equal vote in the eloctions, 
excepting only the Governor and in his absence to thEl De~ 
uty-Governor a double vote when an equivote shall happen.1 
This appeal to the Charter by bot4 houses is characteristie, but 
h~rdly convincing. The Charter did not authorize the division of the 
General Court by simple legislation. If the G-eneral Court could effect 
such a fundamental change, it was absurd to claim that it was beyond the 
competence of that body to alter a mere formal electorial procedure. 
For a number of years afterwards, at each session of the ~~neral 
Court, the question threatened to interfere seriously with the functioning 
of the government. Finally in 1733 a compromise was reached regarding 
.. 
the selection of judicial officers. According to this agreement., either 
House could propose a list of names to be submitted to the othe .. House. 
The latter could strike out such names as it saw fit and add new ones. 
This process continued until a sufficient number of names was agreed upon 
by both Houses. While this cumbrous process worked, the question of elect-
ing non-judicial officers was not adjusted during the colonial l:lra. 
1. Quoted by N. P. Mead, op. cit., p. 18. 
CHA.PI'ER IV 
Rhode Island 
The story of the deve],opment of bicameralism in Massachusetts Bay 
up to the Glorious Revolution was essentially an account of the manner in 
which the popular party was able to check the hitherto l.UIDlolested control 
of the government by a handful of insiders. The demand for two chambers 
in Rhode Island, while ending in a similar way, came about unde:r different 
circumstances. Unlike the other colonies of New England, the towns 
which first comprised "Rhode Island and Providence Plantations" were 
joined in a democratic union in which all free holders, regardless of 
1 
their religious status, were permitted to vote. The religious element 
which played such · an essential role in Massachusetts was not involved to 
any extent with the coming of bicameralism in Rhode Island. But even 
without the presence of religious controversy, there were still many 
differences of opinion among the groups of settlers, each faction en~ 
deavoring to seek political expression and dominance. The basic political 
contest in this colony involved geographic entities rather than social 
divisions although in the case of Salem there was an element of the 
former in Massachusetts Bay. 
A brief account of the government of Rhode Island reveals its unique 
characterj.stics. Roger Williams . planted his first settlement at Provid-
ence in 1636 after he had been considered no longer desirable by the 
authorities of :Massachusetts. Within a few years, if not simuJ.taneously, 
other settlements were started on the tsland and shores of Narragansett 
41. 
Bay by men and women like Williams, who carried their religious dissidences 
one step beyond the accepted orthodoxy of the Massachusetts' leaders. 
1. Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American History (New Haven: 
1936) II, 27. 
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For example, two years after Providence was founded, a remarkable person 
named John Clarke, with his companions from Boston, sought Will:iams 1 advice 
concerning a suitable location for settling a town (they had tried north 
of Boston, but found it too chilly) and were told to buy from t he Indians · 
the island of Aquidneck, by far the largest island in Narragans,ett Bay. 
William Coddington followed the advice and established at Aquidneck the 
town of Portsmouth of which he was the first magistrate. other settle-
ments, Newport, on the same island, and Warwick, on the mainland, filled 
the quota of the four original plantations of what has since become the 
state of Rhode Island. 
It took Williams very little time to observe that it was foolhardy 
to have four disunited towns' in the same area, especially in view of the 
hostile attitude of the Indians and the antagonism of 1~ssachusetts and 
1 
Connecticut. In addition, a chart,er of some kind had to be obtained to 
• 
legalize these plantations, otherwise one could not even establish a 
town goverrunent, for there were many in these settlements who felt that 
they had no authority to set up a municipal government without the, express 
1 f th 'M 1" h th . w . k 2 approva o e nng lS crown, as was e case ~n arwlC • 
Roger Williams went to England in 1643 to procure a charter and with 
the active support of Sir Henry Vane, who was a member of the Council of 
State ruling England at this troubled period obtained the desi1~d 
document on March 14, 1644. This charter united the three settlements of 
Providence, Portsmouth and Newport, with the town of War.vick rE:!ceiving 
3 
no recognition. Roger Williams returned in the summer of 1644, yet the 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Samuel H. Brockunier, The Irrepressible Democrat{New York:1940) p. 128. 
Rhode Island Records, I, 128. 
F. N. Thorpe, Federal a.nd State Constitutions, Coloni al Charter s , and 
other Organic Laws ( 7 v . Washington, 1909 ) VI, 3210. 
sti.ffnecked independent attitude of the towns was so strong that it was 
not until May, 1647 that the settlements got together to organi<;e a 
government under the charter. Even then it took a threat from the outside 
to bring these tovms into agreement. 1 Ever encroaching Massachusetts had 
obtained a patent for Narragansett Bay and its environs at about the 
time Williams got his and i.Ir.mediately arranged to take possession of the 
area. On August 27, 1645, _the secretary of the Massachusetts ~'neral 
Court, Incr ease Nowell, wrote to Williams, requesting his presence in 
. Boston withing two months so he could explain b~r what right he E3xercised 
2 jurisdiction over the territory. The four tovms faced the cho:Lce of 
uniting under the charter or for.feiting it and being incorporat13d by 
Massachusetts Bay, the government .from which they fled. These t owns 
dallied two years before accepting Williams' charter, ·but even then the 
end r esult was more of a con.federation of sovereign towns than a unit ed 
colony. 
Obtained in a period of civil war when the Mother Country perforce 
had little interest in the type of government set up in l:ler colonies, the 
charter which Williams succeeded in acquiring was cut to fit his specific-
-
at ions. It resulted in the most democratic arrangement of the seven-
teenth ceritucy. I.t decreed that the towns should have 
full Power and Authority to rule themselves, 
and such others as shall hereafter i nhabit 
within any Part of the said tract of la.nd, by 
.fonn o.f Civil Gove!'l1I'1ent, as by volunta·ry con-
sent of all, or the greater Part of them, they 
shall find wost suitable to their Estate and 
Condition. j · 
There were two limitations to the powers of the corporation created 
by the charter: the first, a requirement .found in all such charters that 
LJ. 
1. Note: Andrews gives other reasons. Colonial Period of Ame r i can History, 
II, 26 (1936) 
~: ~~a:,Ir;a~e5~e~~~~,T~~r~;:·opp cit., XI, 3210. 
laws and punishments ~'be in conf'ormity with the ·laws of England llso 
far as the nature and constitution of the place will admit, ul .a.nd the 
second, that illl legislation be civil in nature. This latter clause 
guaranteed the separation· of Church and state. 
When Rhode Island's first General Assembly organized its ~~les of 
· procedure at Portsmouth ·· in .May 1647, its democratic character 'became evi-
dent, for it was an assembly orall the people: i.e., of all the free-
holders. At this initial meeting, a suspicion of a representative sys-
' 
tern was present in the stipulation that forty freemen would constitute 
a quorum. Since a meeting of all the freemen as a usual procedure was 
as impracticable as in the other colonies, the assembly adopted a re-
presentative system by ordering that a week before the convenin,g of a 
General Court the chief executive would notify each town that they could 
choose a committee for the transaction of their local affairs and arrange 
for the introduction of legislation at the General Court. The assembly 
also provided for a proxy vote for those unable · to attend the General 
Court in person. 
44. 
The government of Rhode Island was confederative based on the principle 
of sovereign towns; the ·General Court of the colony did not possess the 
initiative in legislat·ion, but the various town meetings. 
It is ordered that all cases presented, conceniing 
general matters for the Colony, shall be first 
stated in the towns ••• 2 
·such an extraordinary arrangement functioned in this manner. As soon 
as a resolution was accepted at a town meeting, the town clerk sent it to 
the other tovms for discus·sion and vote. Should they approve, it would 
then be sent to a committee of twenty-four men--six from each to1~-- who 
1. W. R. Staples, The Proceedings of the first General Assembl~, 1647,p. X intro. 
2. Rhode Island Colonial Records, I, 148. 
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would constitute a General Court, convened for that specific purpose. If 
this General Court found that a majority of the colony approved the 
proposal, it would stand temporarily as law until the next regular General 
Assembly of all the people met. and decided whether the law became permanent 
or not. It is instruc~ive to hote that the General Court merely acted as 
counting clerks in determining the position of the various towns. One 
should also note the distinction between the General Court and the General 
Assembly (for Rhode Isl~nd had both). The former consisted of six 
commissioners from each town who -met for special sessions to approve the 
recommendations of the various town meetings, y;rhile the Assembly was a 
meeting of all the freemen of the colony who were all present by proxy if 
t . 1 no 1n person. 
In addition to the use of both direct and indirect democracy, the 
colonial gove~ment of Rhode Island had one -other feature which placed it 
in contrast to the ·government of its neighbors. The magistrates of the 
other colonies exercised the multiple responsibilities of the legislative, 
judicial and executive powers. In Rhode Island, at this time, according to 
the concluding sections of its code of laws pertaining to the magistrates, 
neither the President nor his assistants had any legislative power. They 
11shall be conservators of the peace in the same town where they live and 
throughout the whole ~olony", 2 but the legislative power·-was reserved to 
the General Assembly of "all the people • !1' The magistrates were members of 
the General_ Court, but they were not considered as magistrates or 
1. Samuel G. Arnold, History of Rhode Island (Providence, 1860) I, 200-
204. . 
2. Rhode Island Colonial Re.r.ords, I, 192. 
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assistants during these meetings, merely as commissioners. At this time 
this General Court could not pass statutes, consequently did not. correspond 
to the General Court of Massachusett. 
The attempt to have a general assembly of all the people, oven with 
only forty constituting a quorum, became so difficult that by ~~Ly, 1648 
the Court of Commissioners of the General Court, whose function was ori gin-
ally of sessional significance, took over the law making power s of the 
General Assembly of all the people. Yet the tradition of having direct 
democracy was so strong that in the spring when the General Assembly met, 
all freemen would continue to attend this 11cciurt of elections" or send 
proxies if they so desired. 
In the May session of the General Court of Elections, the following 
resolve was adopted: 
It is ordered that a committee of six men of each 
town shall be chosen out of each town to meet four 
days before the next General C£urt and to have the full 
power of the General Assembly. 
Thus by May, 1650, the commissioners were the full-fledged ,representatives 
of the towns, but the town meeting still retained thei r preroga.ti ve to 
i nitiate and approve ' legislative proposals before passage by the Court of 
Commissioners. (General Court) 
Besides having the initiative, the towns were given anothe!r safeguard. 
in the October session of 1650. It was ordered that the "representative 
committee 11-the General Court-while given the power to pass a law, must 
send the legislation to the tovms within six days of the adjournment of 
the Court. The "Chief Officers of the town" were to stnnmon a town meeting 
within three days of the receipt of the communication and have the 
legislation read to all of the freemen. Should any freeman object to the 
1. Rhode Island Records, I, 228. 
J.aw, he had ten daysto indicate his dissati8faction to the Secretary of 
the colony. Should a majority of the freemen i n the toYm meeting oppose 
the law, the P!'esident of the colony would declare it void. Bere 1':e have 
an exact fulfillment of an arrangement which Turgot, a French statesman cf 
the next century, considered the ideal form of government,; a uniCCl.L'leral 
1 
legislat~re checked by representative groups of a more local nature . 
In this manner the colonial government of Rhode Island was controlled 
by its freemen. The centrifugal force, latent in such a systern of lttown 
rights 11 was responsible for the near disunion of the colony itself; as a 
consequence from 1651 to 1653 the infant colony of Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantation faced a critical situation. 
In October, 1649, William Coddington left his position a.s president 
and went to Englarrlwhere some eighteen months later he obtained a charter 
vrhich made him virtual dictator for life of the islands of Aquidneck and 
Conanicut, the l2rgest and most populous area of the colony, and abolished 
any pol itical connection with the tovms of Providence and War.'lick. 
John Clarke and Roger Williams were hurriedly sent to England, Clarke 
by the island to1'1ns, to obtain a repeal of Coddington's charter, and 
Williams b~r Providence and Wanric k to procure either a nevi charter or the 
renewal of the old. Vfuether Williams was instructed to obtain a new charter 
for Providence and Warwick as one authority wrote2 or to reve'rt to their 
former type of govern.ment as another contended3is difficult to say, but 
the latte r 's position sounds more convincing. 
1. Correa M. Vialsh, The Political Science of John Adams (New York, 1915) 
p. 14 .. 
2. Rhode Island Historical So ciety Collections, X, 83 . 
3. S~uel G. Arnold, History of the State of Rhode Island(~~ovidence, 1860) 
I, 239- 241. 
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It can be seen in a letter dated October 28, 1652, written by John 
Greene, the General Recorder for the colony, that Williams was told to 
have the original charter confirmed, for the writer clearly expressed the 
hope that "it be the pleasure of our protectors to renew our Charter for 
the reestablishing of our gove~ment.?l 
England ' s Council of State repealed Coddington's charter without 
delay. Unfortunately, after William Dyre returned from England with this 
welcome information and had sent letters to the towns on the main land 
requesting the presence of all the freemen at Portsmouth on a designated 
day , in order to publish the announcement in a suitable manner, Providence 
and Warwick refused to send delegations! These towns informed Dyre that 
their General Court had continued uninterruptedly ·.and, consequently, 
should there be any officialcommunication to be made, it should be made 
before this General Court. The island tov.rns proved equally stu.bborn, 
claiming that .since they were ·the larger part of the colony, t he Court 
should meet in Portsmouth. This absurd disagreement continued to divide 
the two sections until their precarious position compelled t hem to sett l e 
their differences a year later. On August 31, 1654 commissions from the 
four tovms met and agreed to reunite with the understanding that all laws 
passed by the separate assemblies would remain valid f or t he re! spective 
tovms involved. Otherwise the colony would proceed as before \mder the 
2 
authority of the charter. 
Sir Henry Vane, who v;as so instrmnental in obtaining the eharter 
originally , did not mince words in revealing his disappointment at this 
situation in Rhode Island, liThe noice echoes into the ears of all, as 
1. Rhode Island Records, I , 249. 
2. Ibid., I, 276-7. 
3. Ibid., I, 287-8. 
well friends as enemies, by every return of ships from these parts.n1 
Thus one critical peri'od in Rhodeisland 1s existence came t.o an 
end • 
. The restoration of the Stuarts embarrassed Rhode Island as it did 
the other colonies. However fervent her protestations of loyalty there 
were more difficulties, for her charter was annulled along with all the 
other acts of the Long Parliament. 
The position of Rhode Island was indeed doubly precarious . Not only 
were her more powerful neighbors intent on usurping her possess:Lons, but 
the democratic principles that she avowed were quite unappreciated, 
either at home or abroad. As the government of Rhode Island, with the 
exception of the Swiss cantons was the most democratic in exist13nce, how 
would the Divine Rig,ht Stuarts react to such a situation? 
The colony agai. n called upon Dr. John Clarke for his servicesJ this 
tithe :o he was to ask the King for 11a more absolute, .ample, and free charter · 
of civil incorporation. ~r2 It took about three years and the assistance of 
Governor Winthrop, Junior, who was in London on a similar errand for Conn-
ecticut before Rhode Island's hopes were realized. This charter, con-
taining the famous clause calling for religious toleration,passed the seals 
on July 8, .1663.3 
This Charter of 1663 did not establish a royal province bux a govern-
.ment closely patterned after the Charter of :Massachusetts. With the ex-
ception of the usual restrictions that no laws be passed contrc:Lry to the 
1. Rhode Island Records, I, 165. 
2. Ibid., I, 49. 
3. F.N.Thorpe, op. cit., VI, 3213. 
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laws of England and that one sixth of the gold and silver found in the 
area be turned over to the Crown, Rhode Island became virtually independ-
1 
ent. 
There were certain changes to be noted in the government. It now 
consisted of a governor, his deputy and ten assistants, elected at large 
by the people and eighteen deputies elected from the towns, all tenns 
being for one year. The only exception to this ruling vms that. the 
charter appointed the first governor and assistants. 
so. 
The governor, Benedict Arnold, and the assistants named in the charter 
assembled on the very day the charter arrived. This Council decided that 
a general assembly be held on the first Tuesday in lf.tarch and that until the 
spring elections, all officers of the colony, both civil and military, 
remain in their positions. 
In this manner the government based on the Charter of 1644 came to an 
end. It was an interesting experiment, but it had conferred such 
privileges and powers on the colonist that it had drained the energy of the 
gove!'I"l..ment. In effect' the four towns had remained almost independent of 
each other, with the colonial government acting not so much upon the 
individuals who composed the colony, as upon the corporate t mms of the 
confederation. So loose in fact was the arrangement that the colony would 
have been powerless in keeping the four towns together had there not been 
extensive pressure from the outside. 
The contrast between the government of Rhode Island based on the 
Charter of 1644 and that based on the Charter of 1663 is interesting. As 
we have already seen, the former consisted of a General Court oi 
1. Andrews, op. cit., II, 48. 
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Commissioners, six from each town or tvrent;r-four in all. At thB spring 
session of the Court, the Commissioners would elect from among -themselves 
a governor and assistants from each town. However, while the governor and 
assistants were members of the Court of Commissioners, they were acting 
merely as commissioners and not in any other capacity. A commissioner 
would become governor or an assistant, but in the court he was merely 
another member of the group. The only exception t.o this policy was the 
customary practice of having the governor act as the presiding officer of 
the General Court. The entire arrangement reflected the superiority of 
the. legislature over the executive. 
This was not the situation under the subsequent setup. Now the 
governor and his assistants were elected at large by the freeme:n while the 
l 
deputies were elected by the towns. According to one writer, the 
different methods of elections .incorporated in the Charter of 1663 con-
stituted the germ of the bicameral system. That is only part of the 
explanation. It would be more to the point to · observe that thEl governor 
and the assistants were no longer dependent for their authority on the 
Court. Now the legislature was not supreme. Under the nevi arrangement, 
the magistrates sat in the General Court as magistrates and not as 
commissioners, or to use the more familiar tenn, deputies. It was more 
significant that under the royal charter the magistrates could meet without 
the presence of the deputies and engage in legislative activity, conduct 
unheard of under the Charter of 1644. No better illustration of this can 
be seen than the council meeting held on November 2.5, 166.5, whten the 
governor, deputy-governor, and the assistants met and discussed various 
1. Moran, op. cit., pp. 23-4. 
1 
administrative problems. 
Another fact which should not be overlooked in regards to t;he r oyal 
charter was the stipulation that, although the General Assembly would 
comprise both magistrates and deputies, valid legislatiOn was contingent 
upon the presence of the greatest part of both groups. This is more 
clearly ·defined in regards to the magistrates, for the charter :reads that 
the governor or deputy-governor with any six of the assistants, making at 
2 
least seven magistrates "shall have,. •• full power ••• authority.•.t 
52. 
The change from a confederacy to a more unified colony can be detected 
in the fact that, while the Charter of 1644 gave each tovm without 
exception, six commissioners, its successor distributed deputies in 
accordance with the size of the community. Accordingly, Nev~ort was 
entitled to six deputies, the other three original towns, four, and all 
other tovms to be incorporated, two. This ration was soon changed t o five, 
three, two, with Newport .. the commercial center of the period having the 
3 
greatest total, and Portsmouth and Warwick two each. 
The distinction now recognized between the three branches of govern.-
ment was not understood too explicitly at this time, hence it is not 
surprising to find that Rhode Island's new charter presented the same 
union of functions as the Massachusetts Charter of 1629. The governor and 
assistants or the Council were ex-officio legislators in common with the 
deputies and in addition exercised judicial powers both individually and 
collectively. With one group of legislators having such additj_onal 
prerogatives, it was inevitable that a movement would set in among the 
deputies to retire among themselves in order to restrain their magisterial 
1. Rhode Island Records, II, 63. 
2. Ibid., II, 9. 
3. Ibid., II, 33 • 
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colleagues. After all, since the line of demarcation between administration 
and legislation is often difficult to ascertain, the magistrates as 
~xecutors could fonnulate their legislation in the guise of adm:lnistrative 
:n.llings while the deputies would be reduced to an advisory poliey- an 
appendage of the General Court. 
In Rhode Island the movement to place the magistrates and deputies 
in different houses came from the deputies. The first mention of the long 
agitation for bican eraliam came during the session of the General Court in 
October, 1664, .but the motion was tabled for the following session.1 The 
origin of this proposal was somewhat similar to that of Massachusetts . Jm t 
as the movem~nt toward bicameralism had been assisted by the jealous,y of 
Salem toward Boston, in Rhode Island the movement was supported by the 
chronic dissatisfaction of Warwick and Portsmouth, a dissatisfaction which 
had been in existence since the granting oft he royal charter. There were 
several grounds for complaint: their quota of assistants had been reduced 
to insignificance; both towns believed that the tax ra.ites levie:d by the 
assembly to pay John Clarke were too high; and Warwick had her ovm pr·ivate 
grievance. The General Court had oustered an Edmund Cal verly,. one of 
Warwick's deputies, from his seat in the assembly because he had been un-
able to prove a charge he had made against the governor. 
On April 10, 1666, the deputies from Warwick and Portsmouth moved in 
the General Court that the deputies and the magistrates sit separately. 
The General Court passed the proposal which would become effective in the 
following May session with the assurance 11that neither house in the 
General Assembly shall have power With the concurrence of the znajor part of 
1. Rhode Island Records, II, 63. 
the other Rouse, to make any law or order to be accounted as an act of the 
1 General Assembly;.·~ 
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However, when the Assembly met in May, the absence of several deputies 
2 
compelled the assembly to adjourn until the following June~ Apparently 
there was another failure to have a quorum, for the next meeting of which 
there is any record took place in September, 1666. One of the first acts 
which the asse~bly performed was to reverse its decision, thus continuing 
to have the magistrates and deputies sit together. 3 No reasons are given 
in the brief account of this session, but whatever factors were involved, 
it is apparent that the magistrates, with the support of a few deputies 
blocked the adoption of bicameralism. 
The October, 1666 meeting of the General Assembly put an end to this 
question for the time being • 
••• This Assembly having had long and serious debates 
about the premises, do order that the Co~t doe sitt 
together in one house until the Assembly take further 
or other order therein.4 
Within a year of this victory for the magistrates, a train of circum-
stances made it impossible to delay further the desire of the deputies. In 
~~y, 1667, the governor and council inaugurated a series of meetings to 
handle important matters arising between sessions of the General Court. 
The hostility of the French and Dutch, together with the enmit~· of the 
Indians, culminating in King Philip's War, made this a critical period 
for the colony. Extraordinary steps had to be taken, but theSEi separate 
meetings only differentiated further the functions and powers of the 
1. Rhode Island Records,II, 144-h$.- • 
2. Ibid., II, lhB. 
3. _Ibid., II, pp. ··l~0-1. 
4. Ibid., II, 181. 
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magistrates and the deputies. Since the magistrates wer e meeting by them-
selves after the attempt to separate the two groups had failed, the 
deputies sought a comprom · e . The representatives of the towns moved on 
May 7, 1668 that they would have pennission to withdraw for con:sultation 
for no more than half an hour at a time, provided that was the wish of 
the majority of the deputies. 1 Since these meetings were to be held 
during the sessions of the Assembly, and not before or after, the necessity 
for requesting this privilege is not strange. They were assured that no 
law would be passed in their absence. 
Historians of Rhode Island generally agree that this practice marked 
the acceptance of .the essence of bicameralism by that col~ny. 
At the same time the support by the people of the towns for their 
deputies became more evident. The anxiety to prevent any important act 
from becoming a law l'dthout adequate expression oi: the will of the people 
had been a prominent characteristic of the history of Rhode Island. 
Frequently the Assembly had passed laws making both assistants and deputies 
liable to fines for abuse of their authority. This was done without 
dist incti on between, or favoritism toward, either group, but in the session 
of November 6, 1672 there was a new note sounded. Th~ Charter of 1663, 
democratic· as it was, gave all the powers of the Assembly to the magistrates 
in times of invasion, yet in the light of the Petition of Hight, of 1628, 
the people of Rhode Island felt that an exception should be made .in 
matters of taxation and that no taxes should be assessed upon the colony 
without full representation from all the towns no matter how chaotic the 
situation. The significant new note was that in the eyes of the people tre 
deput~es were the prototypes of the members of the English House of Commons 
1. Rhode Island Records, II, 223. 
and should have the same privileges. The deputies found out that the 
presence of a majority of them did not constitute a quorum and, in 
November, 1672, they made a formal demand for greater recogniti.on.1 11 ••• As 
the House of Commons in the people's representative there, and the Deputys 
the representatives of the freemen here ••• 112 This is a step be,yond 
merely considering the deputies as separate and distinct from the assist-
ants. 
Following this declaration of principle,the General Court enacted on 
the same day in November, 1672: 
••• t hat noe tax nor rate from henceforth shall be 
made, layd or levied on the inhabitants of this 
Collony without the consent of t~e Deputys present 
pertaining to the whole Collony. 
lflhile this did not mean that matters of finance m~st originate with 
the deputies, they claimed and won the power to possess the negative voice 
in such matters. 
However the most important element of that day's business was the 
enactment of a law making all legisle.tion regarding the 11 peoph3 1 s ancient 
right and liberties" null and void should the majority of the deputies be 
absent at the time.4 
In the session of 1\fu.y, 1678 this revolt against the magistrates con-
tinued. The deputies amended the law of 1672 which stipulated that no 
tax could be assessed without the full representation of the deputies by 
making it necessar,y that a notice be ·given to every town by the governor 
that a tax was to be assessed, otherwise no tax could be made. This indeed 
was a throwback to the practice under the old charter. 
1. F. L. Riley,ttColonial Origins of New England Senates", Jobns Hopkins 
UniveJ:'sity Studies, XIV, 64. -
2. Rhode Island Records, II, 472. 
3. Ibid., II, pp". --472-4. 
4. Ibid., II, 473, A.foran, op. cit., pp. · 22 -26. 
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With the coming to power of James II, Rhode Island fa ced the same 
crisis as did the other New England colonies; in some ways it was more 
serious than that of 1660. The union of the northern colonies under one 
governor for defensive and administrative matters had for some time been 
a Stuart dream, a dream which James cherished even as the Duke of York. 
However, before this plan for a "Dominion of New England" could be set up, 
the governments and political privileges which these New England colonies 
had been exercising had to be swept aside. 
In 1685 Quo Vlarranto proceedings were started against Rhode Island, 
which culminated in the revoking of her charter and the dissolution of 
51. 
the assembly the follovling June. The stringent measures taken by the royal 
executor, Sir Edmond Andros, to consolidate the New England a~la under 
direction of his king antagonized the majority of its inhabitants, both 
as to plan and method. Still it is curious to find that .AndroB, so often 
. pictured as the autocrat and foe of human liberty in Massachusf:tts, was 
far more courteously treated by Rhode Island, the roost democrat ic of the 
'New England colonies than he was by the others. ¥fuatever the :reasons :for 
this courtesy, it had important political consequences. In his dispatches 
to the Privy Council, Andros spoke favorably of this political product of 
Roger Williams and John Clarke, with the result that her royal charter was 
restored-tardily it is true-as soon as William and Mary assumed the throne. 
Again Rhode Island possessed its royal charter, but by 1690 times 
had changed. Forthe first time political parties with differences based 
more on principles and less on personal issues came into existence. Prior 
to 1690 Rhode Island had been torn with controversy among the towns and among 
such political leaders as Coddington; the questions at issue were mostly 
points of personal influence and ambition. There were as many .factions as 
there we.re towns. Now the political parties which divided the colony were 
two, one composed of the wealthier merchants and landowners who supported 
the royalist program, while the other made up of the ~ess influential 
desired a return to the charter. Among this f i rst group was a merchant of 
Newport, ~rancis Brinley, who represented its point of view as clearly as 
1 
anyone. He bitterly denounced the popular faction for resuming the charter 
and sought what he constdered a more commodious government esta.blished by 
the King for all of New England. Nevertheless the democrat ic faction was 
victori ous, and in May, 1690 the charter was returned and all laws voided 
in 1686 were reenacted. The bitterness emanating from the conflict over 
the question of the restoration of the· charter brought about the final 
separation of the deputies and assistants into two houses. So, while the 
popular faction in Massachusetts at this time prevented the readoption of 
the old Massachusetts Charter of 1624, its counterpart in Rhod1~ Island 
·not only succeeded in returning to the liberal Charter of 1664, but six 
years later in 1696 adopted the Warwick proposal made thirty years earlier 
to separate the t wo groups in the Assembly. Under this b~cameral arrange-
ment the deputies became a coordinate branch of the legislature, having 
the right to select their own speaker and clerk, and veto the proceedings 
of the other house. 
While Rhode Island was organized under her original charter, there 
was no demand that the Court of Commission be separated into two bodies 
for the obvious reason that it was totally lacking in legislative power. 
However, after 1663, with the General Court becoming a force to be 
considered, the demand for two houses was almost immediately heard. A 
58. 
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second point which may have some validity is a comparison between the 
impulses for federation and bicameralism. Both impulses come from 
divergent interests, from segments of the populationJ the difference 
being that the forces for the making of federation are sectional or 
horizontal while the force for the existence of bicameralism are social or 
vertical. 
In perspective it can be seen that the initative for two separate 
houses ca~e from the democratic elements of the government-the deputies. 
They had sought this restraint on the magistrates ever since the check 
which the people of the towns exercised under the Charter of 1644 had 
been removed. Prior to that time no division in the Assembly was demanded 
because it was not needed. 
60. 
CHAPI'FR V 
New York 
The essential use of two legislative houses has been to permit 
antagonistjc elements of society to exercise approximately equal legisl-
ative authority. The development of bicameralism in proprieta~y and 
royal colonies brings out this necessity for two houses with c~neo clarity. 
'' 
The si~ilarity between these two types of colonies can be seen in the' 
case of New York which changed so quickly from the proprietary status to 
the royal. 
The use of two houses in colonies which were proprietary and royal 
from the beginning . was clearly the result of two concurrent causes. First, 
the original custom of the colony, whereby the governor and his council, 
representing the interest of the proprietor or king, were required to 
submit their proposals to the assembly of freemen; and second, the success-
fnl demands made by the freemen to initiate legislation, to be submitted 
1 later to the governor and council for approval. . 
The governmental experience of New York under Dutch rule m'led not 
concern us. Bicameralism presupposes a legislature, an institution which 
did not exist in New Netherlands. The regime under the Dutch WE3st. India 
Company was autoteratic; what assembly existed was only advisory. Our 
interest in the colony begins with its capture in 1664 by the Royal 
Commission of Charles II, after which the colony was :illlmediately handed over 
to the Duke of York and renamed. As the Duke of York possesses an 
unenviable reputation among historians for his views regarding the royal 
prerogative, it is interesting to ascertain his views on the subject of 
bicamer alism. 
1. William c. Morey, ttFirst State Constitutions 11 ~ Annals of thH American 
Academy of Political and Social Science>(l893J XV, p. 14. 
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The Duke of York did not tTeat his new subjects harshly, but attempted 
to vtin tneir good-will and to coax them to declare their allegiance to 
the Crown of England, for his patent specified that his governmental powers 
should only extend to English subjects and made no provision for resident 
1 
aliens. He entrusted the control of the government to Richard Nicolls, 
who had charge of the English seizure of the territory, with thE~ instruct.:.. 
ions to set up an administrative body consisting of himself and a council 
whom he would pick with the approval of the Duke. The new proprietary 
government continued to be as similar to its Dutch predecessor as possible, 
for the Duke did not ' deem it advisaole to change the character of the 
institutions too suddenly, but to alter them so gradually that the Dutch 
would not realize the transformation to English procedure. The deputy-
governor of the proprietor-the Unke was the governor-with his council took 
the place of the director general and council of the West India Company. 
The judicial powers which previously had been exercised by the director's 
council when it sat as a court of law, were entrusted to a 11 Court of 
Assizestt, which Nicolls made the supreme tribunal of the _province. The 
Court of Assizes held an annual session on the last Thursday of September 
in New York City. A full bench included the deputy-governor, his council 
of five, the high sheriff and the three justices of the peace. This 
highest tribunal differs from its prototypes in the othe r colonies ~~ere 
the magistrates, comprising the coundil, acted as the highest court . 
However, inNew York, several magistrates, who were not members of the 
council, joined the body acting in its judicial capacity. The Court of 
1. Herbert L. Satterlee, The Political History of the Province of New 
~,(New York, 1885) p. 53. 
Assizes, as a law making body, was in no sense a provincial assembly or 
1 
legislature . It did not voice the popular feeling. It was wholly 
dependent on the deputy-governor 1 s wj_ll for it was created and prorogued 
by him. Nicolls invested the Court with the supreme power of making, 
altering, and abolishing any laws in the government of New York, but, 
actually he practically narrowed its function down to the registry of his 
edicts. Nicolls next set about introducing in the colony such English 
fo rms of government as he thought were acceptable at the time. Although 
familiar with the Duke's disapproval of popular assemblies, he thought it 
expedient, under the circU!Ilstances, to comply at least outviardly with 
the sentiment of the inhabitants. 
Nicolls accordingly ordered that delegates should be chosen by the 
several toYmships so that they could meet together and give him their 
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advice and information. Such a meeting occurred in the village of Hempstead 
on Long Island late in February, 166.5. Seventeen townships responded, 
each sending two delegates. This convention was not at all what the 
freeholders expected it would be; it was not a lawmaking assembly, much 
less an Assembly of the Province of New York. Nicolls, obedien~ to his 
instructions, did not allovr it to exercise any legislative funct ions, but 
confined its action to the ratification of the measures which hB himself 
prepared. 
This was the situation during the first few years of the Duke of 
York's proprietorship. In 1668 Francis Lovelace, who i s famous at least 
for his infamy, succeeded Nicolls as deputy-governor. After New York was 
restored to English control in 1674, the well known Edmund Andros 
1. E. B. 0 1 Callaghan, The Documentary History of the State of New York 4vols. 
(Albany, 18.50) I, S9. 
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succeeded Lovelace. 
On the first day of November, 1674 Andros, commissioned as Governor 
of New York, landed and assumed command of the provincial goven~ent. 
The problem of placsting the Dutch was urgent. The Duke direct1ed him to 
choose from among the more prudent persons in the province an advisory 
council, not to exceed ten in number. This council was to be consulted on 
all questions relating to the public good or the service of the Dutch. The 
councillors were to hold office during plea$ure or upon conviction of 
crime. 
At this time the question of a general assembly, which had been 
agitated under both Nicolls and Lovelace, again became prominent. The 
people wanted a voice in the legislature, but Andros would r~ot, in fact 
could not, listen to their suggestions and firmly suppressed any moves in 
that direction. 
The Duke expressed his disapproval of popular assemblies in a letter, 
dated January 28, 1676, to his deputy-governor: 
I cannot but suspect they (assemblies) would be of 
dangerous consequence, nothing being more known than. 
the aptness of such bodies to assume to themselves 
many privileges which prove destructive to, or very 
oft disturb, the peace of government where they are 
allowed.l 
This attitude is not surprising for all proprietors, vThether consisting of 
one man or a group, held such sentiments. 
In 1678 the popular discontent, which had been smoldering 1.mder Andros 1 
repressive measures, again broke out. The inhabitants of New York had 
learned t:r.at according to the charter of Pennsylvania, which had just been 
granted, the freemen were allowed to meet in an assembly and to participate 
1. New Yo r k Colonial Documents, III, 235; quoted by Satterlee:, op. cit., 
pp. 65-6. 
in legislation and taxation. Wben the Court of Assizes met in New York, 
its members listened to the general complaints concerning this e:;rievance 
and instructed John Younge, the High Sheriff of Long Island, to draw up 
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a petition to the Duke. This work was favorably received and the address 
was presented in the name of the council of the province, the aldermen of 
New York and of the justices assembled at a special Court of Assizes held 
on January 29, 1681. Thus, representatives of all classes joine~d in 
entreating a share in legislation for the people. The Duke appreciated the 
threatened crisis and when he learned from Andros (whom he calle1d to 
London for the purpose) the true state of affairs, he determined to make 
conce s sions to the people rather than hazard losing the colony. This 
change in approach necessitated a change in administrations. On 
September 30, 1682, the Duke of York commissioned Colonel ThomaE> Dongan, 
a personal friend of his, to be Andros• successor. 
Shortly thereafter the force of public opinion made necessar.y the 
first attempt at a representative body. In his instructions, issued 
January 27, 1683, Governor Dongan was ordered to SUIJ1.mon a repreE:entative 
assembly to join with h:imself and council in making laws "fit and 
necessary to be made and established for the good weal and government 11 of 
thf': colony •1 Governor Dorigan did as he was directed. On Octobe1r 1, 1673 
the first legislative· asst=-..mbly of New York convened. It was a bicameral 
body, the governor and council constituting one house and the 
representatives of the towns the other. The first meeting of this double 
assembly passed a most important act, the Charter of Liberties, in 
accordance with which the government of the colony was to be organized and 
1. Moran, op. cit., pp. 35-6. 
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administered under the ultimat.e control of the Duke of York. This act 
formally made provisions for two distinct chambers. 
Such an arrangement illustrated perfectly the essential pm~pose of 
bicameralism; i. e., to permit disparate segments of a society to have 
equal legislative authority. It goes without saying that the more 
illusionary this is the better for the special interests. The experience 
of New York in adopting bicameralism was repeated by the other proprietary 
and royal colonies. In these colonies the introduction of bicruneralism 
in the course of the colony's political life was much earlier than was the 
case in the charter colonies. Another point to observe from thE~ 
experience of New York which she had in common with other colonies of the 
same type is that the demand for two legislative chambers came i nvariably 
from the great mass of their inhabitants. 
Under this form of government, if the governor considered ijhe sug-
gested piece of legislation beneficial, he was authorized to endorse it; 
should the situation be otherwise, he had the power of veto. YBt this 
power could be exercised only at the discretion of the Duke of York, for 
as soon as a measure was initiated in assembly, the governor sent it 
immediately to the Proprietor for approval and until he received a reply, 
the law was to be considered valid if passed in the interim. 
What is of particular interest is the concession made by the Duke of 
York in regards to financial matters. He had instructed his deputynot 
upon any pretence or colour of law or other establis:~ent 
to raise or take or suffer any person to demand, le~y, raise 
or take any money or other things for or by way of custom or 
impost, for any goods, wares or merchandise imported or 
exported by any merchant or other person whatsoever until 
the same shall be and established by law to be made by the 
general representative of the pr ovince. 1 
1. New York Colonial Documents, III, 33. 
Agitation for the right of self-taxation had existed in Ne-w York long 
before the English took over and continued under the Duke of York's 
proprietorship. Here we find this right guaranteed to the people of New 
York for the first time and it was never relinquished. 
The extent of popular participation in the assembly is not clear. The 
eighteen writs addressed to the various officials in the province presum-
ably authorized each to superintend the election of one delegate, since 
there were eighteen delegates returned. The manner in which they were 
chosen is nowhere specified, but they were to be elected by the "freehold-
ers" and a majority of the first assembly were Dutchmen. 
The Charter of Liberties and Privileges was enacted October 30, 1683. 
Alas, however, the Proprietor never confirmed this enactment. As soon as 
his veto was received in the colony, it was declared null and void. The 
Duke of York had approved j_t originally, but as soon as he became James II, 
he felt that he no longer had to make concessions to retain his position. 
He returned the lawmaking power to the governor and council and the 
representative body was abolished. The government of the colony devolved 
upon Dongan and his five man council. This form. of government continued 
under Andros illltil Jacob Leisler took the government in his own hands in 
1689. The first attempt at bicameralism in Nffi'r York had come to an 
abrupt ending. 
Leisler was a German merchant who had lived in New York S()me thirty 
:years. Being greatly discontented with the system of taxation·-he was one 
of the largest importers and custom payers in the city-and DUtch in 
s;ym.pathy rather than English, he spread the news of the flight of James 
and the reception of t he Dutch William in England. On Iv1ay 31, 1689 he 
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called on the loyaity of the Dutch inhabitant.s to the House of Orange 
and with a group of mutinous soldiers, seized the fort for King William, 
assuming the reins of goYernment . The rebellion was not accompanied 
with bloodshed since Nicholson, the deputy-governor, passively sul:mitted; 
his excuse being that he was without orders from Andros who was then con-
fined in Boston. All official cornmunications, directed to the New York 
provincial authorities, were opened by Leisler who considered h:imself 
the rightful lieutenant-governor of' the province.1 He proclaim!~d William 
and Mary, King and Queen, but he f'ailed to publish William's significant 
proclamation of' February 14, which confirmed all crovm of'ficials in 
their positions . 
News of' Leisler 1 s usurpation was immediately sent to England. On 
November 14, 1689 instructions were issued to Henry Slaughter to become 
governor of the colony. This is important for thi.s commission restored 
the representative assembly with all its rights and privileges . In f'act, 
with some slight modifica t ion, it formed the fundamental law of New York 
until the Revolution . The first session of the legislature was held on 
April 9, 1691 with the two bodies sitting apart , the governor presiding 
over the council. 
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The assembly consisted of f'reeholders in accordance with t he practice 
of' the other colonies in America . Under the regulation of 1686, all · 
statutes, enacted ~~th the consent of the council And a majorit~- of the 
assembly,were to be sent to the King within three months and he was to 
approve or disallow them as he might see f'it. If disallowed, they became 
absolutel y null and void . Whenever the governor should ju ' e it necessar.y, 
he could adjourn, prorogue or dis solve the general assembly. Furthermore 
1_, 0 1 Callaghan, op. cit·., II, 222. 
he had an absolute veto on the action of that body. 
JJmnediately on his arrival, Sloughter commenced the work of evolving 
order from the political chaos that existed. Having sworn in the twelve 
councilors named in his letter of instructions, he t hen brought Leisler 
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to account for his behaviour. Leisler would have undoubtedly been acquitted 
if his only offence had been the assumption of the lieutenant-governo rship 
under the commission from the people, but the most serious charge against 
him as that of refusing to surrender the fort to Captain Ingolsby (Slaughter's 
1 
representative) and on this count he was convicted and executed. 
King William 1 s form of government for New York consisted, theoretically, 
of three distinct branches. In realHy, however, there were but two as 
the governor sat and voted with the council in their legislative proceed-
ings. As its presiding officer, he cast the deciding ballot in case of a 
tie. Being subject to such control by the governor, the assembly could 
·hardly act as a restraint upon him, especially since he could veto its 
measures. In fact, what developed was just the contrary: the assembly, 
during its existence, was effectively checked by both the governor and 
council as it was by the king. All the powers it possessed were granted 
as privileges, not as rights and could be cancelled at will. In other 
words it was a sem-democratic government held in sufferance. The king was 
sovereign in America, even if he wasn't at home. 
A charter transferring the sovereignty of the king to the people of 
the colony of New York was not obtained until the Constitution of 1777, a 
direct fruit of the Revolution. Prior to 1777, the constitution of their 
rights had been based on precedent. This precious collection of established 
l. Satterlee, op. cit., p. 97. 
rights became evident as early as 1638 and reached its climax w:ith the 
right of representative assembly and its attendant right of self-
taxation. 
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CRil..PTER VI 
Maryland 
At the present time it is difficult to appreciate the intensity of 
feeling that existed in the colonies regarding the structure of a colonial 
legislature, a question which appears so academic. Yet in the pa st the 
solution of this problem frequently meant political supremacy for one group 
and suppression for the other. Two colonies in which this struggle was 
especially bitter were Haryland and Pennsylvania. Although both Maryland 
and Pennsylvania were propr:i_etary colonjes and there were certain similar-
ities in their approach to this dispute over one or two legislative 
chambers, there were differences sufficient to warrant a study of both 
situations. Their respective contretemps over this subject came at entiray 
different periods of time, in fact in different centuries. In Maryland the 
issue was hammered out roughly between 1640 and 1660, while in Pennsyl-
va.nia the furor occurred between 1776 and 1790. Another noticeable 
difference which might bear explaining was the fact that bicameralism was 
adopted in Maryland during the proprietary period,while in Pennsylvania . 
the issue did not come up until the Revolution necessitated a new state 
constitution. 
Two factors which made the issue in Maryland such a fierce contest 
was the religious cleavage among the settlers of the colony and the extra-
1 
ordinary powers of the Lord Proprietor granted in the Maryland charter. 
If distrust of one's fellow citizens is the background which produces 
bicameralism, the situation in Maryland furnished factors most conducive 
for its existence. 
1. Cf. "Virginia and Mar.yland, or the Lord Baltimore 1 s Printed. Case 
Uncased and Answered, 1665rt Narrative of Early Maryland, Clayton C. 
Hall (ed.) l9101pp. 187-207. 
The more clearcut and obvious be the social and political eleavage 
in a colonial society, the more immediate was the demand for a political 
counterweight in t.he legislature. In the seventeenth and eight·eenth 
centuries the only political check which either non- proprietary or non-
privileged groups of any sort could strive for was a second legislative 
chamber exercising a negative voice. The other checking device which 
existed was the executive veto which they did not possess. The practice 
of judicial review simply did not exist at the time so there was no use in 
seeking redress from the courts; especially since the highest co 1.1rt was 
none other than the legislature itself. 
The Maryland proprietor received his .full share of political power. 
In the original charter of George Calvert, first Lord Baltimore, which 
conveyed to him unlimited territorial and governmental rights between the 
Potomac River and the .fortieth parallel, he was called "absolute lord and 
1 
proprietor. ~ Yfuat such an extraordinary title signified remained to be 
seen, for it was at the time it was granted archaic and preposterous. The 
reaction to this was swift. 
The general assembly of Maryland arose from the desire whi.ch the 
English immigrants carried with ·them to the New World, to participate in 
the enactment of the laws by which they were governed. This principle 
was confi rmed in the charter itself, which stated that laws wei~ to be 
enacted: 
with the advice, assent and approbation of the Free Men of 
the same Province, or of the greater part of them, or of 
their delegates, or of the greater part of them whom we 
will, shall be called together for the framing of laws 
when as often as need shall require, by this .foresai d Baron 
of Baltimore, and his hei2s, and in the .fonn which shall 
seem best to him or them. 
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1 . H. s. Commager, (ed.) Documents of American History(New Yor~, 1948) p . 21. 
2 • . E. s. Riley, History of t.he General Assembly of :Maryland, __ 63.5-1904 
(Baltimore,l90S) p. 1 . 
72. 
In other words, while the charter called for a general assembly:, the 
proprietor could detennine when and how it would be selected. 
The first assembly met in 1635. No records were kept, so 1~e do not 
1 
know how it was summoned or what it accomplished. There is more inform-
ation about the assembly which met almost two years later. The manner of 
summoning was more or less informal. The governor, the proprietor's 
deputy, issued personai writs of summons to the members of the eouncil and 
to a few others, such as the commanders of political subdivisions knovm as 
hundreds. The sunnnons to these commanders were more than personal, for 
they requested the attendance also of all worthy persons and gave the free-
men of the hundred the privilege of attending in person or of s13nding 
delegates . There were, to be noted, two types of writs used; the special, 
summoning the leading citizens of the colony by n~e; and the g13neral, 
SUlTI.ni.oning the freemen collectively. As was the case in other colonies, the 
plan was for all freemen to be present or with this impossible, various 
freemen would act as 11 proxies 11 or delegates for those unable to attend. 
This rather easy-going procedure ran into diff iculty, for the question 
inevitably arose: Are the delegates merely to convey decisions made before-
hand or are they to make decisions on behalf of these freemen? There is 
a world of difference. In the first case, the delegates acted as a 
messenger and possessed no especial importance but in the latter case, he 
became a plenipotentiary of a sort; he became the representative of these 
freemen. Even if these men were sent as proxies, it was impossible for 
them not to act on occasion as representatives. Then these feYr wielded 
tremendous influence. Thus, when the most important question of the session 
1. Riley, OE• cit, p. 1. 
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was put t o a vote, nineteen delegates cast sixty-nine votes. The complaint 
was the the governor and his secretary controlled the assembly in their 
1 
roles as proxies. 
Maryland's second general assembly, in spite of the fact that the 
proprietor eventually disapproved of its legislation, did succeed in 
establishing one precedent; i . e., t he right of the freeman of the province 
to initiate their own l aws, a privilege that Baltimore had believed was 
his exclusive prerogative. The manner of i ssuing the writs of summons 
rema:i_ned strictly up to the proprietor and the governor. Y'tlflen writs were 
issued in December, 1638, there was a · new ·de,.relopment. This time there 
were three t ypes of summons. There was the personal summons to each 
member of the council and sundry other gentlemen, t he v~its sent to the 
hundreds, directing t hat two or more delegates should be chose; and the 
latest , a writ to the one manor that did not state the number of delegates . 
Summoned in this manner, the freemen of :M..aryland were able t o initiate and 
enact legislation which appeared to them to be mo st needed, the one 
obstacle being the approval of the Lord Proprietor. 
The American colonies werenever isolated from events occurTing in 
the mother colmtry. As these political changes were slowly evolving in 
Maryland, the civil war of the 1640 1 s had its repercussions wi thin Lord 
Balti.rnore 1 s domain. By 1642 the unrest had become so evident that the 
gove rnor felt it necessary to summon the fourth .of his general assemblies. 
Immediately the anti-royalist movement took an anti-proprietary bias and 
the delegates made their first efforts to determine for themselves the 
fo nn and membership of the assembly, heretofore the privilege of the 
proprietor. The delega.tes r equested that the assembl y be divided into t wo 
1 . Newton D. l'i!.areness, Maryland as a Proprietary Province, (New York, 1901 ) 
p. 194. 
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houses, with themselves constituting one house and possessing the right to 
1 
turn dovm legislation not meeting their approval. As the Journal reads 
for July 18, 1642, 110n this day an effort was made to separate the two 
Houses . Robert Vaughan, of Kent, in the name of the rest, desired that the 
House might be separated, and the Burgesses to be by themselves and to 
2 
have the negative; but it was not granted by the Lieutenant Governor. 1.t 
The mention of the island of Kent is most interesting. No student of 
the American colonies is unfamiliar with the famous feud between Lord 
Baltimore and William Cl-aiborne. Claiborne had settled on Kent Island in 
the Chesapeake as early as 1631. He refused to consider himself within 
the jurisdiction of the WJ.aryland charter and rejected all overtures from 
the Proprietor. By 1638 he had _lost the first round in this jurisdictional 
dispute. In 1642, endeavoring to undermine the position of Baltimore, 
Claiborne went to England, but it is significant that a delegate from his 
settlement on Kent was in the vanguard in demanding the use of t wo legisl-
ative chambers. Just as the deputies from Salem sought by this means to 
, curtail the i nfluence of Boston, so the settlement on Kent Island sought 
to restrict the power of St. Mary 's and thus that of the Proprietor. 
In 1642 the issue of two houses resulted in a compromise. Vihile the 
idea of establishing two houses was rejected, as a concession to the 
delegates, three committees were appointed, having the responsibility· of 
preparing legislation prior to the convening of the assembly proper. How 
these committees were to be appointed or how much control they had over 
each other, it is impossible to determine; but one fact is clear, the 
assembly which the proprietary delegates controlled was deprived of its 
1. Proceedings and Acts of the Li-enera1 1issernbly, 1631-1664,p. 130. 
2. E. s. Riley, op. cit., p. 12. 
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power of ir;litiation. 
As the Puritans slowly gai ned control in England, affairs became more 
difficult for the Proprietor in lf~ryland to handle. Between October, 1644 
and December, 1646 Governor Calvert fled into exile ih Virginia, while 
from 1652 to 1657 a Ocmmi~sion sent by the Purit2n Parliament governed 
1~ryland. William Claiborne was a member of this Commission (which was 
acting illegally) so he had his revenge, temporary as it was, on the 
1 
Baltini_ores . Such a rapid change of fortune between the Proprietor and 
his enemies who were now triumphant had a great impact on the legislative 
aspect of the Maryland government as it did on the executive. There is a 
vagueness about the exact year when bicameralism was first introduced into 
Maryland, but i t appears that, between Calvert's exile in Virgi nia and the 
2 
arrival of the Parliamentary Commission, an act passed ·in April, 1650 
divided the Maryland Assembly into two houses. Governor William Stone was 
compelled to accept two houses on principle, with the upper house consist-
ing of the members of the council and presided over by the governor. 
Bicameralism did not last, for the use of t wo houses was discontinued 
during the five years of the Comrrission government. The Puritan faction, 
now dominant, did not Want a second house reflecting the sentiments of the 
Proprietor. After his return in 1657, this faction, sufficiently strong, 
demanded the readoption of bicameralism as one of the conditions of propriet-
ary rule. The adoptj_on and readoption of bicameralism were decided set-
backs for the Lord Proprietor, one of many that reached its climax with 
the defeat of Governor Stone at the so-called Battle of Severn on March 25, 
1655. It wasn't until 1657 •vith the coming of Governor Josias Fendall 
that the Proprietary rights were restored to the Baltimores. Even so, 
1 . cf. Qiction~ry_ of American Bioeraphl , IV, p. 115. 
2. P;I;oceedings and Acts of the General Assemb1y1637-1664, I, ~: 72. 
the proprietary position remained precarious in the face of intrigue and 
betrayal and it was necessary for the Lord Proprietor to utili~~ e every 
political weapon at his disposal to maintain his position. One of these 
weapons was an upper legislative chamber. Bicameralism, paradoxically 
enough, became a tremendous bulwark for the Proprietor, for now that the 
Proprietor's forces were numerically in the minority, the existence of a 
separate upper house became a most convenient check on the lower house, 
which represented the now numerical majority. In fact, so completely did 
the upper house voice the sentiments of the Proprietor that, thereafter, 
the executive veto, possessed by the Proprietor was seldom used. Thus, 
the use of two houses which had been advocated by the Kent group and 
opposed by the Proprietor and his supporters became a tremendous asset for 
the minority faction. 
Disappointed, in spite of their success in establishing two houses, 
the anti-proprietary forces rene1"1ed their attack, basing it thj.s time on 
a . law forced through the assembly in 1650, the year becameraliern was first 
used in Maryland. Until the passage of this law, the freemen of the 
Province had the privilege of attending in person the sessions of the 
assembly or of sending proxies, but the manner of issuing the summons was 
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haphazard and attendance was poor. In .an attempt to strengthen the popular 
faction, this law of 1650 made it mandatory for all freemen to have a 
voice in' the proceedings of the colonial assembly; failure to f'ulfill one 1 s 
1 
responsibilities resulted in a fine of no more than twenty pounds. Some 
writers have intimated that this law established the system of representation 
in Maryland; it would appear that it would be more accurate to believe 
1. Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly, 1637-1664, p. 6. 
that .the system of representat ion already existed, but this law placed it 
1 
on a more definite basis. Now the freemen knew where they stood. Still 
the governor of the province retained some discretionary power since he 
could determine as before how many delegates the freemen should send from 
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each cotmty . Both the law of 1650 and this remaining po~rer of t .he governor 
were to be expanded far beyond any reasonable construction of either. 
The first removal of the Lord Proprietor came as a result of outside 
pressures as well as .inside. After 1658 the attempt to remove the Lord 
Proprietor came wholly from within and was to be based on the treachery of 
the deputy-governor, Josias Fendall, whom Cecilius Calvert had sent over. 
Because of the curtailment of his gubernatorial responsibilities by the 
Proprietor, the criticism of the manner in which he had handled his 
judicial fu_TJ.ctions and a temperamental antagonism to restraint, Fendall 
took it upon himself in karch,l660 to overthrow the proprietary government 
2 
and to set up in its stead a democratic government. At this t:ime the 
popular group in Maryland found itself sufficiently strong both at home 
and abroad to reassert itself. Cromwell who had restored the L·ord 
Proprietor to his position had died, Charles II as yet had not returned 
from exile, and an ineffective Richard ruled as the Protector. Further-
more, the Puritans in Maryland dominated the assembly and controlled half 
of the council It seemed a favorable tj~e, indeed, to repeat the stroke 
of 1652. 
On March 12, 1660, the lower house sent this message to Governor Fen-
dall and the council: 
1. M. D. Mereness, op. cit. , p . 196. 
2. cf. Dictiona~ of American Biography, VI, p. 320. 
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That the Assembly of Burgesses, judging themselves to be 
a lawful assembly without dependence on any other Power 
in the Province nmv in being, is the highest Court o:f 
Judicature, And if ob~ection can be made of the cont:rary, 
We desire to hear it. 
The communi cation was somewhat obscure. What, for example , was meant 
by call ing itself the "highest court of Judicature"? There was an exchange 
of messages between the two houses on this point. and the intention of the 
assembly became clear. The governor and council were invited to become 
part of the Peneral Assembly once more ; Maryland was to be once more 
2 
unicameral in its legislative arrangement, Governor F'endall agreeably 
upheld this point of' view, disclosing that it was his understanding of the 
charter that the freemen had full power to make laws 1¥ithout the assent of 
the proprietar.y.3 That this interpretation was preposterous ce.n be seen 
with a glance at the charter. Farfetched as this interpretation was, there 
was no ambiguity about the goal being sought: a single legislative chamber 
composed of the representatives of the people, who were by this time in 
the great majority. It is important to note that, whenever a faction 
becomes mumerically the strongest, it finds the restraining influence of 
a second chamber an intolerable strait jacket. What opposition that t he 
proprietary group could produce to offset this movement , even though headed 
by Philip Calvert, Secretary of the Province and a younger brother of 
the proprietor, was futile. Fendall boldly resigned his commission as 
governor which he had received from the proprietor and accepted another 
for the same office from the hands of the assembly. 
The success of this second rebellion was even less permanent than 
that of 1653. There was a lack of continued support from within the 
1. E. s . Riley, op. cit., p. 32. 
2. Ibid. , p . 32 . 
3. Clayton c. Hall, The Lords Baltimore and the Maryland Palatinate, 
1904,pp. 59-60. 
province for such high-handed procedure, while shortl y after Charles. · II 
returned to the throne, Lord Baltimore appointed Philip to take F'endall's 
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place and the insurrection came to an end. Fendall continued to r eside in 
Maryland, strangely enough, making a nuisance of hL~self now and then, but 
he dropped out of the pages of history.1 The affairs of the provjn ce 
remained undisturbed for the last fifteen years of the proprietaryship, of 
c Cecilius alvert. 
The story of the contest over the adoption of one or two houses of 
this colonial assembly resulted with the province possessing t wo chambers 
and with the proprietary group being a zealous supporter of its contin-
uance. The political experience of Maryland betwe.en 1646 and 1660 throws 
the same light upon the subject of bicameralism and unicameralism as the 
experience of the other American colonies. What is unique in reference to 
1faryland is the rapid swit.ch from one type of legislature to the other, 
as one .faction succeeded another in controlling the province. This whole 
problem was simply a political football, sought for the :iln.~ediate advantage 
it bestowed and not for any theoretical considerations. Be it as it may, 
Maryland thenceforth possessed without interruption two chambers in its 
legislature, thus following the practice of the vast majority of her 
sister colonies. 
1. DictionaEY of American Biography, VI, p. 300. 
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CHA.PI'ER VII 
Pennsylvania 
No American colony Or state possesses a more important position in an 
historical account of bicameralism i n the United States than does Pennsyl-
vania. Acrimonious and heated as this issue may have been elsewhere, i n 
this state the struggle reached its climax in duration and intensity . N0-
where is there a more perfect illust~ation of the essential purpose in 
ha,~ng two l egislative chamber~: an attempt of one social or economic 
group to check and restrain the other; while a study of Pennsylvania is 
interesting on another score: she had the longest experience in the_ use of 
a unicameral legislature, extending from 1701 to the amending of the first 
state constitution in 1790. 
George 1'ox first preached his ideas regarding the inner light in 1660, 
1 
the year of the Restoration. Seven years later in 1667 the young William 
Penn, while administering his father's prope~y in Ireland, fell under the 
influence of Fox's magnetic personality and became converted to his prin-
2 
ciples. This event had a decisive effect not only on Penn's religious 
life, but on his political career as well. The introduction of the prin-
ciples of Fox into Oxford caused so much controversy and persecution that 
Penn, even as a student, thought that the New World off ered itself as a 
perfect place of refuge for the Quakers . 
The colonization of New Jersey first engaged Penn's attention as a 
suitable site for such an enterprise• The Duke of York, shortly after 
3 
receiving his famous patent from his royal brother on March 12, 1664, 
1. H. M. Jenkins, Pennsylvania: Colonial and Federal (New Haven, 1905) 
I, 193. 
2. C. M. Andrews writes 1668: Colonial Period of American Hist.::Jry (New 
Haven, 1937) III, 273. cf. Dictionary of .American Biograph;r, XV, 756. 
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granted to two of his friends, John Lord Berkeley and Sir George Carteret, 
the territory between the Delaware and Hudson Rivers, which now compri ses 
New Jersey. These two men divided their property between them, designating 
the two sections, East and West New Jersey, with Berkeley receiving the 
western division. 
In :March, 1674, Berkeley sold his half to . a John Fenwick and an 
Edward Byllinge, both of whom we re well-known and devoted Quakers . How-
ever, late in this same year after a difference of opinion a r ose between 
Berkeley and Fenwick in regard to their respective interests in the pur-
chase, Penn; 'a friend and confidant of both men, was called in to decide 
the question, with ·the · re.sult that · one-tenth of West New Jersey was handed 
over to Fenwick while Byllinge became financially ' embarrassed, a predic.;;.;. 
ament that tennin~ted with his handing over his interest. in New Jersey on 
1 . 
February 10, 1674 to William Penn and two associates. In this manner did 
William Penn acquire his first tract of land for the promotion of a Quaker 
refuge, becoming, qy so doing, the. leader in settling West New .Jersey among 
his fellow religionists. 
Penn played a prominent role in drawing up plans for the governing of 
this area. The most important of these documents, dated March .3, 1676, 
was a rather detailed plan drawn up in England and entitled the 11 Concess-
ions and Agreements of the Proprietors, Freeholders, and Inhabitants of 
the Province of West New Jersey in America~ ~" This document became the 
constitution for the West New Jersey colony. Since many of its features 
were later adopted in the Pennsylvania charter, a brief analysis of it 
is pertinent. 
. 7 
1. : ;J'ustin·· winsQr (ed.) Narrative and Critical History of America (1884) 
III, p.· 430. 
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The "Concessions" possessed many advanced features, no imprisonment 
for debt , public trials for all crimes, and so on. In- regards to an 
assembly, the topic in which we are really interested, it provided that on 
the first day of October of each year, one member would be selected for 
each of the hundred "proprietaries" into which the province was to be 
divided. This assembly was authorized to choose ten commissioners and to 
pass laws not repugnant to the nconcessions. . The assembly was unicameral, 
but we know little more about it. 
The experience gained by this co:tmection with the New Jersey colony 
prompted Penn to carry out, a more ambitious project along the line of . 
colonization. He petitioned Charles II early in 1680 for a grant of land 
Yvhich would be more adequate as a haven for his Quaker friends. Basing 
his request on the King 1 s indebted.ness to his father, the Admiral, Penn 
asked for a tract north of Maryland, bounded east by the Delaware, on the 
west by Maryland, and as far to the north as was 11 plantable t1 ~ After some 
delay, Penn received his desired territory in 1681. 
This charter, as a grant of political power, was less imposing than 
that given to Lord. Baltimore fifty years earlier. In the BaltDnore grant, 
laws passed by the assembly and confirmed by the proprietor wer·e valid, 
but in the Penn charter, submission to the Crown.was necessary. Further-
mor e, in the Maryland charter, the Crmvn promised that neither the King 
nor Parliament could :ilnpose taxes within the province, but in t he Penn 
charter, Parliament 1 s right to levy taxes was expressly reserved. 
The "Charter of Liberties 11 , as it was known permitted the freemen of 
Pennsylvania to choose 11 out of Themselves" seventy-two persons who would 
be summoned and act as the provincial council. The governor and cmmcil 
were to prepare the bills submitted to the General Assembly for passage 
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into law. The General Assembly was to consist of no more than two hund.red 
members who were to be elected yearlJ'" by the freemen of the province. It 
is to be observed that this General Assembly possessed the powe:rs of 
amending and pa~>sing legislation, but it could not initiate such l egislation. · 
The legislature was bicameral.1 
It was a remarkable. constitution for s o. early a period . It bore 
unmistakably the influence of his friend, Sir Al gernon Sydney, who in his 
2 
posthumous Discourse Concerning Government (1688 ) held t hat government 
was fo r the common good and not something prescribed by . a king , a s a 
father endeavors to prescribe for hi s children. I n his original draft, 
Penn had given t e G'6neral Assembly eq .al power to initiate bills , but for 
one reason or another-perhaps to stimulate large purchases of l<:1nd- he gave 
this r i ght to the co neil alone . In fact, in order to encourag•~ the 
existence of large property owners, he not only diminished the power of the 
AssEmbly, but also that of the governor, for he gave up the right of veto 
and only retained in its stead three votes in this council of s~wenty-two 
members. The original concept included the council as part of the admin-
istration; committees played a prominent rose , as paragraph thirteen 
reads: 
That for the better management of the powers and tru:3ts 
aforesaid, the Provincial Council shall from time to time 
divide itself illto four distinct and proper committees f or 
the more ea sy administration of the affairs of the F:rovince. 3 
1. A. w. Johnson, The Unicameral Legislature (Universi ty of Minnesota Press, 
1938) p. 34. 
2. George Catlin, The Story of the Political Philos ophe r (New York, 1939) 
p . 288. 
3. Charter of Liberties (Philadelphia, 1909) p. 15. 
sydney's biographer (Ewald, The Life and Times of the Hem. Al gernon 
Sydney, p . 198) asserts that his subject was the author of t he 11hemodell.led 
draft" of this famou s document and answers, i n eff ect, that the constit- · 
ution was chiefly if not entirely, the work of Sydney: it was an analysis , 
he wrote, of the lett ers, political opinions, and thoughts. 
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Neither of these provisions remained a pennanent fixture of the govern-
ment of the colony. The majority of the people immediately demanded full 
legislat.ive rights for the assembly and after 1693, for all pra.ctical pur-
poses, excluded the council from any law-making functions. By 1701 the 
council, while still appointed by the proprietor, had been reduced to a me 
1 
mere advisory board .for the governor. This set-back for the council was 
balanced by the return (as early as 1696) of the executive veto to the 
governor s:ince the asseJil.bly conceded and Penn saw that his deputy would be 
powerless without it. 
This General .Assembly which exerted itself so vigorously eons isted 
originally of all the freemen, but they learned as ·in the other colonies 
that they could not all attend; nor for that lT'atter could the __ imited 
population support two hundred assemblymen. Thirty-six became the maximum 
number and so it remained throughout the colonial period. Furthermore, the 
powers of the assembly continued to increase dovm to 1701 when a new frame 
of government .. was drawn up and introduced. 
The "Glorious Revolution!! was a disturbing time for Penn. Being a 
close friend of James II, he suffered the penalty of losing his colony for 
a short period of time. While Pennsylvania was a royal province between 
1693 and 1695, the assembly was virtually independent. Penn f.::>und the re-
possession of his colony a mixed blessing because popular demands had to 
be met as was the case in the return of Maryland to Lord Balt~nore in 
1652. 
These demands resulted in nine articles, lmown as the Charter of 1701. 
This charter called for an assembly to be chosen yearly by the freemen, 
1. 
with each county having four or more representatives. Now this. assembly 
possessed all the functions of a legislature, in.<:luding the power of 
l 
:Lnitiative. According to the fourth article of the documents all laws 
shall be issued in the fonn, 11By the Governor with the consent and approb-
2 
at ion of the freemen in General Assembly met~t , The council remained, but 
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it was reduced in size to no more than t welve members and was completely 
excluded from the responsibility of passing laws. 3 However, as the deputy-
governor was instructed not to take any action without the apprDval of the 
4 
council,it did possess some weight jn the affairs of the province. 
The assembly functioned with only one limitationJ th~ necessity to smd 
copies of its laws to England for the approval of ,the CroYrrl. Furthermore, 
it meant that as far as administration went, proprietary rule ended then 
and there. Penn retained his property rights in Pennsylvania but his 
political influence was for all practical purposes nil. This was the basic 
difference teween the proprietary conditions of ~~~rland and Pennsylvania. 
After 1701 the influential elements within Pennsylvania had removed the 
politic~l ~spirations of the proprietor, dominated completely the machinery 
of government, 'including its assembly, and so retained its unicameral feat-
ure. In Maryland the contest between proprietor and assembly electorate 
ended in a b·alance of power 'w'hich made unicameralism intolerable. 
A detailed study of the history of this unicameral body which was 
destined to cont:i.nue i.n operation until 1776 throws interesting light on the 
forces and pressures which would eventually be successful in its ultimate 
1. The development, apparently,was the result of Gresham Fletcher's appoint-
ment., J. A. Doyle cf., The English in America:Middle Colonies (New 
York, 1907) p. 527. 
2. Sharpeless, op. cit., p. 65. 
3. H. L. Osgood, American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1924) 
II, 538. Osgood seems amazed that C~vernor Keith should i gnore the 
council llin connection with legislationn. 
4. Sharpeless, op. cit ~ , p. 66. 
destruction. It is not surprising that these factors are the same in 
character which brought about the two-house legislature elsevrhere, but 
nowhere were they more dramatically· arrayed than in t.his provinc:e of Penn 
with its city of brotherly love. 
As we have seen from the experience of other colonies, when a well-
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organized and influential group controls a unicameral legislature-often by 
disfranchising its opponents-it remains perfectly contented with one house. 
It is only when this legislative majority is in danger of being overthrovnn 
that recourse to an upper house is made. An in-group, not numerically 
strong and in danger of losing its political control inevitably turns to 
bicameralism. Up to the middle of the eighteenth century, the struggle for 
control in Pennsylvania was between an "oligarchy of Quakersn a:s Andrews 
would call it, and the Penns and their governors, since they would not 
yield on all points to the assembly. The two men who represented these 
opposing factions were the immortal David Lloyd-j~ortal at least among the 
Quakers-and James Logan wh.o more or less represented the Penns. The dispute 
between these two men reached a climax around 1725 when they exchanged 
paper broadsides with considerable bitterness if not bloodshed. Lloyd was 
the great defender of the unicameral legislature as one would expect. The 
Quakers possessed firm majorities in. this body and were more than satis-
fied with the manner in which affairs were being handled. One might think 
that the Quakers under Lloyd, by wanting unicameralism, were upholding the 
cherished principles of democracy and majority rule, but such a. belief 
must be . considered somewhat naive. As Artdrevrs expressed it: "No democratic 
principle was at any time involved•!l!l The Quakers were the ·aristocrats of 
1. c. M. Andrews, op. cit., III, 321. 
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of the province whose control of the assembly rested on a stringent property 
franchise that excluded their opponents and a legislative check to thi_s 
control was·:· the last thing they wanted. 
The Quaker faction succeeded in defeating the attempt at political 
control by the Penns and their deputy-governors. During this p~riod the 
unicameral assembly was finnly entrenched in the colony. 
Yet this victory was no sooner obtained when the Quakers faced oppos-
ition from a different source. By 1750 the non-Quakers in the population 
of the province had reached such .numbers that a new contest for control set 
in. The French and Indian War embarrassed the Quakers with military prob-
lems that· they couldn't handle, resulting in considerable loss of prestige . 
Throttled by the Quaker control and increasingly infuriated by Quaker 
pacifism, the disfranchised non-Quakers had two recourses for redress of 
grievances : the Penns and the King. When John Penn arrived in Philadelphn 
in 1763, the prevailing opinion was that now there would be a change in 
policy with the proprietor supporting the position of the non- voting mem-
bers of the colony. This hope proved illusionary so the peoplE: turned to 
the Crown for assistance . The results of the recent war had produced a 
large majority in the assembly oppo'sed to the Quakers in spite of the 
restricted franchise, but natural enough in view of the tremendous growth 
of the other elements of the colony . There may have been ot he ::- reasons •. 
One Quaker historian contends, for example, that the Quakers t hemselves 
tried to keep t heir membershi p i n t he assembly as low as possible in order 
1 
to !:educe their responsi bility in war t ime. T·his might be an additional ,. 
f&ctor, ~ but it ,i s ·nnt · wo~h disput:i:ng-. , _· ~t is " jmi?o~arrt: :t!la.~- .one of the 
1. Isaac · Sharpil.ess,- Hi~tory of Quaker Government in Pennsylvania (Philadel-
phia, 1902) · :i:I, • 
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decisive effects of the French and Indian War was simply that the Quakers 
had lost control of the 1micameral assembly of which they were such stal-
wart defenders. Although the Quakers and their allies, the various Penn 
groups, lost control, they lost it to a wealthy conservative group of 
property owners, not to the turbulent representatives of the western count-
ies. By 1764 the new majority was sufficiently large to adopt a resolution 
requesting the king to make Pennsylvania a royal colony. The Penns lost 
· much . Quaker support b8cause they were no longer Quakers. 
This dispute involved, among other items, the topic of such cardinal 
importance as . the right of the assembly to grant money for public services 
on i.ts ovm terms. · The most vital disagreement of all, however, concerned 
the subject of taxation, especially the right of the assembly to tax the 
proprietary estates in the same manner in which the estates of others 
vrere taxed . This particul ar dispute went all the way back to 1'155 and 
arose frbm .. the· same causes. 
The etition of 1755 to the king had prayed that he would thereafter 
forbid the election of Quakers as members of the assembly a d a:>ked t hat 
the colony become a crown pos session. By 1764 the position f the parties 
within Pennsylvania was reversed: in 1755 the Quakers completely opposed 
such a drastic change in government, but twenty years later ' the~r looked 
forward to such a change with pleasure for, by this time , they also wanted 
to get rid of the proprietor. 
Nevertheless, subjecting this action of 1764 to a second thought, the 
Pennsylvania conservatives and the Quakers realized that should the province 
become a crown colony, the charter of 1701 vmuld have to be abrogated, 
thus de stroying the unicameral assembly, while the current t endemcies of 
the Crown and Parljament were not encouraging to their interests. Franklin 
did not even present the petit ion of 1764 to the Court, fqr other events of 
more import develdped}-the behavior of Charles Townsend attracted t he 
attention of the American colonies and their delegat ions in England, making 
the petty . vexations of the past recede into the background. 
The Revolution, striking like a tornado throughout the continental 
colonies, had repercussions in Pennsylvania. Just as the thought of actually 
becoming a royal colony ill 1764 be came less desirable with the realization 
that this would entail the abandonment of a government which had functioned 
· so successfully f or the controlling groups, the thought of gaining political 
independence from Great Britain was discouraged for the same reason. It 
1 
would mean the loss of the charter of 1701, a document looked upon in 
Pennsylvania with the same feeling of reverence as the :t,'ederal Constitution 
possesses today. This fact, combined with the situation where the Quakers 
and the wealthier non-Quakers were not enthusiastic about declari ng their 
i ndependence, brought about a division within the colony that paralyzed 
Pennsylvania during the course of the Revolution. 
The final struggle for political power occurred between the wealthy 
landowners anq commercial proprietors who took over the control of t he 
pro'Vince around 1760 and the vast number of radicals from the voteless 
elements of the city of Philadel!)hia and the western counties. The 
Quakers r emained discreetly in the background. As a result of these factors 
t he Revoluti on was fought without the participation of this most important 
colony. The effects of this dispute were not only a~most disastrous for 
the Revol ution-from the point of view of the revolut ionaries, of course-
but it split the political spectrum of t:be colony wide open, resulting in 
1. Charles J • . Stille~ LJ.fe and· Tl.mes of John Dickinson (Philadelphia, 1891) 
p. 170. 
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bitter party divisions that troubled the state for several decades. 
Buried among other differences, the question of unicameralism was one 
issue involved. 
In resolving this conflict the radicals had the alternative of demandL~g 
a second house in the assembly that would represent their interests and 
act as a check or seek a change in the voting qualifications and the 
apportionment of county representatives, thereby obtaining control of the 
unicameral assembly, In the seventeenth century they would have demanded 
two houses. This time, however, because their numerous strength was be-
coming: more obvious, and because the democratic trend of the r~volution-
ary period was away from privileged social and political groupe:, they 
sought the broadening of the franchise. 
The two parties in opposition consisted of the conservatives who not 
only wanted one more attempt at reconciliation with the ~other Country, but 
assurances that the provincial charter would be continued, and the radical 
faction, influenced by the New England delegates to the Continemtal Con-
gresses, who sought the immediate suspension of British authority in any 
l form. John Dickinson, Janes Yiilson and Robert Morris headed the conserv-
ative group, while the radical group was led by Ben jamin l' 'ranklin, 
Dr. Benjamin Rush and Thomas McKean. 
The roots of this division go back several years. Ever sj_nce the 
close of the Seven Years War there had been considerable dissatisfaction 
with the distribution of delegates to the colonial assembly. By 1764 
there were eight counties in the colony ·but the three original counties 
of Philadelphia, Chester, and Bucks had twenty-six of the thirt.y- six 
1. Stille, op. cit., p. 170. 
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assemblymen. By 1776 these counties, possessing one third of the populat-
ion of the state, had twenty-two delegates while all the others,, compris-
ing two thirds of the total population, had only fourteen. 1 This situat-
ion aroused much resentment in the western counties. Unequal re,present-
ation was also the complaint of the city of Philadelphia which .still re-
tained its original quota of two delegates. 
Another factor that generated quite a tempest was the passage of a 
I 
very restricted suffrage qualification which enabled t he conservatives t o 
r etain extensive control in the three eastern counties. Consequently, the 
problems of reapportionment of county delegations to the assembly and 
aualifications for the right to vote were sufficient grounds for a change 
in t he form of government, quite apart from the international develop-
ments. 
The status of the Pennsylvania assembly became a pivotal issue be-
t ween t he contending groups. For example, on one oocasion difficulties 
with t :he Indians compelled Govel"Ilor Penn to summon the assembly. It 
turned i ts attention, however, to the more pressing question of colonial 
relations with Great Britain. The assembly approved the idea of joining 
a continental congress and appointed seven men as delegates, all from t he 
commercial interests of the province.2 John Dickinson drew up the 
instructions for the delegation clearly revealing the· posi tion of the 
moderates: there were to be no steps pointing toward independence of 
Great Britain or to a change in the form of the Pennsylva~ia go,ffirnment.3 
1. Johnson, op.oi t., p. 34. 
2. Robert L. Brnnhouse, .The Counter Revol ution in Pennsylvania(Harrisburg, l942) 
3. Still e, op. cit., p. 16$. p.lO. 
The radicals considered this approach too cautious. Since the moderates 
had their way in composing the instructions, ~he radical faction suf fer-
ed a defeat; but undaunt~d they transferred the contest to the Commi ttees 
of Saf'ety vmich were coming into existence at this tirne.1 The Committee 
from Philadelphia, as early as February 28, 1776, arrived at t ::1e concl-
usion that a provincial convention should be called to revise the form of 
Pennsylvania' s government. This action raised a storm of protest. To 
pacify the radicals as well as to retain control of aff airs, the conserv-
atives enlarged the membership of the assembly by seventeen additional 
seats, thirteen of which were allocated to the western counties. Even 
under this new arrangement, as it was carefully f'igured, the eastern 
2 
counties retained control although by a narrow margin of t wo votes. Dur-
ing all this time sentiment for independence was growing i n Congress, a 
development which hadn't been forseen, but which placed the Pennsylvania 
delegation in an increasingly awk:viard position. Consequently the radicals 
. ' 
in the Continental Congress had a common cause with the radicals jn t he 
Pennsylvania assembly, a commUnity of interest by no means mitigated by 
the f act 'that both organizations were meeting in the same city, in fact in 
the same building! Both radical contingents agreed that the only way to 
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solve the problem was by overthrowing the provincial government of Pennsyl-
3 
vania. Vfuen bent on overthrowing the government of Gr eat Britain, why 
quibble over a mere colonial government? 
The legislative situation in Pennsylvania differed considerably from 
that in the other colonies. Other assemblies were subject to a governor's 
powe r t o prorogue, a power which t he gove rnor s did not hesitate to use 
2. 
3. 
S~ B. Harding'> '!F.l.rst Pennsylvania Constitution", Annual Repo:r-1, .American 
Historical Association (1894) p. 323. 
Edward Channing, History of the United States (New Yo rk, J.912 ) III, 197. 
Brunhouse, op. cit., p . 12. 
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when they found that the assemblies were getting out of hand. As these 
assemblies were dissolved up and down the Atlantic seaboard, there existed 
a legislative vacuum that the radicals replaced by extra-legal organiz-
ations, such a.s the committees of safety. These illegal group:s sent the 
delegations to the Continental Congress and sum~oned state conYentions to 
draw up new state constitutions and governments. In Pennsylvania the 
governor could not dissolve the assembly thereby placing the radicals in 
a strange predicament. Either they had to ignore its deliberat ion which 
would be difficult to do, seize· control which they were unable to do, or 
1 
attempt to destroy it. The final course might well have been futile 
had it not been for the massive support from the radicals of the neighbor-
i ng colonies. 
The Cont inental Congress finished the stubborn Pennsylvania assembly. 
On May 10, 1776, Congress, on the motion of John Adams, passed a r sol-
ution recommending to the various assembl ie s and conventions of' the United 
Colonies ( a term momentarily current ) that, in reas wher e no gove mmer..t 
exist ed s~~pathetic to the prevailing sentiment, they should fort hwith 
fl adopt such a government as shall, in t he opinion of the repr esentat· ves 
of the people, best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constit-
,2 
uents in particular and America in general. . Thi s resolution ·was a imed 
at Pennsylvania. 
In Pemisylvania, however, the point was not clear whether this 
resolution applied~ Did the Continental Congress really condem.n Pennsylvania 
or not? In order to clarify this ambiguity, Adams had the Cong:ress pass a 
1. William B. Reed, Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed (Philadelphia, 
1847) I, 15"3. 
2. Stille , op. cit., p. 178. 
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second resolution five days later statine: that it was ''irreconeiable with 
r easo::1" for the inhabitants of these colonies to take oaths of allegiance 
to the British Crown. As the Pennsylvania assembly had taken such an oath, 
there could now be no doubt of the applicability of this second resolution. 
Furtherrrore, the Congress, on the same day (Ma y 1.5, i 776) adopted a 
committee report recor.unending the suppression of any exercise of authority 
under the British Crovm, Even though this adoption war:: made from the 
pressure of the revolutionary movement, this step by the Congre s s was 
outright rebellious and the majority in the Pennsylvania asseJ!lbly, under 
the leadership of Dickinson, was not disposed to submit quietl y to such an 
order. 
However,the course of events shook the assembly. Vlhen it convened on 
J,"ay 20, 1776, it faced not only this onslaught of Congress, bt.t the rising 
opposition within Pennsylvania itself. In fact it faced outright rebellion . 
The officers of the five Philadelphia battalion.s of rr ilitia refused to 
recognize the .:J.ut.hority .of the assembly or to .obey the orders of any gener-
als a po inted by it. The r adicals, encouraged. b. ? this success, v;ent on 
to s eize control of t he colony itself and to formulate a new government 
more suitable to their i nterests . 
On the very day the assembly met and approved the resolution that 
the assembly derived its powers from nour mortal enemy, the King of Great 
BrHain : i a mob of about five thousand assembled in the ya rd of the state 
. 1 
house to approve . The revolutionary committee of Pennsylvania was asked 
to direct the el ection of a convention which v;ould draw up a new constit-
ution for t e stae . The whole prcJ::edure was flagrantly illegal, but so 
1. Samuel B. Harding, ''Fi:r-st Fennsylvani.a Constitution", Annual Report, 
American Historical Association, 1854, p . 374. 
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f or that matter, were other aspects o£ the Revolution. 
This conven~ion met in Philadelphia on June 18th, calling itself the 
"Conferees and Delegates o£ the People of Pennsylvania~~ This body intend-
ed to execute the resolution passed by the Continental Congress on the 
preceding ]lf.ay 15th. With such men as Franklin and Colonel . McKean at the 
forefront o£ this Convention, the men who led the movement were by no 
means of the rabble. The 11conferees" assumed plenary political powers, even 
going so far as to provide a declaration of religious faith to be taken by 
1 
each member of the Convention. 
As these steps were being taken, the assembly based on the Charter of 
1701 quietl'Y expired. It was necessary for two-thirds of the members to be 
present for a · quorum. The more radical Whigs withdrew after June 8th by 
secret agreement and never a gain returnee to take their seats in the assem-
bly. · up until the end of August attempts were made to have the required 
quorum present, but it was found impossible. The assemoly could no longer 
function as the legislature for Pennsylvania and on September 28, 1776 it 
finally expired. With it expired the charter govero.ment of the colony. 
The state constitutional convention called by the various committees 
of safety met in Philadelphia from June to September 1776. Benjamin 
Franklin was lL'1animously chosen president, yet f or the most part this body 
wa s not composed of prominent citizens of the colony. They were mostly 
farmers or small merchant s, while many of them, especially those from the 
western cou.'1ties, were naturalized citizens. 2 Franklin, in reality, had 
little to do with the proceedings of the convention because he was 
1. Stille, op. cit., p. 185. 
2. J. Paul Selsam, Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, (Philadelphia~ 193 5) 
p. 148. 
frequently absent, attending the sessions of the Continental Congress. 
Ja.rnes Wilson, another prominent member, was absent for the same reason. 
It was Pennsylvania 1 s misfortune that at the time that t he critical issue 
of its f uture constitution was being hammered out, its most influential 
citizens were unable to be present . 
8trangely enough, the majority within the convention favored t he 
retention of the features of the old charter; the only step to be taken 
wa s to change the source of political povi8r from the British Crown to the 
people of Pennsylvania. It should have been a simple performance. 
The cpmmittee selected by the convention to bring in an 11essay for a 
frame of goverrm1ent" comprised such men as Colonel Matlock, a Mr . · Cannon, 
a Colonel Potter, Mr. Rittenhouse (the most .prominent of the group) and 
1 
two others. In the well-establi shed tradition based on the charter of 
1701, this committee recommended that the new state legislature would have 
one house under several restrictions . There was nothing revolutionary 
about thi s . The committee revealed its 11 radical 11 tendenc ies in the 
composition of· the executive. They envisaged the executive as plural, to 
be entitled the Supreme Executive Council and to consist of one member 
from the city of Philadelphia and one from each county, all serving terms 
of three years . Vl hile the councillors were to be elected by the elect-
orate of t heir respective constituencies, its presd.dent and vic•~-pres ident 
would be chosen annually from the Council by joint ballot of the Council 
and the unicaweral assembly. This executive council possessed :no 
legislative veto , thus weakening it, but its principal wealmess wa s i n its 
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l ur ality . Both features disturbed the conservative el ements of the state. 
1. Proceedings of the Convention, Hazard's Register (Philadel phia, 1792-
94) IV, 19.5. 
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Another fact which shocked the more conservative "Whigs was the posit±on 
of the state judicial system. The judges of the Supreme Court we!'e to 
be appointed by the Council for a term of seven years with no restriction 
on reappointment. This was considered quite a departure from the previous 
practice when judges held office during good behavior. 
Intensely as the conservatives disliked this arrangement, that which 
provoked their bitterest 3.nimosity and which they attacked relentlessly 
until it was destroyed was the institution called the Council o:f Censors. 
This s econd council, comprised of two members from each county ;vho were 
elected by popular vote for te:nn.s of seven years, was entrusted with the 
respo~sibility of making recommendat ions for changes to the stat e constit-
ution and to detennine whether it had been "~riolated. To this extent it 
had the power of judicial review. The conservatives objected principally 
to the f act t.hat nothing could be done about the constitution for seven 
years. 
Writers disagree in the extent that this constitution of 17.76 (for 
t hese ideas were adopted by the convention) differed from the Charter of 
1 1701. Allan Nevills in one of his early works calls the constitution a 
complete abandonment, while another writer, writing s~@pathetically for 
t.he radical faction stated nthe constitution of 1778 is merely that of 
1701, w·th the royal and proprietary authority displaced by that of the 
2 
people ~ v 
Although this constitution had been hurriedly and imperfectly accom-
plished, it produced what its authors wanted-a democratic form of govern-
ment . In fact, it was the most democratic of the period, for among its 
l. Allan Nevins, American States during and after the Revolutj_on 1775-1789 
(New York, 1924) p. 153. 
2. Burton A. Konkle, George Bryan and the Constitut ion of Penn:sylvania 
(Philadelphia, ~922) p . 128. 
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aforementioned features, v1as a clause abolishing property qualif'icati ns 
from the priv'lege of voting. A most significant f eature , inde:ed. Further-
more, it reapportioned the seats of the as sembl y among the western counties . 
more equally, but the easterners were outnumbered twenty-four t .o forty-
1 
eight . 
The attempt to put the new constitution into effect produced one of the 
2 
greP.test political.struggles ever witnessed in a1 American state. The 
account of that memorable contest has been adequately discussed else-
where; here we are primarily interested in the role played by the unicam-
eral feature of the legislature established by this constitution. The 
conservatives of the state, unceasingl~r active, attacked unicameralism, 
along with the Council of Censors and the plural executive; they did not 
cease until all three were remo"~Jed forever from the state government. 
The adoption of the Council of Censors and a plural executive were 
·two f eatures that were foreign to the past traditions and history of Penn-
sylvania, but a unicameral legislature had existed since 1701 with marked 
success and up to 1776 had had the support of the· conservative13 as well a s 
the radicals . The explanation f or this changed attitude regarding unicam-
eralism is neither mysterious nor difficult to ascertain, fall:i!J.g as it 
does, into the general pattern that we have found elsewhere . 
Contemporary newspapers and pamphlets were filled with the pros and 
cons r egarding these features, but the argument was mostl y bes:ide the poi!t • 
The basic issue concerned the extension of the elective franch:lse to thous-
ands of the inhabitants of Pennsylvania and its effect which brought into 
l . Channing, o • cit., III, 197. 
2. cf . Allan l~evins, op. cit .; al so, J . Paul Selsam, 'I'he Pennsylvania Con-
stitution of 1776; A Study in Revolutionary Democracy (Philadelphia,l935) 
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office a large group of men who formerly had nothing to do with govern.ment. 
As Franklin observed, "It is a fact that the Irish emigrants and their 
children a r e now in possession of the new overnment of Pennsyb.Tania, by 
their majority in the assembly, as well as of the great part of the territ-
1 
ory; and I remember well the first ship that brought any of them over~~ 
He referred, of course,to the Scotch-Irish, whose most noted leader was 
George Bryan. 
Always behind the question of unicameralism and b icameralism was the 
struggle for mastery between contending groups, a contention frequently 
aggravated by differences in religion, nationality, language, and customs. 
In Pennsylvania a class struggle occurred between the large land owners and 
the newly arrived Scotch-Irish, who were led by Bryan and Professor Cannon. 
The lesson of this ~ontest was not forgotten when a few years later and in 
the same city a federal constitution was drawn up. As James Madison quite 
frankly stated on that occasion, the landovmers and men of property "ought 
to be so constituted as to protect the minority of the opulent a ainst the 
2 
majori ty:,.Jt 
Much of the opposition in Pennsylvania to the constitution of 1776 
was based not so much on its features as on the fact that it gave the con-
trol of the state to the radicals. Another objection stemmed from the 
failure of the radicals to submit the new constitution to the people of the 
state for ratification. This was not unusual for, of all the state constit-
utions coming into exist~nce at this time, only Massachusetts :referred it 
to the people for ratification. In Pennsylvania there did not even exist 
1. 
2. 
Franklin's ~'forks, Jared Sparks(ed.) (Boston, 10 v. 1830-40:~ X, 331; 
quoted by J. Pa1.1~ Selsam, Pennsvl vania Constitution of 177{~ (Phila. ,1935) 208. 
Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American 
States (Washington Government Printing Office; 1927) 
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an assembl y to pass judgment on the work of the convention; it appeared 
to be a coup d 'etat by the radicals. No wonder there was opposition! 
The new government did not begin functioning until March 5, 1777. 
Thomas Wbarton, Junior, became the president of the Executive Council, 
while George Bryan was the vice-president. The radicals) in complete 
control of the state , encountered unyielding resistance. The conservatives 
as a reaction to the new government practiced pure obstructionism. As one 
expressed it, "The Government of t his province or state as the~r term it is 
truly ridiculous. Not one of the laws of the Assembly are regarded. No 
1 
courts open, no justi ce administered ·. !1 The explanation for the break-
down of justice was clear enough, the judges sL~ ly refused to serve under 
the new regime. 
Such antagonism to the new government engendered bitter response among 
the radicals, aggravated by the events of the Revolution. The British 
occupation of Philadelphia during the spring of 1778 did nothing to soothe 
irritated nerves. The conservatives made themselves congenial to the 
British, enjoying, in the meantirr.e, quite a social whirl. The radicals, 
on the other band, felt compelled to make themselves as scarce as possible. 
This state of affairs lasted only a few months until the threat of the 
French closing the Chesapeake and cutti~g their line of supply compelled 
the British tc withdraw to New York to the consternation of t he loyalists.· 
Philadelphia once again fell into·· .the hands of the radicals. The harshness 
and brutality visited upon the patriots were returned ten fold. For a time 
this reaction was quite severe. A mob--the only term which could defire it-
took over the city as soon as the British left and threatened to hang all 
1. "Diary of James Allen, EsquirP of Philadel phia", Pennsylvania Magazine 
of Arts and Biography, IX, 282~ 
._.11~1-----~1111 .............. 
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Quakers, Tories, and s eculators. Calling themselves the nconctitution-
alists 1' eince the~ su ported the con8titut ·on of 1776, the mob resC' l VPd to 
drive out e'Jery i ndication of loyalism from t!"le cit r. The RE: -> ~t ion was 
indee a civ"l war and nowhere was that fact more ev:ident than i n this 
state, where conditio 1778 to .the end o the war bordered on chaos . 
The war was respons i b but so also vra s the defiant disobedience by many 
to the state official .. The Quakers, who constituted one-fifth of the 
government . It is on fair to note, howev:er, that thanks to the unruly 
behavior of the troops during the occupatio!l, the majority of the 
1 Quakers refused to have anything to do with them al so . 
Between 1778 and 1790 t he radicals and conservatives of Pennsyl vania 
crystallized into two political parties, the radicals taking the name, 
11 C:onstitutionalists 11 , and the conservatives calling themselves, ' Republicans.n 
With the British play·ng a third role, politics became a t hree way tussle . 
The Constitution~lists had greater grievances against the eastern 
aristocracy of Pennsy than against the policies of the British min-
istry. They joined the Revol ution mainly as an opport1mity to take 
over the government o· Pennsylvania, and as we have seen, they were initiall y 
successful . They not only established a completely democratic government, 
but carried out many eng-desired changes . For exampl e, the assembly dis-
continued the College of Philadelphia vnth its royal charter and disaffect-
the Constitutionalist • In November, 1779 they deprived the Penns of all 
1. Isaac Sharpless, 
,.,.._,,_----..-t_,__.. 
before July 4, 1776. Fi ally, i n 1785, after the Constitutionalists had 
returned t o power for ti last time after a brief loss of control, they 
re ealed the state chart r granted to the Bank of North America by the 
opposing faction in 1782. 
Thomas Paine, who ad supported the Constitutionalists up to now, 
broke with theffi on this issue. He ·warned that such a step woul d ruin the 
Constitutionalist pa rty and result eventually in the destruction of the 
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Constitution of 1776. prophecy proved true. More than any other fact -
or, the destruction of Bank of North America (the first by t hat name) 
contributed to the defe t of the Constitutionalists in 1786, giving contra] · 
of the a ssembly to the epublicans. The importance of t his change extended 
far beyond the botmdari s of Pennsylvania. 
In 1787 t he Consti utional Convention met in Philadel phia to revise 
the Articles of Confede ation, but ended up by draft ing an entirely diff er-
ent document. The Cons itutionalists of Pennsylvania under George Bryan 
opposed this new federaJ Constitution because they bel ieved that it would 
bring to an end their slate constitution. As long as the Articles of 
Con.federation called fo a unic2meral Congress, there was moral support for 
the position of unicame alisiP on a state level. Now that the new federal 
Constitution called for a two-house Congress, this support was removed. 
by the time the federal convention had adjourned, the old party designation, 
such as Vfuigs, Tories , onstitutionalists, and Republicans, had come t o an 
end, ~ to be replaced by he terms, Federal i sts and anti-Federalists . The 
majority of the Constit tionalists of Pennsylvania became anti-Federalists ~ 
for reasons local as federal . The erst ~hile Republicans of the 
state beca~e, for t part , staunch supporters of the :ede~al Gonst·t-
ution, for t he ve ry reas ns the r ad "cals opposed it. As Benjamin Rush 
expressed it in a lette 
Government , like a 
with all its dirty 
order and happiness to 
Aft er the Republ ic 
1786, they immediatel y 
An election of the 
quirement of a 
publicans 
September, 1789, the 
vent ion for No rember 
In fact, 
possibl e 
paper that gave too c 
By this t :i.me the 
i n their opposition to 
some of their 
l ess adamant in 
t his constitution was 
reverence ~ );3 
clearly outlined: 
the power of 
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to Fic:tering on August 30, 1787, "The new Federal 
sylvania;. '1 
will overset our state dung cart , 
and irreverend , and thereby restore 
1 
s won a reso1mding vi ctory in the el ections of 
a convention to revise the st.ate constitut i on. 
Censors was due in 1790, cut owing to the re-
majority before the Council could act , the Re-
expect from its deliberations . I t was not until 
assembl y got around to call a con-
record of the proceed n:s nf -t-.his convention . 
o arnd. us t o hav j t as unpublicize as 
to withdraw· t heir support from any news-
2 
e a surmnary of what took place . 
itutionalists felt that they had gone too far 
federal Constitution, and i n order to recoup 
during the sessions of t he convention 
the Constitution of 1776. Nevertheless , 
be 11treated with a delicacy approaching to 
l ines of the new state constitut i on we re 
legi slat ure, a singl e executive possessing 
independent judiciary, and a bill of rights . 
1. Har · n ., op. cit . , . pp. 391- 3. 
2. J . B. ~.~cMa ster & J D. Stone, Pennsylvani a and Federal Constitutions 
(Philadel phia, 188 ) p . 15. 
3. Harding, op . cit., p. 400 . 
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Property qualifications or the elective franchise failed to be adopted. 
Vmen this constitution s ratified and proclaimed on September 20, 1790, 
Pennsylvania, which for eighty-nine years had a unicameral legislature, 
fell in l ine with the ot er states and the federal constitution and adopted 
a bicameral legislature. 
By 1790 the temper of the times had overwhelmed the opponents of 
bicamerali~i . The er-revolution brought an end to this experiment in 
radical democracy, remo ng in its wake the use of one legislative chamber. 
Subsequently the weigh of political thought was predominantly opposed to 
such a device. 
. ----- ,-
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CHAPI'ER VIII 
stitutional Period 
The period 
their political 
1790, when both the states and the nation made 
na.om~>nrs to live independently of Great Britain, was 
that solidified the 
would continue down 
to be taken, nlli~erous 
which were not mere rec 
but which emerged 
The 
bulence. 
al groups accentuated 
of American History, as well as the cauldron 
s and prejudices toward unicameralism v;hich 
present day. As the nation discussed the steps 
came to light, divergences 
be explored over a cup of tea, 
vast social tunnoj_l existing at the tirne. 
Revolution were filled with crisis snd tur-
of a large proportion of the colonial profession-
se-rious social dislocation. The scarcity of 
money made it impossible for debtors to pay off their obligations, a con-
dition which produced 
say that t here 
as when it was 
This ·era of bad 
tions. The various 
bitterness. It would be no exaggeration to 
a revolutionary spirit after the Revolution 
saw a shift in the contending political faa-
between the settlers and the King, between 
the people and the prop rs, between land-holders and the tenants.-at-will, 
were now superceded by e contest between the commercial and the non- · 
commercial elements. cifically the issue concerned the control of the 
governments . participants to be virtually a struggle for 
survival. No wonder t at a time when the fo rms of the government 
were being each group should strive desperately to select ·-
those governmental devi s that would favor itself. 
The commercial , upon whose shoulders now fell the conse rvative 
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role, had to take into consideration a variant product of the Revolution. 
An awakened political onAciousness among all segments of the population 
now demanded a voice i the councils of government for their participation 
in the overthrow of Br"tish rule. Consequently the period of the Revolut-
ion was the first phas of the campaign to broaden the American electorate. 
Such a progran recuired the removal of the property and tax-paying 
qualifications. At first the radicals only partially succeeded in removing 
property qualification in Delaware (1792), G-eorgia (1789) and New J-Iamp-
whe-re p:roperty qualifi ations were done av;ay with in 1776 and 1777 respect-
ively. To the horror f the conservatives radical Vemont, in fact, ad-
opted complete male s Among the ideas which the conservatives 
espoused to restrain t is newly won influence were a strong executive, an 
independent judiciary, and a double legisiature; with at least the upper 
house in their control. With such an arrangement they felt that they had 
more than to preserve a semblance of stability. The radica 1 
groups,on the other ha order to facilitate the free exercise of the 
popular will (meaning of course) wanted a weak executive, a feeble 
judiciary, and a singl legislature that they would dominate by sheer 
force of ntwbers. 
Advice about how 
from all stations 
man. Political litera 
all types and ages 
theory or another . 
1. Kirk Porter, 
p . 110. 
goverr@ent should be framed came from all sides and 
from the eminent statesman to the lowly husband-
became the rage. Past political experj_ences of 
brou~ht up and presented as precedents for one 
es of executives, of legislatures, of judicial 
of Suffra e in the United States (Chicago, 1918) 
"::lllftti 11~,-----. • ....,.....tl11'1't' ._..,... 
107. 
systems, questions rega ing tenure of office, the suff rage, questions 
political ad infinitum , all were discussed and rer;iiscussed. Since v:e are 
interested i n the form o legislatures, it is pertine::tt to analyze the 
schools of thought on t s subject between 1770 and 1790 • 
This issue was fir debated on a state level. In 1778 the conservatives 
of Ymssachusetts had won a victory when they rejected a proposed state 
constitution because of ts weak executive. A significant manifesto fol-
lowed this rejection. A group of twenty-seven leading men cf Essex County, 
led by Caleb Cushing and Theophilus Parsons, held a meeting at Ipswich : 
which produced a doc 
constitution. 
as the Essex Result. 
considerable cogency, 
lands, why should a 
must deal inevitably wi 
the propriet 
perty, has e 
follows that 
The language is t 
The 
to be absolutely 
sents. 
1. Essex Result in T, 
stating the chief objections to the rejected 
which Parsons was the author-has become known 
senting the position of the property holder vli th 
between meetings of the proprietors 
If a non-proprietor was forbidden to 
others? 
proprietors of common and undivided lands 
, can affect only their property, therefore 
that in ascertaining the ma jority, the votes 
ed according to the respective interests of 
s. If each member, without regard to his pro-
influence in legislation with any other, it 
ome members enjoy greater benefits and powers 
than others, when these benefits and powers1 
th the rights parted with to purchase them. 
the idea is there. 
Essex Result believed that for a government 
' 
reflect exactly the society which it repre-
Theophilus Par~on~ (Boston, 1859) p. 372. 
~11-~ .... tllfiiii ... ~Pf 
They (the rep esentatives) should thin~, feel and act 
like them (th people) and in fine, should be an exact 
miniature of heir constituents. They should be ••• the 
whole body po itic, with all its property, rights,and 
privileges, r duced to a smaller scale' every part 
being diminis ed in just proportion. 
Furthennore: 
••• the legislative body should be so constructed, that 
every law aff cting property, should have the2consent of those who old a majority of the property. 
Having these predi these men found a unicameral legis-
l ature to be out of th question. It was too frequently influenced by 
the nvices, follies, pa sionsn of an individual; being avaricious, it 
would exempt itself fro the burdens it placed upon its constituents. It . 
might even vote itself erpetual as did the Long Parliament in England. 
Not only did this Essex Junto believe that there should be two houses; but 
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also, in electing the pper house, an entirely different group of electors, 
possessing still higher property qualifications, would be necessary. 11Thm 
senators may be chosen 11 ost easily in an county convention which may be 
called the senatorial c nventi.on. n3 
It might be noted arenthetically that this proposal to make use of 
conventions for the ele tion of representatives constituted a return to 
the old manner in which elections were held in England. 
Such conservatism to dominate the state constitutional conventions, 
a trend that was distur to many, both at home and abroad. 
This great debate constitutional issues was by no means a par-
ochial affair possessin only· local interest . The American Revolution had 
been the center of worl interest, attracting the attention of the leaders 
1. Parsons, op. cit ., • 376. 
2. Ibid,,p. 376. 
3. Ibid., p. 391. 
of European thought. 
the 
the first concrete 
And if the Revolution 
more enthralling. 
it , the first real 
practical? Many 
people conduct 
chaos? For it 
European interest 
Richard 
student of American af 
Perhaps I do 
introduction 
Revolution 
ive course 
Price criticised many 
especially the various 
pass. The appendix 
letter addressed to 
the writer 
the United States. 
during Turgot 's lifet 
1. Allan Nevins, The 
1789 (New York, 
2. Richard Price, 
(London, 1785) p. 
reason fo r this ~.nterest i s .. ot hard to find; 
afte r so many reams of theorizing, 
in eighteenth century political liberali~. 
s exciting to watch, · its aftermath should be even 
is easier to fight for a principle than to live 
republican principles faced it. Was democracy 
not. Could a government of the 
wisdom and dignity or would it degenerate into 
be overlooked: 
st ti.?fl.e in the world 1 s history that a large . 
ities had begun the formation of their o>vn 
r written constitutions. . 
well illustrated by a statement . of the Reverend 
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clergyman, who had been a close and enthusiastic . 
go too far when I say that, .next to the 
Christianity among mankind, the American 
prove the most im~ortant step in t he progress-
human jmprovement. . 
ures of the new state constitutions , lamenting 
ious tests which candidates for office had to 
s volume made it valuable since it contained a 
by the famous French statesman, Turgot, in which 
isappointment with the post-revolutionary trend of 
letter (which Price had promised not ' to publish 
) condemned vigorously what t he writer con~idered 
and after the Revolution 1775-
ce of the Aw.erican Revolution 
~,,,,_,~---'""''._~.·· 
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an urnecessary copying f the English government. In opposition to t he 
conse rvatives , ~e belie ed t hat t he new state const i t utions should fac i lit-
ate and not restrain po ular control . He felt that a legal r ecognition of 
t he di ffe r ent orders of society woul d result only in increased divis ion 
arid friction . · Referrin to these new constitutions, his letter stated: 
I observe th t by most of them the customs of England 
are imitated v.rithout. any particular motive . Instead 
of collectin all authority into one center, that of 
nation , they have established different bodies, a body 
of represent tivE·s, a council, and a governor·, because 
t he re is i n ·ngland a House of Commons, a House of Lords , 
· and a Ki ng. They endeavor to balance these differ ent powers, 
as if this e uilibrimn which in England may be a necessary 
check to the enormous influence of royalty coul d be of nay 
use in Repub ics founded upon the quality of all the ci t izens; 
and as if es ablishing different £rders of men was not a 
source of di isions and disputes. 
This passe.ge, quot d at some length, constitut ed the heart of t he 
letter that set off .a c ain reaction which had an linpact on t he const itut-
ional development of th United States . As Turgot was one of t he great 
libe ral statesmen on th continent and had an international reputation, 
his opinions carried co siderable weight. Sufficient at least, so that 
John Adams, our ministe. to England at the time, deemed them worthy of a 
repl y . ·w·riting through ut 1786 ·with conscientious industry, he published 
in the spring of the f'o lowing year and in time to exercise considerable 
inf luence upon the Cons itutional Convention his answer , which he called A 
2 
Defense of t he Constitu ions. The attitude of John Adams toward t he type 
of legislature crystall zed American opinion to such a degr ee that for a 
century and a half a ch llenge to its premises struck one as the rankest 
political heresy. In f ct, to many, it is still unthinkable. 
There is very litt 1 e danger that the "Defensen will ever be widely 
1. Price, qe. cit., p. 14. 
2. Charles Warren, The ~kin of the Constitution, (Bo ston, 1928) p. 156. 
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read. It is long, · and tedious. In it Adams described the small 
republics of Europe, and cont e~porary, with considerable detail and 
no little erudition. every case he endeavored to ·show that the best and 
were those approaching nearest to his model, the 
English, which he cons ed the best illustration of a ":rlixed" government. 
A .1l:mixed 11 government , of course, one in which the executive , l egis-
lative, and judicial ions would be kept separate. One cannot gainsay 
1 
writers as to t he vicio of the framework of the state government. tr--
Adams did not inve~tigat , eithe'r historicall y or analytically. Exactly 
when the balance of powe s was instituted in England he did not say, but 
in his later writings he maintained that the principle of a mixed govern-
ment was introduced in 88, but not fully until the first year of t he 
reign of George III. very period wh -i ch Adams described 
its system of the balance of powers was the 
very period which saw t of its decline, for after 1689 Parliament 
became supreme . of Turgot 1 s criticisms except the lattff' 1 s 
stricture of the 
ining what Turgot meant 
center, that is the 
1. 
2. 
Shall we 
assembly 
and vested 
assembly s 
shall be c 
After long 
other sense 
of a mixed government and he had difficulty determ-
the phrase "collecting all authority into one 
He finally arrived at this interpretation: 
se then that Mr. Turgot intended that an 
presentatives should be chosen by the. nation 
all the powers of government; and that this 
be the center in which all the authority 
cted , and shall be virtually deemed the nation . 
ion, I have not been able to discover any 
his words, and this was probably his real meaning. 
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A com~on error that the _roponents of bicameralism fall into is the 
belief that if there is 
unchecked legislature 
objection to the 
but they are 
supply that check. 
enough, was based on 
ity"; with local assem 
legislature. Thus 
one house, then necessarily there must· be an 
rule. The advocates of one house have no · 
checks, even on the one-house legislature, 
idea that a certain group or class should 
, for example, never believed that there should 
l legislature. Turgot' s s cheme, interestingly 
Calhoun would later call the "concurrent major-
s ratifying the legislation of the central 
beginning Adams possessed a misconception ot 
as HTh~e . and John [ilton, well as his disciple, Condorcet, he · believe~ in 
French statesman wanted 11 governmental power to be placed in thP. hands of 
the point . As 
with acerbity: 
••• and so, i 
has given us 
directed at 
1. Margaret Coit, 
2 . C. M. Walsh, T 
his political philosophy had pointed out 
spite of all his long-winded tirades, he 
so much as a si~gle ar~Qment really 
t rue question at issue • 
• Calhoun . (Boston, 1950) p. 235. 
Science of John Adams (New York, 1915) p. 185. 
this sort. Adams wrote, "Shall every criminal be brought before the 
assembly and tried? Sh 11 he be there accused before five hundred men?ttl 
Apparently Adams b lieved the assembly would always exercise judicial 
functions . He also bel:eved that should such an assembly have the power 
to appoint the executiv it would open the door to all kinds of abuses . 
Shall the ass mbly appoint a governor or president and 
give him all he executive power'? Why should not the 
people at lar e appoint him? Giving this power to the 
assembly will open a Yrider door to intrigue for the place; 
and the arist cratical families will be sure2 nine times in ten, to ca ry their choice in this way ••• 
Here is an idea th t at first appears strange and which is surely 
unique as far as the ei hteenth century was concerned. Adams ~-believed 
that a single house wou d produce such intense r:a rty spirit that there 
woUld be war and rebell on. The only w~y that this could be prevented 
woiud be by placing tho e who possess influence - the natural aristocracy 
in another house where his natural power could be checked by the lower 
chamber. When other wr ters frankly said that "j:,heir aim in furthering a 
bicameral system was to check the turbulency of the democratic masses, 
Adams . implied that the anger came from excessive aristocracy rather then 
excessive democracy. ams was really a century behind the times. Just 
as he worried unnecessa ily about the judicial powers of a one~house 
assembly when legislat es were ceasing to use them, here he reverted to 
1. Adams, op. cit . ,p. 3 3. 
2. Ibid., p: 304. 
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had been in Europe 
· somewhat out of touch 
. . 
ible, for was it not 
••• it is inc 
of .. Mr. Turg 
people, in 
Adams felt 
past to support 
congresses provided suf 
ation of 
~ fa ct which helps to explain vrhy he was 
1 
latest political trends. 
that a unicameral house was quite imposs-
the past'? 
bent on him who shall embrace the opinion 
, to name the age, the country and the2 
ch such an exper:Lrnent has been tried. 
id not need to cite the fa ilure of the more r emote 
of a single house ; the American provincial 
evidence of the uncertainty and procrastin-
••• an gen"-'-""'ll!"'" were more convinced by 1 hat they there 
sav:, heard, felt, of the ne t?.ssity of t l:. ree b~anches, 
than t hey woul ave been by reasoning o · r eadin6 • .:-
Although the Defen 
littl e doubt about 
the constitutional h 
pressed it in a 
to hear it)ttMr. 
is wordy and makes difficult reading, there is 
of its .:nfluence at a critical moment in 
the United States. As Dr. Benjamin Rush ex-
R'chard Price (who couldn't have been too happy 
ok has dif fused such excellent principles among 
us, that there is little doubt of our adopting a vigorous and compou.TJ.ded 
Federal Legislature~ ,_.4 
In 1788 a political tract appeared ·reflecting the conservative point 
of view; this was Jonat Jackson's Thoughts . upon the Politicat Situation 
of t he United States. so soon after Adams's Defense, it contained 
many of its ideas, servile copying of Adams. :For example, 
1. Vful . H. Hiker, ~~:::.::.::~:_.::.::_~~_;11;;~t,::ed~S::_:t~a:.;t~e:!:.s (Macmillan, 1950) p. 141. 
2. Adams, op. cit., 
3. Ibid., p. 303 . 
4. Quoted by Warren, 
.. 
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Jackson deprecated our tating everything European, vrriting that Americans 
were 11 so habituated to 
dared to wear out coate 
statement Ada.ms would 
approach to Turgot 1 s 
criticisms that he 
gold, by the patriots 
"justly criticized!. :t2 
Jackson frankly 
aristocracy was the g 
Jackson believed more 
net ex cessive aristoc 
Much has 
ciples, the 
people ·upon 
than the pe 
vailing or 
greatest 
ocratical 
directed by 
interested 
the sentimen 
r fashions and opinions that we have scarcely 
cut in their modes~~ This is certainly a 
He also seemed to have a more balanced 
Where Adams ignored the aspects of Turgot 1 s 
have accepted, Jackson, in referring to the letter 
the United States" while other parts could be 
bicameralism. Vfuile Adams maintained that 
danger which the two houses must obviate, 
alistically that it was excessive democracy and 
that must be feared. 
lately said of aristocratical men and prin-
alarms have foun~ed. There never was a 
h, in my opinion, who were in l ess hazard 
of this country, of an aristocracy's pre-
thing like it, dangerous to liberty ••• The 
they run, is their proness to a highly dem-
rnment; a government in vrhich they would be 
rule but their own will and caprice, or the 
shes of a very fjy.r persons who affect to speak 
s of the people. 
He then went on to explain the advantages of bicam.eralism. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
firm believer in the modern doctrine that 
an~=~~·m~~~, supreme or SUbordinate, can 8Ver be 
· without. two legislative houses of assem-
and lower house-the l ast of v;hich shall be 
rly the guardians of the people's liberties 
more particularly the receptacle of that 
cracy, which Dr. Adams and every· sensible 4 
man, must s . will ever arise in all societies of men. 
Jonathan Jackson, the Politic of the United 
States (Worcester, 
Ibid., p . 37. 
Ibid., p. 54. 
Ibid., p . 182. 
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Although Europeans have been quoted in support of unicameralism, we 
are not to suppose that it received no encouragement from Yvriter s on this 
side of the water• Tho Paine, during his sojourn in this country, could 
see no other system. A 
••• I draw my form of government from a prin-
ciple in nattre, which no · art can overturn, viz.: that the 
more simple nything is, the less liable it is to be dis-
ordered, and the easier repaired when disordered.l 
Perhaps the best e ample we have .of the radically democratic tracts of 
t he period which stress d heavily the doctrine of the nc.tural rights of 
man and unicameralism i People the Best Governors, published anonymous-
ly in New Hampshire in The author of this pamphlet .favored t he con-
centrat ion of nearly al a single assembly. There could be a 
smalle r b~?dY or council be elected b~' the assembly, but it could 
merely advise and prepa e business for the larger body. Taxation should 
not be the basis for ap ortioning representation, 11for it will make an 
inequality among the 
The paper argued that i 
I 
? 
up a munber of lords over the re st~ 1.t -
a distinct negative power was possessed by an 
upper council, it could ot come as representatives of the people . To 
allow them to elect a co mcil with authority to nullify their actions would 
be to hand over authorit which had been given them to use. 
resentatives to appoint a co~cil with a 
negative auth rity, is t.o give away that power which they 
have no right to3do because they themselves derived it from the eop e. 
'While this pamphlet considered it contradictory to have · the represent-
atives of the people app a council to "negative 11 their actions, there 
1. Thot:'.a s Paine l Writ· s, M.D. Conway(ed) (L~ v. New York, 1894-96) I, P• 6. 
2. Quoted by B: .. F. Wrig t, American Interpr etation of the Natural Law (Cam-
bridge, 193~ ) p. 105. 
3. ltPeople are th8 Pest Governors II i n F. Chase, History of Dartmouth 
College(New Hampshir , 1891) p. 656. -
is no contradiction in aving it appoint a council to act in a purely ad-
visory capacity. 
Agreeable to this observation was the government at Athens; 
the coQ~cil onsisted of 400 persons; and in a legislat ive 
capacity, cotld devise and prepare matters for the consid-
eration of t e people . 1 
Vfuile John Adams h s been considered the greatest name on the side of 
2 
bicameralism, Franklin was undoubtedly the most influential 
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person upholding unicam ralism, a position he held during the Constitution-
al Convention and throu hout his life. His arguments were many and varied. 
In answering the object·on against the single system that the passions, 
jealousies, and ambitio s of men would ~xist unchecked, he asked: 
May not the V' isdom brought to the legislature by each 
member be an effectual a barrier against the i mpulses 
of passion, tc., when the mem~ers are united in one 
body as when they are divided'? · 
Furthermore, he personal experience as did Adams: 
Have we not xperienced in this state (Pennsylvania) -vrhen 
a province der the government of the proprietors, the 
mischiefs of a second branch existing in the proprietary 
family, countenanced and sided by an aristocratic council? 
How many del and what expenses were occasioned in 
carrying on he public business; and what a train of mis-
chiefs, even to thepreventing of the defense of the pro-
vince during several years, when distressed by an Indian 
war, by the · niquitous demand thfit the proprietary property 
should be e empt from taxation. -
¥That is fasci:tatinc about this statement is the fact that at the time 
Pennsylvania had only o e house with the council acting in an advisory 
capacity, but apparentl it stil exercised more authority than Franklin 
would prefer. 
Such in brief were some of the arguments used during the eighteenth 
1. 11 People are the Best Governors~' op. cit11 , p. 659. 
2. Nevins, op . cit, , p. 179. 
3. Franklin's Works, o • cit . , V, 165. 
4. Ibid- ' v' lw.-
.~. .. ~M-------··1_,..._...,. 
century as wen debated 
system of legislature 
the single system. 
Vermont, and Georgia 
with the exception of 
denied the right of o 
eralism by the Constit 
eralists was almost c 
states which had one 
the example of the fe 
eventually a universal 
adoption was delayed in 
- ~·-.-r 
seriousness whether a single or double 
These arguments routed the advocates of 
states with the exception of Pennsylvania, 
bicameral legislatures immediately, although 
York and North Carolina, the upper house was 
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ting money bills. With the adoption of bicam-
Convention in 1787, the defeat of the unicam-
Stubborn battles continued in the three 
e, but the persistence of the conservatives and 
goverrunent were sufficient to bring about 
ion of the bicarneral system, although its 
for t wo generations. 
':-+11--11--------···-~ 
popnlar unrest. 
·washington, for 
about the governmental 
1 
ensue.!' 
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CRAFTER IX 
the Constitutional Convention 
Convention met at th j s time of social turmoil and 
to many that desperate measures had to be taken. 
unles s something fa.r reaching be done 
tuation, "anarchy and confusion will inevitable 
New England to Georgia were be-
coming disturbed over t • situation. To them the weaknes s of the o-overn-
ment of the Articles of was daily becoming more scandalous . 
Not only was tho Congre to prevent boundary and tariff disputes 
among the states, but states themselves were unable to .aintain ord~r 
showed. The cr,y was rd that the government of the Articles be amended, 
democratic features vernment should be frovmed upon and that the 
counter- revolution ing in Pennsylvania should occur simult neousl y on 
a national level. Th · s feeling r esulted ·n the IJ nv&ni:-ion and :;Jroduced 
the Constitution of the Un:tted States that 1 as intended to end all "anarchy 
and confusion. '! 
Durir g this the topic of how many ho se a legislature 
should po sess was lost arnong a host of other questions, but it was present 
nevertheless. 
After an adequate finally shoVTed up, the Convention had been 
called to order and the of procedure had been detemined, the dis-
1 . Quoted by Charles li rren, op. cit . , p. 1.5.5. 
cussion started 
t he governor of 
(knovm as the Virginia 
t re . The Convention, 
ciple 11without debate • . 
quest ion was not placed 
There was some discuss i 
ed his point of 
statement, 11All agree 
of the most effective 
As far 
already been decided . 
discussions . 
· America quite '!!ell 
republican form of 
ature . 3 Everyone 
into two houses, 
Martin 
ature, believed that 
M.ason was 
settled on the 
found in the 
on the state level. 
1. c. Warren, -~....;.__ __ , 
2. Madison's 
3 . Ibid., p . 
4. Ibid., p. 
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the presentation of a series of resolutions by 
, Edmund Randolph. The third of these resolutions 
for two houses in t he national l egisla-
committee of a ~'<hol e , adopted the prin-
This action occurred on May 31, 1787, but the 
the Convention Qntil June 21, 1787. 
in vvhich Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts show-
that of the majority of the delegates) with his 
a check on the Legislature is necessary11 • 2 One 
was to divide it into two houses . 
were concerned, the issue of two houses had 
l earn this view during the course of subse uent 
believed that he knew the mind of the people of 
on t wo points it was well settl ed : one , on a 
state l egislatures · should be divided 
rrL~ority, including such men as Luther 
between state and federal legisl-
4 
house was needed for a confederation. 
when he stated that the mind of America was 
tvro houses; or at l.east the mind of America 
for the issue had,in fact, been already fought out 
re are many indications of the attitude of the 
Notes(Scott Edition, 1893) p . 78. 
p . 
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Convention t oward this 
On the last day of May the manner of electing t he upper house dominat-
ed the discussion. 
his resolution had 
governments, 
answer the 
Nothing could be 
clari f y his position since his 
In ansvrer Randolph replied that he 
the general object was to provide a cure 
under which the United States labor ed; tl~t in 
vils to their origins, every man had f ound it 
and follies of democracy ; t hat some check 
to be sought for, against this tendency of our 
that a good Senate seemed most likely to 
se . l 
this statement . No matter how the 
Senate was to be select , its role of checking the follies of democracy 
was clear t o "everyone" 
On Saturday, June , when t he Convention was debating the extent of 
t he 
Despotisms 
in an Exec 
danger of a 
procl aim it .• 
there can be 
be restrained 
and inde 
check, but t 
of those who 
test them. Personal 
from Scotland, a poor 
on manki nd in different shapes, sometimes 
, sometimes in a military one . Is there no 
gislative despotism? Theory and practice both 
If the Legislative authority be not restrained, 
ther liberty nor stability; and it can only 
by dividing it within itself, into dist inct 
· branches . In a singl e house there is no 
inadequat~ one , of the virtue and good sense 
se it . ~ 
on the subject and there was no one to con-
e had been his instructor. On his arrival 
homeless boy, Wi lson had been a staunch Vnhig. 
.._.l,-~ .... Jillll~l-''~·.-
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As a student of law he provided as much as anybody t.he legal knowledge 
combating parliamentary pretensions to tax the American colonies. As he 
became more and more p 
in his views. 
the Pennsylvania 
divorced himself 
the hard 
against the militia of 
unchecked democracy v a~ 
Wilson became more and more conservative 
more bitterly opposed Georg~ Bryan and 
1776. By 1779 Wilson had completely 
this action reached a climax during 
1779 when he was compelled to defend his home 
radical state regime. Wilson's experience at 
1 first hand . There is little wonder why he 
desired an upper house o restrain the lower. 
principles of the Articles of Confederation should 
not be abandoned completely (for want of authority on the part of the del-
egates to do so) Patterson of New Jersey presented on June 15 an 
alternate While this so-called New Jersey plan 
called for an unicamer 1 Congress, similar to the one under the Articles, 
it is interesting 
when t he Plan was 
. The 
argument on 
the various 
powers, not 
te that this feature is not explicitly mentioned 
2 
presented • 
in defending his proposal, based his 
if the Articlas were radically wrong, then 
return to their States and "obtain larger 
3 
ourselves.!t 
Legislature~ are necessa~. Vfuy1 For the purpose of a 
check. But the reason for the precaution is not appli-
cable to th ' s case . Within a particular state, where 
party heat revails, such a check may be necessary; and 
besides, th Del egatigns of the different States are 
checks on e ch other. 
1. Dictiona XX, 326-328. 
2. Madison 's Notes, o 
3. Ibid., P• ~ 
4. Ibid., W • 169-170. 
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It is important to point out that the three delegat es, Luther Martin, 
·John Sherman, and William Patterson, who thought that a bicameral system 
was unnecessary in the federal Congress, believed that it was required for 
party r easons on the state level. 
On June 18th, Alexander Hamilton rose to say a few words about both 
the Vi r ginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan, being as he said, 11unfriendly' 
to both. Hamilton's views on various subjects are well knmm, so his 
vi ews on the subject of one or t wo houses could be predicted without too 
great difficulty. His .fundamental premise was the belief that t he British 
"' government was the best model to follow. urthermor e, "their House of 
1 
Lords is a most noble institution. 1 That, even if a Senate was elected 
fo r seven years, it woc1ld not ·withstand 11the amazing violence and turb-
2 
ulence of the democratic spirit. ~' Consequently, Hamilton presented his 
own plan calling for two houses; in the lo,.ver house the member s wot.l.ld 
serve for t hree years, and in the upper house the members would be elected 
for good behaviour and would be elected ''by electors chosen for that pur-
3 
pose b;v the people.' Hamilton ' s scheme represented the position of the 
extreme right on this topic. It was too extreme even for a conservative 
Convention, for the Convention always faced the dilemrr1a of how conservative 
could the Constitut i on bo and still be ra.tified. Hamilton 1 s notions 
certa inly wouldn' t be r atified, but the attitude of t he Constitutional 
Convention regarding bi cameralism is clearly delineated. The opinion was 
almost unanimous, in fact what "all m.en 11 thought, that ·two houses were 
necessar.y to control the forces of democracy. 
1. lVJ.adison 1 s Notes, op. cit., p. 182. 
2. Ibid., p . ~ 
3. Ibid. , p . 185. 
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CKI'\.FTER X 
Vermont 
The story of Vermont highlights several interesting aspects of Amer-
ican politics. The controversial origin of the state is well know. Col-
onized during the period of the Revolution by irrnnigra11ts from New York and 
other adjacent states, divlded within it-self by boundary disputes, Vermont 
for a long time had a split political personality. In 1777 it declared it-
self an independent state and continued in this status until it entered 
the United States in 1791, the first state to do so after the original 
thirt,een. 
The first constitution of Vermont (1777) clearly indicated the rad-
ical nature oft he state 1 s inhabitants, The only model the Vermonters 
could follow was the Pennsylvania constitution that had been drawn up 
earlier that same year, consequently; this Vermont constitution copied 
the Pennsylvania model in many ways and is some details went beyonds it in 
its radicalism. Once again there was a Council o_f Censors who had the 
responsibility of meeting every seven years to report Violations of the 
constitution and to recommend amendments to it . The Vermont constitution 
also called for a one-house assembly. In addition, Vermont went further 
than Pennsylvania 1?ith the introduction of universal manhood suffrage and 
this constitution abolished slavery within the state. 
While the constitution called for a one-hous.e legislature, the exec-
utive branch of the government consisted of a governor a11d a counci1.1 
Furthermore, the constitution forbade the legislative and executive 
1. Vermont state Papers, William Slade , editor (Middlebury, 1823) p . 246. 
~ranches from exercising the powers given to the other. This separation 
I 
became more explicit in the Constitution of 1781, the second in Vermont's 
series of constitut.ions.1 
I 
The political coloring of Vermont fluctuated briefly after this rad-
ical beginning before ,falling into the conservative pattern for 1'.rhich the 
I 
I 
state is now so extolled or ridiculed. Prior to 1815 Vermont alternated 
between the Federalist and Jeffersonian parties, neither ~roup possessing 
I 
a decisive advantage. I Then came a brief period of eleven years between 
1815 and 1826, the period of one-party rule in this country, ihen the 
Democratic RepublicanJ dominated even this Green Mountain State. The col-
lapse oft he Federalist Party rather than identity of view produced this 
extraordinary developdent . 
The political evolution of present day Vermont commenced after 1826. 
This undervrent severali stages . Frem 1826 t o 1831 the Adan s wing of the 
Republir::an Party won control of the state. However, this victory as 
so1T'.ewhat nullified by ~he rise of the anti-Masonic Party which succeeded 
in el ecting its candidate for governor, a William A. Palmer, three sue~ 
cessive times . The ami-Masons controlled the state from 1831 to 1835, 
but in 1835 the state beca~e Wbig and after 1854 irreparably Republican. 
There were severali important factors behind these political changes . 
' The misfortune of the Hartford Convention and the attitude oft he Feder-
alist Party in genera1
1 
to the War of 1812, especially after it closed on 
I 
' 
a high tide of patriotism, destroyed the venerable party of Washington 
and John Adams in Vermont as elsewhere and ·left a political vacuum. The 
I 
followers of Madison and Jefferson fell heir to the state and federal 
125. 
1. F.N.Thorpe, Charters, Constitutions, and Organic Laws (Washington, l908t 
VI, 3725 . 
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i 
governments, including t hat of Vermont . But as a one party system i s 
I 
not compatible with our electoral systems, the ranks of the older Re-
publican Party split •Vith Vermont supporting the New Englander, John Quincy 
Adams, instead of Andrew Jackson. Durin8 the 1830's, the role of the 
I 
mti-Masonic Party- which was most conservative in its attitudes- and 
the furor over the bank policies of President Jackson decisively affected 
i 
the political situation with the state and permanently altered its govern-
ment. 
By this time Vermont had its third constitution. There had been the 
Constitution of 1777, ,the Constitution of 1781, and t hen the· Constitution 
I 
of 179.3 which was in effect at this moment. All three of these constitut-
1 
ions cslled for a unica1111eral l8gislature. Furthem.ore, these constitutions 
' . 
had several features that were unpalatable from the start; e. g. , represent-
ation in the House of Representatives vras based on the principle of tovm. 
equality, a principle that became more and more ludicrous as disparities 
in t he sizes of these, co~~unities grew l arger. Also the legislature 
I 
gradually became too large as the number of tovms increased in number. · 
I 
There was another complaint: the executive power had been placed in the 
control of a Council, ~lected at large, because of the earlier distrust 
of governors.1 These :weaknesses supplied excellent excuses for amending 
the constitution, espeyially thatarticle which provided for unicameralism. 
Opposition to a one-house legislature existed in Vermont from the begin-
ning. As early as 1792 the Council of Cen'o~s recommended its discontin-
uation, for possessing a "single and numerous body" tended to 11 encumber 
1 . Daniel B Carroll, The Unicameral Legislature of Vermont (1932) p. 65. 
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discussion and subject such legislatures frequently to hasty and crude 
. . ,1 detemJ.natJ.ons •. 
I 
. ! ' 
Ari example of such tthasty and crude detenninations" 
was an a ct of February, 1779 forbidding any court of justice to handle 
i 2 questions involving land titles. Such a law illustrates clearly the 
radical tendencies of the legislature at t his early date . The only check 
on this branch of t.he !government was a suspensive veto of one year pass-
essed by the governor and council~ All three of these constitutions made 
1 
it mandatory to have the govern~r and council consider all bills "for 
3 
their perusal and proposals of amendment'', and if their consent was not 
f0rthcoming, the House! of Representatives would have t o wait uritil·the 
next legislative session before the bill could be repassed. The question 
of whether it was nece
1
ssary to resubmit a bill for a second time to the 
go•.rernor and council after they had rejected it the previous year caused 
considerable dispute. , 
i 
The conservative_s of the state had already blocked one huge loop-hole. 
The Constitution of 17~7 stipulated that the suspensory veto did not apply 
to laws of a temporary and emergency nature . Such loose phraseology was 
removed by 1786. 
A veto la r-;ting only one year, while applicable to all bills passed 
by the House of.Representatives, was not adequate in the opinion of many. 
i 
They believed that there should be an upper house possessing an absolute 
veto. Besides the well-known fact that in all the other states . the upper 
I 
I houses were endowed ,.vith such powers, one factor worked to the advantage 
of this movement. 
I 
1. Slade , op. cit., III, 547. 
2 . Ibid., VIII, 388. 
3. Thorpe, op. cit., VI, 37hl~, 3757, 3767. 
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In spite of the rather hopeful wish that. the three branches of the 
1 
government wo1J.ld not "exercise the powers properly belonging to the other 11 , 
I 
I 
a desire found in the later constitutions, a great deal of political act-
ivity was accomplished! jointly by the House of Representatives with · the w·v-
ernor and council. For exw.ple, appointments of state officers fro!ll the 
governor on dovm (if there was no majority of the popular vote-) were made 
in a joint session of the House of Representatives and the council. Further-
' I 
More, it was the constitutional prerogative of the governor and council to 
exercise the right of ;L-11itiating legislation as well as to concur. No 
! 
wonder then that the official documents would refer to the 11two houses 11 or 
that the newspapers ofl the state could write a statement like the 
following : "Pursuant to the requirement of the Constitution, both branches 
of the Legislature assembled at the state House. 1.~ 2 
This occurred before there was any fomal separation into two houses . 
I Such a development reveals as much as anything the illusionary nature of 
t he doctrine of the separation of powers. It is possible to make a mental 
I 
distinction between thk legislative, executive, and judicial function, but 
in actual practice the
1 
executive performs too many legislative functions 
I 
and the legislature too many executive powers to warrant calling the two 
separate and distinct. : For all practical pur poses, Vermont had bicameral-
ism from t he beginning, but the power of the lower house to override the 
objections of the uppe~ house after an interval of a year constituted an 
advantage that many thought should be removed. 
Relations between these two houses ·ere not cordial. In 1826 the 
1. Thorpe, op. cit., VI, 3755. 
2. The State Journal ](Mont pelier) October 13, 1835 
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lower house repassed a :bill whi ch had been suspended by the council and 
; 
declared it to be l aw without the f ormality of resubmi tt:i_ng the matter to 
the councH. It had been the practice to return such l egisl ation t o the 
I 
I 
council as a matter of courtesy. This quest i on was brought up at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1828 . The Council of Censors among its recom-
mendation f or change a~d its l ist of unconstitutional acts by the state 
government duril1g the preceding seven years contended that the Ifuuse of 
Representatives had ushrped the authority bel onging to the council . The 
argument was absurd and was not given serious attention by the Convention, l 
but it wa s a straw in the wind. 
Simultaneousl y the pol itical tumUlt of t.he national scene began to 
have its reverberation's within the Green Mounta j n State . On ~iarch 4, 1829 
Andrew· Jackson was inaugurated as Fres:i_dent of the United States . A few 
years earl ier in 1826 a William Morgan had been killed in northern New 
York. Both of these devel opment s prod~ced strong currents in the politic-
al field, the first b~nging about the gradual feel ing of antagonism to-
ward the policies of Jackson, whil e the second started the anti- Masonic 
..... 
hysteria . Ve!'l.nont was ·especial l y aff ected by both of · these moverr.cnts . 
I 
I 
Not onl y wa s Vermont adjacent to the region where the murders had occurred , 
2 
but many of the fugit i ves from New Yor k had f led into Vermont. Agitation I . 
against the Jacksonian Democracy and Masonry v1ere the principal pol itical 
infl uences at the time t hat Vermont f ormall y adopted bicarn.erali sm in 
I 
Janua:ry, 1836. 
Between 1831 and 1835 the governor of Vermont va s Wi l liam Palmer, an 
1. Ca:r:rr.1.1, op. cit !.:t pp. 65- 66. 
2. Charl es · J\!cCarthy, ''The Anti- I"i.asonic Party", illTl.erican Hi storical As soc-
iation Report, 1902, I , 504. 
Anti-Mason. During hi,s tenure in office the national issues involved 
I . 
the tariff, intern~l iillprovements, and the continuation of the Dank of 
the United States. In
1 
his references to these issues, Palmer usuall y 
I . . 
t ook the view of the National hepublicans , advocating protection, intern-
al improve~ents, and expressing the opinion that the great majority of 
I 
I 1 
the Vermonters favored: the contLnuation of the Bank. The National 
Republicans~ at first, did not lmow how to handle this Qnusual third 
party maven ent . Vjhilel the Anti-Masons espoused the views cf the Nati on-
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al Republicans regarding these issues, they opposed the ~~sons, and, alas, 
most of the promj_nent ~rational Republicans were Masons. I t took several 
years to resolve ·.tnis situat·iou. At first the two older parties Qnited 
I 
to overthrow the Anti~TvTasons, f.'onrdng a ccalition ticked in 1833, but it 
. 2 
was unsuccessful in dislodging their opponents from off1ce. This attempt 
was recognized at the iAnti-11Iasonic .State Convention held at Montpelier on 
I 
June 26th and 27th in 1833 as an example of how freemasoP~Y controlled the 
3 
t wo major parties. ~his strange alliance between the Democratic and 
I 
National Republicans was too UPnatural to be other t han ephemeral, for it 
was the product after 
the election of 
of th~ bitterness which the followers of Clay fel t 
1832,U and this bitterness did not last. 
The Anti- Mason domination of Vennont continued until 1835 when the 
I 
party faced a critica:I situation. In the first place, several of the 
leaders of the Anti- Masons wavered in regards to rechartering the Bank, 
5 
especially Thurlow Weed. Govern.or Palmer, v:ho had been e.damant in his 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Walter H. C:!:'ockett, Vermont, The Green Mountain state , (:New York, 1921) 
III, 254 . I 
Ibid.; ··.III, 262. . 
Proceedings of the Anti-I '.asonic State Convention 
McCarthy, o~. cit., p. 511. 
Glyndon G. an Deusen, Thurlow Weed., Wizard of ~he Lobby . (Boston, 1948) 
p. 63. I 
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support of Biddle in his struggle with Jackson, followed Vleed 1 s chaT'ISe of 
• tt1 mind, stating that 11he was opposed to it s renewal at the present tl.l1'e • . 
In addit d.on t he Democrat s of Vermont gave their candidate for governor .the 
I 
biggest vote the party had received fo r the last two decades, although 
they did not win. Pahner received si.'Cteen thousand t wo hundred ten votes, 
Bradley, the Democrat-' thirteen thousand two hundred fifty-four votes , and 
the Whig' candidate, five thousand four hundred thirty-five votes, a poor 
I 
third. Wi t h the Demo1rats piling up tremendous victories el sewhere, it 
appeared as if event ually the Lemocrats would again be controlling the 
. I 
state , something they had not done since 1826. 
I 
Vermont was or should have been a strong National Republican state . 
I . 
For a decl ining agricultural community, the l•merican System of Clay held 
an irresistible appeal . · Consequentl y, this huge Democratic vote presented 
i 
an anomaly that should not be tolerated, and wa s a dan6e r that could be 
removed only by a rapproch.rnent with the Nat ional Republicans b3r the Anti-
Masons . In view of this fact and the political aberration of Palmer, the 
.. 
Anti- Masons discarded ,their governor and the t wo parties j oined hands in 
nominating a good voty- getter named Jennison. 
Fearing t ha.t 1835 might be the l a st opport tmity for special legisl-
a tion in the field of internal iP!provements, the l egislature passed i n that 
I 
year a prodi gious .am0unt of railroad legislation, chartering such enter-
1 
prises as the Vermont Central Railroad, the Benni.11gton and Brattl eboro, 
~ I 2 
the rtut l and Connecticut and ethers . To t his extent the part y prepared 
I 
for the worst. Also, on the eve of the expected loss of control of the 
1 . Records of Gove rnbr and GoUfl.cil, VIII, 270. 
2. Crockett , op. cit., III , pp~-270-1. 
T 
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I-l..ouse of Representatives, a final effort was made t o restrict its influence 
I 
by making the council's suspensive veto over it legislation absolute. 
Accordingly, in ~he Constitutional Convention of January, 1836, the 
question of giving th~ council such a veto became the burniri.g issue. Should 
this po fer _be granted,1 Vermont finally would no longer be the only state 
with a unicameral l eg:ilslat ure. Joel Doolittle, the President of the 
l 
Council of Censors, p~esented the arguments for bicamerali~. The 
arguments were all familiar. The other states and the federal government 
had a division of the legislatures, v"l"hich have !1been found best adapted 
I 
2 
to insure safety and stability in legislation·.; t Doolittle referred to 
the inter-house dispute of 1826, a dispute which had no arbiter to decide 
I . 
it except the parties themselves. 3 In his closing remarks, Doolittle 
revealed his a:n..xiety regarding c,1rrent trends brought about 11by the course 
of migration, the influx of foreigners, the rrultiplicat.ion of corporations :. ~ 
These statements iare matters of opinion, but there 1as one statement 
of fact toward which there can be no objection. Doolittle stated that 
11for thirty years the 1grant of legislative authority to the Executive 
Council v:as never den:i,ed or seriously doubted '~;-· Chapter II, Section II 
of the state const itution read, "The supreme l egislative powe r shall be 
I 
vested in a House of Representatives of the freemen of the Commonwealth 
I 
or Sta te of Vermont~tt6 Although the vote was close-one hundred sixteen to 
7 I 
one hundred t welve- the Convention amended the stat e constitution so as 
I 
1. Journal of the Co~vention of 1836 
~.: Ibid.' p. 23 . 
3. Ibid., pp.27-28. 
4• Ibid., p·. 28. 
5. Ibid., p. 23- 24. 
6 •. F. N. Thorpe, op. cit., VI, 3742. 
7. Boston Dail y Advertiser and Patriot, January 18, 1836. 
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to make room for a full-fledged senc.te . The last rerraini"~ stronghold of 
! 1 
unicameralism had · succumbed to the "Whig Counter-reformation ·.!t 
i. 
The dismay of the propertied classes before the rising tide of Jack-
I 
scnian Democracy was in many ways pitiable . Such men as Chancellor Kent 
of New York and Vlilli<k Sullivan of Iiassachusetts bel·.eved that the exper-
:iJr1ent of self government "approaches to a total failure . !1 One of the 
schemes to prevent a complete debacl e was advanced by Noah Webster. Web-
ster believed that thffre was a distj_nction between the rich and the poor 
in society and that this distinction should be recognized in the form of 
l 
2 government . However,· his plan to divide the electorate into two classes 
I 
was simply C'J.t of the question . . A more subtle approach was required . For 
I 
the sake of public relations, at least, the class conflict doctrines of 
I 
Federalism had to be jettisoned and the identity of class interest emphas-
ized . I This became the theory of mutual dependence of Labor, Capital, and 
~anagement . The issue was to be represented as one of governmental tyran-
ny, not class tyrarmyJ The best way to prevr-:>nt bureaucratic tyranny was 
to apply the principles of ttmixed Govei'T'_"!lent • ,. That such a concept could 
serve two purposes could be disguised by politi.cal propaganda . The demand 
for two houses, equal
1
in power, was advanced in that manner. 
In Vermont the li~igs had one of their few political successes . The 
victo~ for bicameralism in this state showed the same combination of 
factors as simil ar victories for bicameralism revealed elsewhere . J1ist as 
the conservatives of Pennsylvania hack in 1790 fought t o check the dem-
ocratic general assembly by obtaini.ng a Senate to veto its le~islation, the 
I 
l. Arthur J.K. Schlesinger Jr . , The Age of Jackson (Boston, 1946) :pp . 267-282. 
2. Ibid., p. 268 . -
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Whigs of Vermont succeeded in winning an outstanding victory in the face 
I 
of an e.dverse political tide . 
Jacksonian Democ:rlacy in the main had its way, and whil e the trad-
it ion for t wo houses qould not be shaken,' .many of its teeth could be pulled 
to make it more acceptable . Property qualifications for holding seats in 
I 
the state senates Y< ere reiDoved; ths same electorate voted for candidates 
for both houses; and bicameral ism which wa s intended to repre3ent different 
econorr,ic groups develdped into the irrational condition it has at the 
present . The final result became a compromise: bicameralism. retained its 
form but not its function . At a time like the present when pressing 
probl ems demand deft and facil e handling by the legislature, it is a trag-
I 
edy t hat such a cumbersome device stil l remains on the theory that t wo 
I houses are needed to prevent 11hasty and crude determinations . !., 
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ABSTRA CT 
Though Americans have tended t o be untheoretical or undogmatic _n 
t heir politics, t hey ha•re persistently believed that a tvw-ho se legi sl ature 
i s superior to one h~ving a single chamber. Jo~n Adams long ag ex~res sed 
the attitude which has become traditional when he vrrote : "A singl e as sen1bly 
is liable to all t he vices, fol lies, e.nd frail ities of an individual, sub-
ject to fits cf humor, starts of passion, flights of enthusiasm, partialities , 
6r pr e judices, and consequently productive of hasty r esults and abstiTd 
1 
judgements . II 
The purpose of this paper is to pr esent as clearly a s possible t he 
hi storical background for the adoption of t wo houses, a subject so ext enuous 
that few have hazarded it. The procedure to be :foll owed i s t o 'iscus s t he 
various circumstances state by state hich brought about bicamer al · sm 
l eaving out those states whose experiences paral leled each other or w·hose 
records were too scanty to provide an adequate analysis . These common-
wealths incl ude Virginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Ll8r y-
l and, Pennsyl vania, and Vermont pl u::: an account of bicameralism and the 
Const itutional Convention of 1787. 
Of all these stat es Virginia had the most fl i ppant reason for adopting 
bicame ralism. From t he beginning the members of the governor' s council 
and the house of burgesses sat together whil e performing thei r l e gislative 
and judi cial duties . Because of their different interest s and their 
diffe r ent modes of election, jealousy always existed bP.tween them. Lord 
Colpepper exploi t ed t hi s antagonism in 1680 by encouraging the burgesses 
to seek additi onal powers; t hereu on he · nrormed t he King of this rashness 
1. John Adams, vv·orks, Charl es F'I'ancis Adams (eel. . ) 10 v . 1850-.56 . IV, 19.5; 
quoted by Robert Luce, Legislative ssemblies (Boston, 1924) . 
with the result that the two e;roups were separated by royal proclalllation. 
Gol pepper had a lawsuit pending regarding land rights and he did not want 
representatives of the burgesses to participate in its adjudication. 
In colonial Massachusetts where the magistrates had bc:en entrenched 
politically, the whol e drift dovm to 1690 was an attempt to limit t his 
povmr . This movement c.a"lle ma inly from the dept,_ties of the to·:ms and also 
from Sale jealous of the political dominance of Boston, This coalition 
won the negative voice for the deputies in 1636, tbe codifying of the 
Body of I.iberties in 1641, and the adoption of bicameralism in 1644. In 
this political development the :role of bicameralism is clear enough; it 
was sir.tply part o.f a program to curtail the political influence of the 
authorities. 
ii 
The experience of Connecticut differs from that of Massachusetts in 
several ·Hays . I nitially the founders of the Connecticut Rive towns possessed 
rather liberal notions for the day, a fact which can be seen in the method 
freemen were to be detennined and in the limited judicial power of the 
magistrates . For example, the inhabitants of these Connecticut .towns wouJd 
select their own fre r:men as a species of 11bo!lle rule" and from the start 
there was a code of laws and ~unishments. In this respect Connecticut 
shovred a mild political reaction tc the stringencies of Massachusetts Bay, 
but a conservative movement soon set in. 
Both the magistrates and deputies sat in the same chamber but when it 
appeared the deputies would be so numerous as to deluge the· magistrates, 
the latter in self-defense obt ai ned the negative voice in 1645 . This year 
marked the beginning of an increase in the political control by the magis-
trates . The magistrates increased their powers pri nc i pally because of 
their ability to take military measures between sessi ons of G-eneral Court . 
By 1660 the magistrates controlled the colony with little references to 
the deputies. 
iii 
The royal charter granted to Connecticut in 1662 altered this arrange-
ment . This charter called for a C~neral Court with a governor, deputy-
governor, twelve assistants and no more than two deputies from each town . 
They s t as one chamber without an~r apparent disagreement until 1678 at 
which time the governor and assistants became a standing council to handle 
problems arising between sessions of the General Court. Hov ever, when in 
1686 the charter was jeopardized by the colonial pol icies of James II, the 
council began its practice,, ,of submitting reports to the entire General 
Court for approval. This sit1iatio.n had all the features of a parliament 
assembly with a 11 cabinet 11 being both in the General Court and responsible · 
to it . This analogy is not perfect, however, because since 1645 the 
council possessed the negative voice over the deliberations of the General 
Court, a pract ice the Charter of 1662 pe rmitted . 
One result of the Glorious Revolution was to encourage the ascendancy 
of the General Court over the council . The result was that in self-defense 
and at the instigation of the council itself the councillors and the 
deputies separated into two ho uses in 1698.: Unlike the situation in Mass-
achusetts which produced bicameralism, the impetus f or di vision in Conn-
ecticut r.ame from the magistrates and not from the deputies . 
Rhode Island and Providence plantations had a quaint and not widely 
known experience in the field of legislative practice. Rhode Island similar 
t o the' other :New England colonies consisted of a small group of tovms. 
These tmms numbered four originali.y, Providence, Portsmouth, Newport, and 
V/arwick, two located on the mainl and a.nd t·wo located on an island knm~m as 
iv 
Aquidneck. 'I'hjs e-eop.:ra.phi cal division and the individual i sm of t he founders 
of these to~'l!l.S I!laae t he establ ishJnent of a unified colonial government . 
extremely difficult . The first gover11.ment was really a confederation. The 
charter provided f or a General Court with eputies f r om the f our t owns, but 
this assembl y did not have ei ther the power of init · ating l egislation or, 
in . fact, passing legi slati on. Legislative proposals rere ~B . thro on· town 
meetings t o be subrr..itted t o the Gener'l r;ourt for disct:ssi on . If a ma j or-
ity 0f the Ge~ e al Court foun ' it cceptabl e it v onl d become a t emporary 
law f or the entire colony until t he other t owns had the opportunity in toYFD 
meetings to approve nr di sapprove . Each tovm i n effect had the right of 
nullifi ation . This was the unsatisfactory situation until 1663 when 
colonial agents obtained a nevv charter from the English government ten:nin-
at ing this extraordinary legislature and replacing it with a General Court 
similar to that of the other New Engl and colonies . Prior to 1663 when the 
Rhode Isl and assembl y had little power t here was no demand for two houses . 
However, no sooner was the new charter put into ope ration when s1 ch a 
demand was made almost :immediatel y , comi ng i n October, 1664. It came from 
the deputies and reflected the strong mun:i.dpal jeal ousies. that had 
characterized Rhode Isl and's earli er history. Qnly four years were necessary 
f or carrying out this demand . In 1666 because of a private grievance the 
de ut i es of the tovms of -~ arvlick and Portsmo)lth proposed t hat the deputies 
sit apart from the assistants . In 1668 this separation took place and 
this arrangement continued through the nev constit tion of 1842 . 
Maryland demonstrated cl ear l y the power politics al ways behind t he 
dewand for t wo. houses . Thi s issue was settled qui te earl y in her history 
between 1640 and 1660. ·The interest of t ,e proprietor and his supporters 
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was so cl early at va riance 1'.\ith t heir op _  onents that the vehement demand 
f or counter-balancing repr esentation was not long del ayed . According t o 
the lv'taryl and charter, the propri etor had the authority to make laws vdth 
the ''advice, assent, and approbation" of the freemen of t his colony who 
could be called together "in a form which shall seem best t o b:l .. Jn or tham 11 • 
The I\~.a ryland assemblies were summoned by writ s . The a ssembl ies which met 
in 1635, 1637 and l ater were based on two types of writs, thus making 
di stincti on among the personnel of the assembl y. The governor and a few 
of the leading citizens were stunmoned by personal wr i ts, while the remainino 
freemen had to be satisfied by a general writ summoning them coll ectivel y . 
Findi ng such a general assembly out of the question the freemen fell ·back 
on the custom of sending prox ies or deputies . · 
The request that these two groups should be seated in diff er ent cham-
bers came from the most persistent opponent of the Baltimores , Will iam 
Claiborne f r om the Island of Kent. Actually at the time Claiborne was in 
England so the proposal was made by one of his supporters named Robert 
Vaughan i n July, 1642. This s estion was compromised by establishi ng 
committees of both groups having the power of initiat ing l egislation, a 
power which t he deput ies now exercised t hroue;h their co!!lrr. ittee f or the 
fi r st time . Then occurred the most amusing illustr ation of the true .mean-
ing of bicameralj_sm. In 1650 after the proprietor lost pol itical control, 
hi s opponents i ntroduced bicameralism i n l ine with Va'.lghan 's earlier re-
que st . However, in 1652 when a Parl iamentary Commission of which Claiborne 
Tas a mer11ber had taken over control of the colony, it immediately abolished 
one of them, f i ndi ng two houses no longer necessary. 
In 1657 the proprietor was rei nstated and his opponents withi n the 
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colony foa_n.d themselves in the same pos: tion they ·rere in 1642. ()nee agaj.n 
they demanded that two hoP ses be r A:.rE"tituted and, much against the propriet-
or's wishes, tv o houses were again used. After 16.57 the colon:l. 1 E'Upporters 
of th Palt.imores rapidly became the minority faction and the Balt/m re.s 
found that the most effective political check was t heir co:1tr 1 of the 
upper house which their oppone~ts so insistently forced upon them. No won-
der then the Baltimores became zealous supporters of bicameralism. 
The stormy political story of Pennsyl vania car>.not be adequately des-
cribed in a few words, but the question of the form of legislature was a 
factor in this melee. According to the I'enn Charter of 1701 there was a.n 
assembly with a governor's council having- merel y advisory powers. Yet with 
the untoward and earl y decline of Per>.n 1 s political influence within his 
colony, this unicameral. assembly became the governing body of the colony . 
This situation was satisfactory to the conservative Quaker elements of 
Pennsylvania who could dominate the l egislature through high property 
qualifications fer the voting franchise. The gradual breakdoym in the 
property qualifications accelerated by the revolutiona!Jr movement against 
Great Britain threatened their political control as early as 1757 . The 
Revolution with its del!loc;rat ic undercurrent had a most declsive impact on 
the government . of the colony. After the assembly based upo:1 the Charter cf 
1701 lapsed because of a lack of a quorum in 1776, the radical leader s, 
mostl y of Scot·ch-Irish ancestry, summoned a state constitutional convention 
to devise a new state government. One of the goals of the radicals wa s 
the continuation of t he one-house l egislature so traditional in Pennsyl vania. 
In .the face of the freer voting franchise t~e conservative elements who had 
been such staunch supporters of their unique assembly nmv advocated t wo 
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houses . While the radicals succeeded in having one house adopted in the 
Constitution of 1776, their conservative rivals utterly refused to co-
operate. This feeling of rer.Jugnance to the new government was accentuated 
by many of its poli~ies, particularly its destruction of the state charter-
ed Bank of North .America in 178.5. The professional and moneyed classes 
boycotted the new reg:iJne, making it almost impossible for it to fun.ction . 
There was a .terrific din of propaganda demanding a new state consti.tution 
and t he destruction of such agencies a.s the Council of Censors and the 
unicameral l egislature. Finally in 1790 after fourteen years of agitation 
a new constitutional convention was summoned r esulting in the Constitution 
of 1790. This ended the one-house legislature which Pennsylvania had ever 
since 1701. One of the principal arguments heard at this convention was 
that since the federal Constitution and practically all the states possess-
. ed two houses, there was no reason Yfhy Pennsylvania should not do likewise . 
By 1790 the qonservat i ve thought of the country was overv1heLmingl y opposed 
t o the use of one house . 
wnen the federal convention met at Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, 
the minds of the delegates were quite firmly set regarding the format of 
the legislature . The experience l ea!'Iled on a state level during the. 
Revolution and particularly in Pennsylvania. and the lesson learned from 
having a weak Unicameral Congress during the Confederation determined this 
state of mind . The fact that the fonn of the Congress was not gemane to 
its functional weaknesses was not stressed. There is no wonder, then, 
that t he delegates took it for granted that two houses were necessary and 
it was adopted without debate even before the Connecticut Compromise put 
the two houses to effective use . One should remember which came first, 
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hov:ever, for this Compromise did not produce the two- house system. 
The l ast stronghold of unicameralism was Vermont whose constitution 
of 1777 was patterned after the Pennsylvania constitution of 1776. The 
unicameral nature of the Vermont assembly was never universally popular 
. 
. throughout the state especi~lly after Pennsylvania had discontinued the 
practice, and the Cou..ncil of Censors had recoiNnerided on several occasions 
its discontinuance.. It was not until the shift in policy of the anti-
Masonic party which controlled Vermont in 183.5 and the grovrth in strength 
of the Jacksonian Democrats that enough power was generated to amend the 
constitution in Januar,y, 1836. With the removal of the Council of Censors 
and the adoption of bicameralism, Vermont fell in line with the other 
states . 
The expe~ience of these colonial and state governments regarding the 
use of bicameralism disclosed the fact that the immediate explanation for 
its .existence was either to seize political control or to restrict control 
by another faction. As far as the question that two houses are necessary 
to prevent hasty legisl2.tion, we find that it became me r ely a rationaliza-
tion of the status quo • • The two principal circumstances producing bicameral-
ism were: first, the representatives cf the underprivileged or the masses 
v1snted to have t:!:le same final say as the more privileged groups; an:i second, 
whep the more privileged groups fearing a loss of political control desired 
to have a veto on the growing political strength of their opponents . Both 
groups , then, were rerfectly willing to have two houses if' it served their 
purpose . 
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